DESARROLLO DE ALGORITMOS PARA APLICACIÓN ERGONÓMICA

Marx, like most bourgeois economists of his time, saw capitalism as an organic and purposeful economic system whose processes are law-like and mutually co-dependent. However, each regarded such laws and purposes very differently. Most saw the private accumulation of capital as an endless process that, in the aggregate, promoted the collective growth of riches and, more generally, the unlimited progress of the human race. In contrast, while admitting that capitalism promoted capital accumulation, Marx rendered the road to progress to be fraught with crises and contradictions. Most crises could be encompassed by capitalism as opportunities or incentives to reorganize itself by revolutionizing the forces of production with the aid of science, technology34_and suitable policy. This entails that (i) new approaches to business and management must be constantly devised through a scientific study of the economy; and that (ii) an ongoing pressure exists to engineer and diffuse cost-effective and scalable innovations across the economy. In this way, for example, business downcycles (Mandel 1995) can be integrated into the normal functioning of the economy. However, this scientific approach to the

34

In Schumpeter s well-known contention, capitalism is a system characterized by ongoing processes of

creative destruction . However, Schumpeter focuses on the role of techno-business entrepreneurs in socio-economic restructuring, but disregards the importance of social conflict or political realignments as the plausible origins of these transformations. For a similar view, see (Korotayev et al. 2011).

39 economy has unexpected outcomes. On the one hand, since overcoming crises is found to be a useful way to restore high capital accumulation rates, creating crises becomes rational. On the other hand, the system seems unable to handle certain crises. These are

internal contradictions of capitalism, which in the long run would signal its demise. This is not the place to engage in a detailed discussion about Marx s views on the unsolvable contradictions of capitalism. What follows, instead, is an interpretation of Beniger s influential analysis of the control crises of industrial capitalism (1986). In principle, control crises are one among the many kinds of crises of capitalism. In Beniger s argument, they are of the solvable kind.

Beniger focuses on strategies and techniques used to control processes within each economic sphere, as well as to efficiently communicate and coordinate different spheres. Note that, for Marx, these activities were part of the sphere of circulation: though they were essential for economic integration, they did not create value and, in fact, they were responsible for indirectly raising production costs. Yet, Beniger wants to account for the growing economic importance of information in the late 20th _{century, which leads him to} somewhat dismiss the centrality of production in Marx s analyses of industrialism, in favor of an informational approach more suited to the informational economy. This approach owes much to Weber s institutional approach to society and the economy.35

On the other hand, Beniger, like Marx, directly approaches the capitalist economy as an integrated system of semi-autonomous, networked spheres (extraction, production, transport, services and consumption) seamlessly adjusting their throughputs to one

35

Although Weber had rejected Marx s materialistic account of the origins of capitalism, he also came to see Western societies as an integrated system with an emergent purpose. This system was not capitalism, however, but Modernity; and its embedded purpose was not the accumulation of capital, but the growing complication of organizational power in private and public sectors alike. Weber identifies three ongoing related trends in modern societies. One was secularization, by which authority was untying from local tradition and relations of family, prestige or charisma to become an objective, scalable and improvable system for decision making and management. If an industry conceived a solution for a local problem, for instance, this solution would be scientifically assessed and quickly generalized to be applicable by any agent, public or private, to similar management problems observed in a distant place. A second trend was that of bureaucratization. Bureaucracy is an increasingly rational institution of governance through control and information processing. Though Ancient Empires were bureaucratic too, bureaucracy is now deeply entrenched in the organization of corporations and governments, having become an inextricable

iron cage with five typical features: hierarchy of authority; centralization of decision-making; formalization of rules; standardization of action into tasks; and specialization of tasks (van Dijk 2006, 108). The third trend was rationalization, by which growing numbers of societal agents come to see their activities as problems to be solved, and are ready to assume and implement methods for the pursuit of efficiency and the selection of the best solution available in every case. Rationalization involves a positive hegemony of practical reasoning aimed at more efficient results in exchange for less effort, less waste of time, less attention and so forth, and a correlative disregard for any other factors; remarkably, traditional values. Thus, Weberian rationalization takes a slightly broader meaning than Marx s (Giddens 1990).

ICTs and the industrial order

40 another within a global functioning that promotes capital accumulation and the formal and geographic expansion of production and the markets. Thus, to some extent, Beniger integrates Marx s and Weber s views on society and the economy. This is apparent in his tenet that the origins of the Information Society can be traced to a Control Revolution taking place by 1890s, as a response to a series of control crises triggered around 1850 by the expansion of the industrial system in the U.S. In this manner, the typically expansive tendencies of the capitalist economy can be seen to trigger the expansion of control functions in society. Finally, another coincidence between Marx and Beniger lies in their similar conceptions of capitalist crises: although capitalist dynamics give rise to periodic crises that may temporarily stop capital accumulation, most of them are solvable and actually constitute incentives for more expansion and growth.

The concept of bottleneck helps capturing this dynamics most clearly. Bottlenecks are situations in which a key factor of a process is not available, or does not occur, in the quantity or quality required for this process to take place reliably and at a critical speed. Bottlenecks arise in semi-autonomous, networked processes that exchange certain volumes of materials. For those processes to work coherently, they must adjust to one another and run reliably at a certain speed. Often, however, there is a weak link which has difficulties to adjust to the speeds and throughputs required by other processes in the chain. The throughput of this process may be too high or too low, its speed too fast or too slow. As a result, disruptive events or dynamics in one sphere can quickly have profound repercussions throughout the system. Many of these events, Beniger argues, are due to deficient communication between processes: that is, information bottlenecks.

