Desarrollo emocional para las relaciones interpersonales

As illustrated in the theoretical framework, many scholars that study the relationship between independent regulatory agencies and their parent ministry use the analytical framework of the principal agent model. Central assumptions within this model include the possibility that preferences between the principal and the agent may differ, and that the agent may behave strategically in order to pursue these preferences at the expense of the ministry. In response, a ministry may need to supervise its agent, by monitoring and sanctioning activities. In the now following paragraphs, I argue to what extent my observations confirm or reject these assumptions. My argument in this section mostly derives from the AFM context, because I was able to interview two former AFM board members, who were in direct contact with the minister and other senior civil servants at the ministry. As such, I assume they have a good view on the relationship between the AFM (as an agent) and the ministry (as a principal). Still, they might be biased, either intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore, I try to verify their statements with observations from other, more independent respondents.

In general, both respondents state that the relationship between the AFM and the ministry of Finance at the time of their office was rather co-operative. According to Mr. Docters van Leeuwen, as of the AFM’s founding, the ministry and the AFM had a shared goal, namely, to establish a serious and well respected independent conduct-of-business regulator:

‘’If a new regulator was to emerge, it had to be a good one. That’s what they [the ministry] wanted.’’ This observation is confirmed by Mr. Boot, who is professor in Corporate Finance and Financial Markets, member of the AFM’s Capital Market Commission and chairman of DNB’s Banking Council, who states that Mr. Docters van Leeuwen was selected on purpose as the first chair of the AFM, because of his independent reputation. Mr. Boot:

‘’And the new regulator should - one way or another - manifest itself, otherwise you never gain your independence. Therefore, you need a lever, and that is why [Mr.] Docters van Leeuwen was chosen.’’ Thus, as of its founding, the AFM was rather independent in terms of its regulatory tasks. The most convincing evidence in this regard is the fact that, according to Mr. Docters van Leeuwen, a civil servant had to leave the ministry, after he tried to influence the AFM’s regulation. Mr. Docters van Leeuwen:

‘’Once a civil servant told us how to execute our regulation. Of course I did not answer his request.

[…] A week later I was at the ministry and I asked where the person was. The person had left the ministry. He was appointed as financial attaché in Brussels. He was removed, because they explicitly did not want that. They said: we are responsible for the legislation, the budget and the appointment of the board, but we are not responsible for the regulation itself. That’s up to you.’’

Nevertheless, some incidents occurred during which the interests of the AFM contradicted with the interests of the ministry. Occasionally, the AFM undertook activities that were outside the scope of its mandate. For instance, the AFM once published a website on which consumers could give their opinion regarding certain financial products. The ministry requested the AFM to remove the website, because it was not authorized to do so. According to Mr. Docters van Leeuwen, however, such incidents rarely took place (transcript interview Mr. Docters van Leeuwen).

Altogether, I regard the above mentioned observations as evidence against the principal agent model, because it illustrates that the ministry does not want to hold the AFM strictly accountable. Instead, the ministry is willing to guarantee the AFM’s independence, even at the expense of its own civil servants. Only when the AFM acts outside its mandate, it is corrected by the ministry. So far, these paragraphs illustrate the general relationship between the AFM and the ministry. In the now following paragraphs, I specifically discuss to what extent the principal agent model holds in regard to the AFM’s international activities.

According to Mr. Maatman, who was member of the AFM board between 2008 and 2012, the AFM and the ministry together discussed their activities in transnational networks beforehand, because this enabled them to have more impact in the international decision making arena and prevented them from making contradicting statements (transcript interview Mr. Maatman). More specifically, Mr. Docters van Leeuwen states that during his chairmanship the AFM and the ministry sometimes cooperated in order to pursue a certain goal. For instance, one of the board members, Mr. Kaptein, was willing to introduce the so called duty-to-care principle in the European context. At first, the ministry was not very supportive. However, after Mr. Kaptein was appointed as chairman of the specific committee and after the emergence of the ‘woekerpolisaffaire’, the ministry could be convinced. Thereafter, the AFM and the ministry together successfully influenced the Commission, by which the duty-to-care principle was adopted in European legislation (transcript interview Mr. Docters van Leeuwen).

Also, according to Mr. Docters van Leeuwen, sometimes the ministry and the AFM informed each other about developments regarding the different networks they participated in. Information in one network could be of use to the other. For instance, once, a senior civil servant of the ministry heard critique regarding Mr. Docters van Leeuwen his objectivity as chairman of CESR. He informed Mr. Docters van Leeuwen about this. In response, Mr. Docters van Leeuwen acted based on this information. Mr. Docters van Leeuwen:

‘’[…] thereafter, I put extra emphasis on making sure that the French knew that I understood their position similar to the Dutch position, and that both were indifferent to me.’’

The observations above contradict with the assumptions of the principle agent model in regard to opposing interests. Instead of substantially monitoring and steering the AFM’s international activities, the ministry cooperates with the AFM in order to pursue common goals.

Moreover, according to the logic of the principle agent model, the AFM and DNB may strategically behave in the international context in order to increase their de facto autonomy vis-à-vis the ministry of Finance. Although my observations confirm strategic behavior of the AFM and DNB, which I discuss later in this chapter, I have not found evidence for strategic behavior with the purpose of increasing de facto autonomy vis-à-vis the ministry of Finance. Thus, also this assumption of the principal agent model does not hold.

Additionally, it is important to note that not all activities in transnational networks are coordinated or thoroughly thought through. For instance, Mr. Docters van Leeuwen did not aim to become the first chairman of CESR. He was nominated by his foreign counterparts, without a preceding lobby by himself or other Dutch actors (transcript interview Mr. Docters van Leeuwen). I have also done similar observations regarding DNB. An indicator for limited strategic behavior, for instance, is the statement by the EIOPA coordinators of DNB, according to which they do not even know all the people that participate in EIOPA related meetings that they coordinate. Moreover, most of the time they only instruct and challenge their colleagues on the main topics, because the details require too much expertise (transcript interview DNB’s EIOPA coordinators). Thus, in this regard, a DNB expert has substantial discretionary space, which is at odds with the assumption of an independent regulatory agency that consists of actors that together behave strategically to pursue a common goal.

Altogether, the preceding paragraphs point out that the assumptions of the principle agent model do not hold in the light of my observations. Most of the time, the interests between the agencies and the ministry do not contradict and strategic behavior is limited. Instead, the AFM case shows that the AFM and the ministry cooperate in the international decision making arena. Also, I have not found evidence regarding strategic behavior for the purpose of increasing de facto autonomy. However, a serious remark should be made in this regard. The argument in this section is mainly based on the interviews with two AFM board members in the period between 2002 and 2011. As illustrated in the previous chapter, in 2011 the vision ‘Toezicht op afstand’ was published, by which the formal autonomy of both organization vis-à-vis the ministry was decreased. I have not been able to interview AFM senior officials in this period. Possibly, the de facto relationship between the AFM and the ministry changed after this new vision. Therefore, the argument of this section should be considered as a first exploration. A more strict argument requires further research.