Desarrollo de la Metodología Diagnóstico Inicial

Having argued that institutional factors alone are insufficient to explain similarity and variation in union responses to subcontracted workers, it is the case that the institutionalist approach provides a useful framework to explain differences in union behaviour between countries faced with similar challenges. The institutionalist approach focuses on the mediating role of institutions, but it should not be ignored that union behaviour may influence the institutions. An example is the transformation of collective bargaining structure towards centralisation in Korea in particular in the metal, banking, and health sectors where the initiatives of unions made it possible, although the new bargaining structure has been relatively

42 disorganised at sectoral level (Lee, 2011c: 779-784). Hence, institutional factors per

se are not sufficient to examine the deeper dynamics of union responses, although

they are useful in explaining between country variation (Frege and Kelly, 2003: 12). As such, this study also pays attention to non-institutional factors.

In this group of studies, a notable example is the actors’ strategic choices approach (Kochan et al., 1984; 1986) whose key premise is that ‘choice and discretion on the

part of labor, management, and government affect the course and structure of industrial relations systems’ (Kochan et al., 1986: 14). Kochan and colleagues (1986) introduced the concept of ‘strategic choice’ to the industrial relations literature in the mid-1980s. Although Kochan and colleagues are not uninterested in environmental pressures as one of sources of changes in industrial relations systems, they insist that these pressures are not strict determinants of industrial relations outcomes. These researchers emphasise the importance of particular configurations of power relations among the actors involved. In a similar vein, Romo argues that institutional change is caused by the ways in which actors interact and ‘new institutional equilibria reflect changes in their balance of power, strategies and forms of interaction’ (2005: 8).

Kochan et al. (1986) argue that central to analysing changes in industrial relations

systems is an understanding of which choices actors involved make within two major constraints of the structures and history. But their argument focuses more on the management side, as confirmed by the expression ‘one of the strongest factors impinging on choice is management values toward unions’ (Kochan et al., 1986: 14).

43 to actors’ strategic choices in that differences in actor policies or industrial relations in studies of similar national cases reflect different patterns of actors’ strategic choices (Kelly, 2011: 68). In other words, actors’ policies and strategies are not just conditioned by external forces but there are some choices for actors themselves (Kelly, 2011: 69).

Regarding the issue of how actors generate their interests, Blazejewski (2009: 244) points to the importance of the integrated approach between actors’ interests and situations. That study pays attention to the fact that whilst collective institutions are expected to be relatively stable, actors’ interpretation of their institutional opportunities and constraints vary, depending on their positions – such as shop stewards, workers and works council members. Blazejewski then argues that differences in the ways actors make use of institutions can be explained with an analysis of micro-level differences in institutional meanings and practices (ibid.).

It may be that institutional factors are insufficient to examine the deeper dynamics of union strategic choices. For this reason, this study also considers union interests as one of the main factors in that underlying interests play an important role in shaping institutional structures and outcomes (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011: 7). Interest-based theorists pay attention to material interests shaping policy preferences, as policy interests might differ between skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers or between workers in trade-affected industries and those in the public sector (Rogowski, 1989; Swenson, 1991). Wailes and colleagues summarise the feature of comparison based on interest-based approach as follows:

44 Interest-based comparisons, therefore, proceed by disaggregating societal interests and identifying similarities and differences in the coalitions of interest that underpin policy patterns across countries. (Wailes et al., 2003: 622)

This approach, however, has not been well developed in the main body of comparative industrial relations literature compared to the areas of national trade policy, economic policy, public-sector restructuring or changes in welfare provision across countries (Wailes et al., 2003: 622). The reason may be the distinct feature of

this approach where institutions and policies in industrial relations are regarded as what have resulted from compromises through political contestation between interest groups in a society (Gourevitch, 1986; Korpi, 1978). But there have been useful attempts to apply the interest-based approach to the study of industrial relations. A notable example is the work of Pontusson and Swenson (1996) on the decentralisation of Swedish collective bargaining during the 1980s. They argue that this phenomenon was in part caused by changes in preferences of the employers and workers between sectors in the context of the international economy, which might have undermined the fundamental principle behind the long lasting centralised bargaining system, the cross-class coalition of interests since the 1950s. Drawing on empirical evidence, they argue that a number of non-institutional factors may play roles in shaping the interests of actors in industrial relations (Pontusson and Swenson 1996: 247).

The interest-based approach is useful to ‘explain the non-institutional sources of policy preferences and the role that international economic changes may play in shaping these preferences – a major weakness in the new institutionalism’ (Wailes et

45 criticised by its tendency to pay relatively little attention to the impact that ideology and ideas may have on policy outcomes (Schonhardt-Bailey 1998: 302) and its tendency to ignore the link between preference change and policy outcomes and the role of institutions (Garrett and Lange, 1996: 49).