Descripción de los casos de uso expandidos

Capítulo 2. Características del Sistema

2.10 Descripción de los casos de uso expandidos

David Piachaud

introduction

From a small child protesting that ‘It’s not fair’, to a former Enron employee, commenting on a senior executive who had been urging employees to invest their savings in Enron stock at the same time as he was unloading his, saying ‘It was unjust’, a concern for social justice dominates much of everyone’s lives. ‘Social justice’ is a term that is both normative and prescriptive: situations are assessed in terms of their social justice and actions are guided by concepts of social justice.

Social policy is to a large extent concerned with social justice. For example, in Britain, politicians commonly espouse social justice: the leader of the Labour Party set up a Commission on Social Justice in 1992 and a former leader of the Conservative Party set up a Social Justice Policy Review in 2005. For many social democratic politicians the pursuit of social justice is a genuine and central political objective;

certainly, few politicians espouse social injustice. Whether social justice requires some degree of equality of outcomes or requires equality of opportunities has been a continuing debate. Gordon Brown stated that ‘real equality in life chances is what government seeks’ (Leonard, 1999, p 46).

The very ambiguity of the term ‘social justice’ – a ‘feel good’ term that almost all can subscribe to – may of course be one reason why it is useful for many engaged in persuasion, the manipulation of public opinion and the solicitation of electoral support. For practitioners of social policy, concerned with practical policies reflecting many motivations, social justice is often a remote reference point, as abstruse as a lecture on thermodynamics to someone on the footplate of a steam engine. But if what is meant by social justice is unclear, the destination seen but darkly, then there is little chance of it being achieved.

Social justice tends to be discussed at an abstract, perhaps refined, level by political and economic philosophers. Many political philosophers have attempted to clarify what social justice is or should be. On this, there has not been unanimity of views. The purpose here is not to join in this very extensive debate (Chapter One); shelf-loads of books have been devoted to this task. Rather, the objective is to consider three of the most important theories in the past half-century – those of Nozick, of Rawls, and that associated jointly with Sen and Nussbaum – and discuss what they contribute to thinking about social policy. To a considerable extent, each of these theories can be seen as a different paradigm with its own intellectual faction or claque that defends the chosen approach and criticises or ignores other approaches. (Factional disputes characterise much intellectual activity and there is little doubt that professional superstar status comes with a personalised paradigm.) Certainly the stakes are high – a philosophic approach that may underlie the thinking and action of governments around the globe is not insignificant. Yet this factionalism and product differentiation is not wholly illuminating.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, key features of the three theories are briefly outlined. Then what they share in common and what are their principal differences are examined. Some implications of the three theories for social policy are then considered. Three particular issues are then discussed: first, the relationship between public policy and private behaviour in so far as it affects social justice; second, children and the issues they pose for social justice; third, global inequality and justice in the world. Finally, the key questions that any conception of social justice and any practical social policies must answer are summarised.

the three approaches Nozick

Robert Nozick’s ‘entitlement theory’ in Anarchy, state and utopia (1974) sets out three components for a ‘wholly just’ world:

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.

2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone who is entitled to a holding, is entitled to the holding.

3. No one is entitled to a holding except by repeated applications of (1) and (2).

The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution. (Nozick, 1974, p 151)

Justice in transfer requires fair contracts without stealing, fraud, enslavement or forcibly excluding others from competing in exchanges.

Justice in acquisition involves exclusive property rights over the material world. Nozick follows Locke’s notion that mixing one’s labour with the world can generate ownership providing the position of others was not worsened compared to when the acquisition was unowned or held in common.

If past acquisitions or transfers did not satisfy the conditions for justice of acquisition, Nozick argues that a principle of rectification for past injustices is necessary. But he does not explain with any precision the circumstances in which acquisition could be judged unjust. Some have argued that such a rectification principle is in practice impossible.

Nozick (1974, p 231) has acknowledged that without it no system of transfers can be condoned.

Nozick describes his entitlement theory as ‘historical’ in that the justice, or not, of the distribution depends on how it came about. In a just society:

What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift. In a free society, diverse persons control different resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary exchanges and actions of persons.

(Nozick, 1974, pp 149-50)

Nozick’s approach has been widely interpreted as a libertarian position in which any taxation is effectively theft, depriving individuals of property they are entitled to on the assumption that past acquisitions have been freely contracted and justly obtained. As he put it, ‘the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state more extensive violates people’s rights’ (Nozick, 1974, p 149).

Rawls

John Rawls’ A theory of justice (1971) is a monumental work that has influenced virtually all recent discussions of social justice. He set out to examine the principles that should underlie a just society.

Rawls (1971, p 303) summarised his general conception of justice as follows:

All social primary goods –liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured.

Rawls proposed the principle of fair equality of opportunity according to which ‘those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances’ (Rawls, 1971, p 73). But he does not spell out the meaning of ‘similar life chances’.

He considered what principles we would choose if we did not know what position we would have in the society – the ‘veil of ignorance’.

His conclusion was to propose two principles of justice:

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of liberties, with a similar system of liberty for all.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

a. to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle; and

b. attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.’ (Rawls, 1971, p 302)

Principle 2a is referred to as the difference principle.

To promote distributive justice the state requires a number of institutions, described as follows:

I assume that the basic structure is regulated by a just constitution that secures the liberties of equal citizenship.…

I assume also that there is fair (as opposed to formal) equality of opportunity.… Finally the government guarantees a social minimum either by family allowances and special payments for sickness and unemployment, or more systematically by such devices as a graded income supplement (a so-called negative income tax). (Rawls, 1971, p 275)

To achieve this, the government requires four branches:

(1) the allocation branch ‘to keep the price system workably competitive and to prevent the formation of unreasonable market power’;

(2) the stabilisation branch ‘to bring about reasonably full employment’;

(3) the transfer branch ‘to ensure the social minimum’;

(4) the distribution branch ‘to preserve approximate justice in distributive shares by means of taxation and the necessary adjustments in the rights of property’ (Rawls, 1971, pp 276-7).