Consider a factory plant that produces more than it can sell. Such plant is not profitable, and its manager should clearly downscale production. Yet, the existence of such over-dimensioned production process poses incentives for revolutionizing the rest of processes with which this one is interlinked. This led Marx to assume that the state- of-the-art technology is more or less the same across sectors, so that bottlenecks quickly lead to innovations in the underdeveloped processes of the chain. What Beniger (1986) offers is a detailed picture of the difficulties involved in such adjustments. In particular, he shows how the development and expansion of the industrial system in U.S., taking place about 1830-40, triggered a chain reaction of innovations that created information bottlenecks. These, in turn, prompted a Control Revolution in the late XIX century.

41 This crisis starts in 1830-40. The steam-powered integrated factory, together with cheap anthracite and increases in productivity through the slow but steady diffusion of the American system of interchangeable parts, converged to yield huge outputs in iron, cotton and other agricultural commodities (ibid, 215). Despite commercial relations with many countries had been reopened after U.S. independence, industrialists needed new markets to allocate this production excess, and were led to geographically expand to the West (ibid, 208 ss.). As they did not find fast and reliable means of transportation, they had to develop railway networks through joint initiatives with the government. Since the 40s, railway networks came to develop through ever longer distances and in ever denser patterns. Yet, this created coordination problems in transportation, which can be seen as information bottlenecks: accidents and lags were frequent and arriving times uncertain. This was solved by integrating a standardized signalization system by telegraph to the railway network, in a frantic process which lasted merely eight years and that later would we applied in the control of other infrastructures –like water and energy systems (ibid, 221)36_{. In turn, this raised control needs in distribution, which, in} the 1850s, brought the rapid emergence of new commercial figures (ibid, 254 ss.).

Still, the crisis scaled-up in the 50s, a period of strong growth where the American system was applied to producing industrial machines, including specialized machine- tools; most decisively, too, the application of the Bessemer method helped to massively boost the outputs of steel. This created a strong coupling in the growth of the industries of steel, railway and other civil engineering, and telegraph, which led to two new information bottlenecks. First, a crisis of coordination arose in the production of basic materials such as iron, copper, zinc and glass (ibid, 220) to promote two decades of intense innovation in management and control of production. Second, a distribution crisis in supply chains occurred due to problems in handling growing inventories; this had to be tackled in the 60s by creating department stores, managed by large retailers and wholesalers. Soon, however, new crises arose in petroleum industries, which, around 1870, had begun to apply continuous-processing technology to mass production.

36

The common aspects between telecommunication networks and other infrastructures are at once physical, organizational and regulatory. While early telegraph systems followed the layout of transport or energy infrastructures, this continues to be the case today with cable networks, which tend to follow roads (Graham & Marvin 279ss.). Nowadays, too, deals and partnerships remain frequent between the providers and operators of different infrastructures –transport, water or energy, which constitutes a pressure for the increased concentration of capital and centralization of management in these sectors (2.5), and thus for the reproduction of oligopolies.

ICTs and the industrial order

42 The resulting rotation speed of goods and capital was so high that a crisis in the control of demand arose, prompting innovations in marketing and bureaucracy since the late 1880s. Since then, many other innovations in information processing and control followed, often with the aim to secure broadened and more reliable markets in the face of growing competition. These took place in areas as disparate as government census, traffic control (traffic lights, inventories) or control of consumption (public relations, supermarkets, surveys, catalogues, mass advertising). Together, they amounted to a Control Revolution that announced the mass media and mass society of the 20th _century. In fact, this revolution involved the use of precedents of modern computers, such as typewriters and punch-card tabulating machines (1889), the latter of which would be later used in the telex service. It is these and similar reasons that move Beniger to claim that the origins of the Information Society can be traced to this period.

To conclude, it is important to note that another way to read Beniger s argument is by highlighting its link with an effect that modern economists know as rebound effects or Jevons paradox (Hilty et al. 2006). A rebound effect happens when increases in the operational efficiency of a process indirectly lead to an expansion of the demand relative to the goods and services whose production or operation was made more efficient. Consider, for example, a highway. Improvements in the efficiency of road use expand the capacity of that highway; then, if prices are set by the market, the increased capacity of the highway translates into a reduction of prices, which acts as an incentive for the expansion of the demand and, consequently, as yet another incentive for expanding the supply through investments in the requisite efficiency improvements. This virtuous cycle perfectly captures the dynamics of propagation of bottlenecks that was frequent during the expansion of industrialism. Rebound effects typically arise in relation to vital goods and services, such as energy use, or those primed by better socio-economic opportunities, like transport (Plepys 2002; Hilty et al. 2006). However, as Beniger s argument makes clear, they can be consciously brought about in any sector, provided that a scientific economic assessment is applied to the effective control of the demand. Indeed, that is the reason why the Jevons paradox has often been acknowledged by industrialists as a true fuel for the ongoing expansion and dynamism of the economy.

43