appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Although Valenzuela HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/191002.htm" \l "_ftn67" \o "" came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall – an imperative, operating to
impose a duty that may be enforced HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/191002.htm" \l "_ftn71" \o "" – should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.”
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained.
We reverse Valenzuela.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no
doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
NOTE:
While nine (9) justices voted to allow the President to appoint the Chief Justice during the prohibited period, only five (5) justices voted to reverse IN RE VALENZUELA & IN RE:
JUDGE VALLARTA. As such, the President is not allowed to make any other appointments in the judiciary during said period, except the Chief Justice. IS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE MADE AS AN EXCEPTION IN SECTION 15, ART. VII?
Whether the COMELEC EN BANC may directly review the Decision of RTC in connection with the election of a Municipal Mayor with a division of the COMELEC first deciding the same.
SANDRA ERIGUEL VS. COMELEC and MA. THERESA DUMPIT-MICHELENA, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010
ISSUES:
May a division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) elevate an appeal to the Commission en banc without first resolving it for lack of quorum because other members inhibited themselves? And in connection with the said appeal, may the COMELEC en banc legally proceed with a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining that the same have been kept inviolate?
FACTS:
Petitioner Sandra Eriguel (Eriguel) and private respondent Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena (Dumpit) were mayoralty candidates in Agoo, La Union during the May 14, 2007 elections.
On May 18, 2007, after the canvassing and counting of votes, Eriguel was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Agoo. Eriguel received 11,803 votes against Dumpit’s 7,899 votes, translating to a margin of 3,904 votes.
On May 28, 2007, Dumpit filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union contesting the appreciation and counting of ballots in 152 precincts in Agoo. Dumpit alleged that some of the ballots cast in favor of Eriguel were erroneously counted and appreciated in the latter’s favor despite containing markings and identical symbols. Dumpit also alleged that while a number of ballots containing Eriguel’s name were written by only one (1) person, the same were still counted in the latter’s favor. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o ""
Preliminary conference was then conducted on June 15, 2007. Revision of ballots followed shortly thereafter and was completed on July 18, 2007. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" The results of the revision showed that Eriguel had 11,678 votes against Dumpit’s 7,839 votes, or a lead of 3,839
votes.
On Dumpit’s motion, the RTC conducted a technical examination of the ballots. Senior Document Examiner Antonio Magbojos of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Questioned Documents Division conducted the technical examination for Dumpit, while Chief Inspector Jose Wacangan of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No.1 of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
conducted the examination for Eriguel. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Eight (8) other witnesses for Dumpit also testified during the trial. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" On December 7, 2007, the trial court issued a decision upholding Eriguel’s proclamation. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o ""
Unsatisfied with the findings, Dumpit appealed to the COMELEC. The case was docketed as EAC No. A-01-2008, and was initially assigned to the Special Second Division composed of Presiding Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento and Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer. Commissioner Ferrer, however, decided to inhibit himself. This prompted Presiding Commissioner Sarmiento to issue an Order dated July 22, 2009 elevating the appeal to the Commission en banc. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" The transfer of the case to the Commission en banc was apparently made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which states,
SEC. 5. Quorum; Votes Required. – (a) x x x
(b) When sitting in Divisions, two (2) Members of a Division shall constitute a quorum to transact business. The concurrence of at least two (2) Members of a Division shall be necessary to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling. If this required number is not obtained, the case shall be automatically elevated to the Commission en
banc for decision or resolution. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o ""
Thereafter, the Commission en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l
"_ftn12" \o "" On December 9, 2009, after an exhaustive appreciation of all the contested ballots, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o ""
the Commission en banc promulgated a resolution nullifying 3,711 ballots cast in favor of Eriguel after finding the same to have been written by only one (1) or two (2) persons. The following figures were thus derived: HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l
"_ftn14" \o ""
Dumpit Eriguel
Total number of votes per physical count after revision
7,839 11,678
ADD claimed/credited ballots 35 41
LESS ballots INVALIDATED after appreciation
14 4,026
Total No. of votes AFTER Comelec appreciation
7,860 7,693
On this note, the Commission en banc set aside the RTC’s decision and declared Dumpit as the duly elected mayor of Agoo, La Union, for having garnered 167 more votes than Eriguel.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o ""
HELD:
Eriguel essentially raises the following two issues: (1) procedurally, whether the Special Second Division of the COMELEC gravely abused its authority when it automatically elevated Dumpit’s appeal to the Commission en banc after only one commissioner was left to deal with the case; and (2) substantively, whether the COMELEC en banc’s fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof violated the doctrine enunciated in Rosal v. Commission on Elections. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l
"_ftn16" \o ""
The petition meritorious.
I. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o ""
It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and
en banc only upon motion for reconsideration. HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" .
