DESCRIPCIÓN DE LA PROPUESTA

Britain initially interacted positively with EU social policy as Edward Heath, PM at the time, attempted to bring “tangible benefits” (George, 1998: 69) from EU membership. However, with the onset of the oil crisis and Britain’s selective Europeanism (May, 1999: 54) the jurisdiction over social policy rapidly became a ‘tug of war’ as the EU attempted to create a sphere of autonomy at the national level. This started with Heath’s obstruction to a common energy policy coupled with disagreement over the size and distribution of the ERDF. While the economic crisis had fostered a favourable environment for EU social policy to develop, it created a hostile environment for EU-member state relations hence creating a period of ‘crisis progression’ as ‘eurosclerosis’ ensued.

The election of Margaret Thatcher signified “a radical turning point in the British welfare state” (Evans and Williams, 2012: 1), with an emphasis on individual responsibility, and a “sudden and dramatic shift in approach” (Evans and Williams, 2012: 9) to Britain’s relationship with EU social policy. Thatcher wanted the state to be autonomous in its actions with no external interference, relegating EU social policy’s secondary role to non-existent. Respectively, Thatcher assented to the SEA on account of her interpretation of the treaty setting limits on EI. Thatcher also endorsed Delors for a second term as the European

139 Commission Chief, a move she would come to regret, as the development of the EU’s social dimension accelerated under his tenure.

Delors ambitions were revealed with the announcement to the EP; “in ten years, 80 per cent of economic legislation – and perhaps tax and social legislation – will be dictated from the Community” (May, 1999: 74). Thatcher dismissed these comments by Delors as “over the top” (Gowland et al., 2010: 110). Delors became favoured amongst the trade unions, Thatcher’s arch enemies, by virtue of his claim in a speech to the Trade Union Confederation (TUC) (September 1988) that a single market was impossible without a common social policy, through which the interests of workers needed protecting. Thatcher responded, in her famous Bruges speech, asserting that the government had not “rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels” (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1988).

The Social Charter garnered further support from the trade unions, elevating Delors into the “surrogate champion for the British worker” (Gowland et al., 2010: 112), and further opposition from Thatcher who contested the charters position under QMV, denouncing it as Marxist and a “creeping back-door [for] Socialism” (Gowland et al., 2010: 110). Delors became the paradoxical figure of national inspiration and threat to national sovereignty. It is debatable how far the succeeding administration under PM John Major was a continuation or break from Thatcherism as the only means by which Major could unite his government was through a mutual opposition to EU social policy, thereby continuing Thatcher’s antagonism to EU social policy.

Accordingly, Britain secured an opt-out from the Social Charter in the Maastricht Treaty forcing the formation of the social protocol. ‘Crisis progression’ was being actively harnessed to keep EU social policy out of the British social model and in an attempt to shape a limited EU social policy, as Britain desired. The European economic crisis spread mechanically, as a period of ‘crisis progression’ embedded arresting the normal operation of national politics, and by implication national policy responses. ‘Black Wednesday’, the day Britain exited the ERM, caused opt-outs from Maastricht to subsequently become viewed as warning signs and dangers of the wider treaty (Baker et al., 1994: 38). Correspondingly, the economic crisis spilled over and transformed into a national political crisis. Euroscepetics resistance to Britain’s participation in Maastricht extended to EU membership.

Contrastingly, Labour was in favour of greater participation in Maastricht, claiming the “double opt-out” from the EMU and Social Charter rendered Britain a “semi-detached

140 member of the Community” (Geroge, 1998: 244). This led to a “parliamentary siege” (Baker et al., 1994) over the ratification of Maastricht, which became the longest ratification process in history. By implication, the Eurosceptics had seemingly been successful in constraining the future actions of the government who “would certainly not dare to bring any new treaty before Parliament that furthered European integration” (Baker et al., 1994: 47). EU policy progress was arresting national policy responses to the economic crisis and causing significant fractures within the political landscape. Notably, this dispute led to the creation of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), as Nigel Farage absconded from the party in protest.

Nonetheless, ‘crisis diversity’ continued in the background as EU social policy revitalised national social policy with Major borrowing concepts from the EU level and applying Thatcher’s logic to it, as reflected in the Citizens Charter within public services and Patients Charter within the National Health Service (NHS). The EU’s strategy of increasing female participation also served to revitalise and reinforce the national trajectory of social policy. Major was simultaneously encouraging young and single mothers off benefits into employment. To this end, Major had enacted the 1993 EU directive which stipulated maternity provision had to be made for female workers, including part-time workers, when commencing employment.

Major had also abolished the Wage Councils in 1993 and increased the age of retirement for women, a proposal previously opposed by Thatcher. However, further changes by the EU went beyond a supportive role for the nation state. This led the then Employment Secretary, Michael Portillo, to resist EU policy progress relating to changes in parental and paternity leave in 1994 on the grounds that it would restrict competition and, more importantly, such matters were private matters between employee and employer (Glennerster, 2007: 214). Thus, continuing Major’s defence of workplace regulation. However, Major did assent to the EC’s Working Time Directive after successfully negotiating an opt-out for those employees who wanted to work longer hours.