Desarrollo de la Planeación

A majority of Merkur’s texts emphasize the economic and security implications of 1989 in relation to the EU and concurrent international organizations such as NATO. For example, Peter Bender writes that a possibly enlarged European

Union would change the political status quo: “[a]us einer westeuropäischen Gemeinschaft würde eine europäische Gemeinschaft, die nicht mehr identisch wäre mit der Nato”.71 Another text by an American writer, Daniel Bell, stresses the economic aspects, which he refers to as the “Einschluß Osteuropas in einen europäischen Handelsblock”.72

Democracy occupies a large part of the discussion about Eastern Europe, but is treated in a very different manner than in Esprit or NLR. Specifically, I would like to indicate three aspects relevant toMerkur’sdiscourse on democracy. Firstly, democratization is discussed in its global implications, rather than as a merely European phenomenon. Secondly, the connection between democracy and economic free-market reforms is considered elementary to the advent of democracy. And thirdly, there is a conviction that democracy can only ever thrive in a nation state rather than through the workings of civil society or social movements, as emphasised in Esprit and

NLR.

Merkur largely concurs with and follows the then-influential “third wave theory” of democratization (as coined by Samuel Huntington) in order to explain the Eastern European transition processes, according to which these democratization processes are to be understood as part of a larger worldwide phenomenon of democratization waves.

As inNLR, Merkur eschews a distinctly European framework in favour of a discourse which sees the emergence of democracy as the result of global, political and economic processes. There is only one instance where Dahrendorf refers to the events of 1989 as “das Jahr der europäischen Freiheit”,73 but the overall framework is not that of a distinctly European achievement as inEsprit.

Merkur frequently makes the point that democracy can only flourish in a free-market economy. For example, one of the articles by Lord Dahrendorf interprets the revolutions of 1989 as a quest for democracy and market economy, which is then directly equated with freedom: “Es geht um Demokratie

71

Peter Bender, ‘Über der Nation steht Europa: Die Lösung der deutschen Frage’,Merkur, 495 (1990), 366-376 (p. 374).

72

Daniel Bell, ‘Einige Ausblicke ins 21. Jahrhundert’,Merkur, 500 (1990), 965-972 (p. 968). 73

und Marktwirtschaft, also um Freiheit.”74 The quest for democracy and market economy is the main driving force for the revolutions in 1989, Dahrendorf claims: "[e]s geht schlicht um die Alternative: Bürokratie und Planwirtschaft oder Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft” (‘Deutsche Kopfschmerzen’, p. 1022). For

Merkur, political freedom and democracy can only flourish where economic

deregulation and free trade have gone before. This correlation is voiced in no uncertain terms. Indeed, the question of democracy in Eastern Europe and the chances for its success are thus directly linked to economic performance. Democracy is the main “currency” of the international system to which Eastern Europe will have to subscribe, in the same way, as it will have to absorb a free- market system as the entry ticket into an international system.

Another article even goes so far as to allege that stable and reliable Western Europe, specifically Germany, is in a position to install democracy in those countries by grace of its economic might and “organisational” capabilities: “Der europäische Osten ist auf niemanden mehr angewiesen als auf die Deutschen, auf ihre Wirtschafts- und ihre Organisationskraft. Deswegen hängen auch die Chancen der Demokratie dort von ihnen weit mehr ab als von allen anderen Westeuropäern und den Amerikanern.”75

The discussion of democracy in Eastern Europe is interpreted as the emancipation of those states into newly sovereign, functioning nation states.

Merkur, as was mentioned in the introductory section, places great emphasis on the relevance of the “nation”. Accordingly, when it discusses the advent of democracy in the Eastern European countries, it relates this to the formation of sovereign, democratic nation states. The German sociologist Ulrich Oevermann emphasizes here the “notwendige Verklammerung von politischem Nationalstaat und demokratischer Herrschaft”76 in Eastern Europe. Similarly, Dahrendorf points out that 1989 has also signified the return of the sovereign nation state. In his aforementioned text ‘Die Sache mit der Nation’, he discusses 74

Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Deutsche Kopfschmerzen-Angst vor dem Wandel’, Merkur, 489 (1989), 1019-1023 (p. 1022).