This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained.
While the Local Government Code allows local government units to sue and be sued, a party suing such LGU may not attach its properties during the trial of the case. It is a waiver of immunity from suit but not a waiver of liability.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN VS. HON. SIMEON DUMDUM, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City et al., GR No. 168289, March 22, 2010
The case stems from a Complaint HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" filed by herein private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao against herein petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief executive, Felix V. Ople (Ople) for collection of a sum of money and
damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the year 2000, respondent, doing business as KD Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and related supplies, was contacted by petitioner Ople. Respondent had entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality.
Respondent claimed that because of Ople’s earnest representation that funds had already been allocated for the project, she agreed to deliver from her principal place of business in Cebu City twenty-one motor vehicles whose value totaled P5,820,000.00. However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondent’s claim for payment. As of the filing of the complaint, the total obligation of petitioner had already totaled P10,026,060.13 exclusive of penalties and damages. Thus, respondent prayed for full payment of the said amount, with interest at not less than 2% per month, plus P500,000.00 as damages for business losses, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l
"_ftn12" \o "" [1] invoking immunity of the state from suit, and [2] enforceability of the contract.
On October 20, 2003, the trial court issued an Order HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" denying the two motions. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but they were denied in an Order HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" dated December 29, 2003.
On February 13, 2003, the trial court issued an Order HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" granting respondent’s prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment conditioned upon the posting of a bond equivalent to the amount of the claim. On March 20, 2003, the trial court issued the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" directing the sheriff “to attach the estate, real and personal properties” of petitioners.
ISSUES:
May local government units validly invoke “state immunity from suit” in the present case?
Was the trial court correct in issuing a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of petitioner local government?
HELD:
Petitioners, , posit that as a municipal corporation, the Municipality of Hagonoy is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment.
Private respondent, for her part, counters that, contrary to petitioners’ claim, she has amply discussed the basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment in her affidavit; and that petitioners’ claim of immunity from suit is negated by Section 22 of the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporations with the power to sue and be sued.
The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a
general or special law HYPERLINK
"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn34" \o "" such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers —one of them is the power to sue and be sued.
With this in mind, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment must be dissolved
and, indeed, it must not have been issued in the very first place. While there is merit in private respondent’s position that she, by affidavit, was able to substantiate the allegation of fraud in the same way that the fraud attributable to petitioners was sufficiently alleged in the complaint and, hence, the issuance of the writ would have been justified. Still, the writ of attachment in this case would only prove to be useless and unnecessary under the premises, since the property of the municipality may not, in the event that respondent’s claim is validated, be subjected to writs of execution and garnishment — unless, of course, there has been a corresponding appropriation provided by law.
HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o ""
Grounds for refusal and/or cancellation of party list groups.
ANTONIO D. DAYAO, et al vs. COMELEC AND LPGMA, G.R. No.
193643, G.R. No. 193704, January 29, 2013 The Facts
The individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) while petitioner FPII is an association comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the country.
Private respondent LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG and energy sector who have banded together in order to pursue their common objective of providing quality, safe and reasonably priced gas and oil products. The group advocates access to reasonably priced LPG by household consumers.
On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC, through a petition for registration as a sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the May 10, 2010 elections under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act. LPGMA claimed that it has special interest in the LPG industry and other allied concerns.
It averred that one of its programs is the promotion of fair trade practices and prevention of re-entry of cartels and monopolies by actively pursuing the initial gains of oil deregulation, and vigilant advocacy for the curtailment of bureaucratic and regulatory procedures and governmental practices detrimental to the entry, development and well-being of small LPG entrepreneurs.
After the requisite publication, verification and hearing,9 and without any apparent opposition, LPGMA’s petition was approved by the COMELEC in its Resolution dated January 5, 2010. Four (4) months thereafter, individual petitioners lodged before the COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a party-list organization. They were later on joined by FPII as a complainant-in-intervention.
The complaint was docketed as SPP No. 10-010 and it proffered in essence that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and independent re-fillers of LPG that control 45% of the national LPG retail market and have significant ownership interests in various LPG refilling plants. To buttress the complaint, FPII emphasized that the business of marketing and refilling LPG requires substantial working capital as it involves the purchase of LPG from importers or big oil players in the country, establishment of refilling plants and safety auxiliary equipments, purchase or lease of thousands of LPG containers, mobilization of a marketing, distribution and delivery network. FPII also alleged that LPGMA is a mere lobby group that espouses their own interests before the Congress and the Department of Energy.
In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented
sector of the society. It also averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for registration.
In its first assailed Resolution dated August 5, 2010,14 the COMELEC dismissed the complaint
In its first assailed Resolution dated August 5, 2010,14 the COMELEC dismissed the complaint