75

Claus Koch, ‘Zwischen östlichem Staatsbedürfnis und westlicher Marktgesellschaft: Experimentierfeld Deutschland’,Merkur, 503 (1991), 97-111 (p. 110).

76

Ulrich Oevermann, ‘Zwei Staaten oder Einheit? Der dritte Weg als Fortsetzung des deutschen Sonderweges’,Merkur, 492 (1990), 91-107 (p. 91).

the return of the nation state in Europe in relation to Germany and Eastern Europe. His analysis interprets the events of 1989 as, amongst other things, a resurgence of the nation state, the sole form of governance in which democracy and freedom can flourish. For the revolutions to succeed, it was necessary

daß Länder, eben Nationalstaaten, sich als solche wiederfanden und aufhörten, bloße Versatzstücke eines in sozialistischer Fertigbauweise hergestellten Blocks zu sein. Für Polen und Tschechen und Ungarn und Rumänen und manche andere hieß im Jahre 1989 die Freiheit zugleich die Wiederkehr des souveränen Nationalstaats […] (p. 824).

Merkursees the role of the state in delivering and ensuring democracy as much more important than that of the civil society groups discussed extensively in

Esprit and NLR. While Merkur welcomes the concept of a politicised

“bürgerliche Zivilgesellschaft”, it is generally sceptical about its relevance in promoting democracy. This is most apparent in the fact that none of its writers are actually prominent dissidents, or members of civil society groups. Granted, Ralf Dahrendorf sketches out the position of Eastern European intellectuals in his column ‘Europäisches Tagebuch III’,77 but their role is largely discussed as an afterthought in most articles.78

Consequently, the possibility for exchange between East and West, which is so crucial to the declarations of a “renewal” as sketched out in Esprit, are completely absent here. Claus Koch, for example alleges that “die Aufbruchsbewegungen im Osten haben keine neuen Ideen in den Westen bringen können” (‘Zwischen östlichem Staatsbedürfnis’, p. 100). In short, the social movements are simply not made out to be the agents of a European renewal, a reinvigoration of political life in Europe, or as vital to establishing a social Europe. In fact, Koch’s text also takes issue with the way in which the revolutions have been appropriated by the West as representative of a romanticized democratic idea. He writes:

[d]ie gewaltlosen Volkserhebungen, welche die Implosion des Kommunismus in Osteuropa vollendeten, waren keine Revolutionen. Sie 77

Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Europäisches Tagebuch II’,Merkur, 521 (1992), 737-741. 78

One such exception is an article by Axel Honneth, ‘Soziologie. Eine Kolumne. Konzeptionen der civil society’, Merkur, 514 (1992), 61-66. This article offers an attempt to define and historically locate the role and relevance of civil society in political philosophy, but is critical about what it sees as largely unclear and romanticized notions of civil society.

als Revolutionen hochzuloben, liegt heute vor allem dem liberalen Konservatismus im Westen am Herzen. Er will damit den Umsturz in Osteuropa für sich vereinnahmen, als eine Option für die westliche repräsentative Demokratie – und nebenbei für ihre politische Klasse (p. 109).

Since Merkur’s discussion is built on the foregone conclusion that Eastern Europe will have to adapt to the “Western” political and economic system, this in turn leaves little room for discussing the potential that Eastern European civil society groups could bring to a specific European framework. Consequently, the sense of introspection and self-criticism as well as the calls for a “redemocratizating” of the European space, are absent fromMerkur’spages. This section has demonstrated the different interpretative frameworks which are used by the journals in their discussions of democracy in Eastern Europe. These differences are, to an extent, attributable to political left/right differences and therefore unsurprising; however, I would suggest that they are also indicative of larger disagreements about the merit and value of democracy as a common European framework. Whereas Esprit promotes democracy as a specifically European set of values and achievements and as the new “raison d’être” for Europe, the understanding in NLR and Merkur is markedly different. Whereas NLR rejects the form of liberal democracy that is being promoted in those countries, Merkur aligns itself with a specific discourse of the political Right, which emphasizes the role of the economy and nation state to functioning democracies in Eastern Europe. Democracy is not posited as an ideal in its own right and certainly not a European achievement.