Sen and Nussbaum

Amartya Sen (1992, 1999) rejected utilitarian and resource-based concepts of justice. Instead, he saw the requirement of a just society as being that all should have certain capabilities – what people are actually able to do and to be. Sen’s thinking on capabilities has evolved over a considerable period and he has been reluctant to specify what these capabilities should be. Martha Nussbaum (2003) has supported Sen’s general approach and has proposed a set of 10 capabilities, comprised of the following:

(1) To live to the end of a human life of a normal length.

(2) To have good health, to be adequately nourished and to have adequate shelter.

(3) To move freely from place to place, to be secure against violent assault, to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.

(4) To use the senses to imagine, think and reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human way’ – including political activities and religious freedom.

(5) To experience emotions – love, grief, anger, etc.

– unblighted by fear and anxiety.

(6) To form a conception of the good and to reflect on one’s life.

(7) To live with concern for other human beings and be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.

(8) To live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

(9) To laugh, play and enjoy recreational activities.

(10) Politically, to participate in choices that govern one’s life.

Materially, to hold property and to seek employment on an equal basis with others, and to work as a human being. (Nussbaum, 2003, pp 41-42)

Sen distinguished the capability perspective as follows:

The capability perspective … differs from various concepts of ‘equality of opportunities’ which have been championed for a long time. In a very basic sense, a person’s capability to achieve does indeed stand for the opportunity to pursue his or her objectives. But the concept of ‘equality of opportunities’ is standardly used in the policy literature in more restrictive ways, defined in terms of equal availability of some particular means, or with reference to equal applicability (or equal non-applicability) of some specific barriers or constraints. Thus characterised, ‘equality of opportunities’ does not amount to anything like equality of overall freedoms. (Sen, 1992, p 7)

Sen stresses the importance not only of personal characteristics – sex, health, intelligence and so on – but also of social characteristics – public policies, social norms, roles and hierarchies and so on and environmental characteristics – infrastructure, institutions, climate and so on.

For example, for a disabled wheelchair user, substantive freedom to move from place to place depends on more than income; it also depends on whether buildings and buses are designed in a way that allows access.

If income is defined as command over resources in terms of purely private purchases, then money income is an appropriate measure. If it is defined as command over all resources then accessibility to public and private facilities is also important. For money to be exchanged for resources and, ultimately, improve an individual’s welfare, requires the ability to engage in exchange, as well as something that can be exchanged.

Similarities and differences Similarities

All three approaches emphasise the importance of basic political liberties and the importance of fair process. The advantages of free, voluntary exchange are recognised and treated as desirable in all three theories.

Markets should be open to all without discrimination. None should be excluded on any basis from access to free and open exchange. It is a common feature that social justice requires a liberal, open system in which all have access to all markets, be they for labour or for goods.

This area of common, shared views may seem rather limited but basic political liberties and fair exchange are not enjoyed by most of the world’s population. The political and social institutions necessary for these aspects of social justice are not set out by any of the writers in any detail but it must be recognised that achieving them is something only recently achieved in only some countries. Unless active steps have been taken to fight oppression and end discrimination on the basis of gender, colour or creed, then discrimination persists. It can be argued, following T. H. Marshall, that without social rights – literacy, shelter, an end to destitution – then open access to fair exchange is not possible. Thus, in the specification of even a minimal state with equality of process put forward by Nozick, there is already an extensive, if unacknowledged, role for social policy. Yet, in contrast to Rawls and Sen and Nussbaum, this is almost the limit of Nozick’s concern with social justice.

Differences

The principal differences between the three theories may conveniently be considered in relation to time – time past, time present and time future. What does each theory have to say about the past, what aspects of the present are relevant to social justice, and what relevance does the future have?

Time past – what is a fair starting point?

In what way is an assessment of social justice dependent on what has happened in the past? Is the starting point fair?

Nozick presumes that the past has been just, providing fair process has been followed. The starting point for different individuals may not be the same but it is not so different that it renders future social and economic exchanges unjust. However, holdings may have been acquired by means not sanctioned by the principle of justice in acquisition.

‘Rectification’ is required to deal with such injustices but Nozick does not spell out clearly what he considers to be past injustices. Slavery, seizure of lands used for grazing or habitation from native Americans and racial discrimination have all featured significantly in the history of the US. Given that history, one might conclude that Nozick should say

nothing about social justice. Nozick has, nevertheless, been generally interpreted to assume that the past has been just and that there has been justice in acquisition. As a consequence, on this Nozickian approach, providing the principle of justice in transfer has been adhered to, the current distribution of income or wealth is just, however unequal it may be.

If one goes back in time far enough, something very unjust could be found in the past antecedents of everyone, either boosting or depleting their inheritance. Thus, the past has an overwhelming, inescapable and incalculable bearing on the justice of the present situation. In a sense, we are all products of our history, and all our histories involve injustices that might justify rectification. For example, Owen John Thomas told of a Welshman accused of trespassing:

‘Your land, is it? Where did you get it from?’ said the Welshman. ‘Why, I got it from my father, and my father’s father’s father,’ replied the landowner indignantly. ‘Well, where did your father’s father’s father get the land in the first place,’ asked the Welshman. ‘He fought for it, my man,’

answered the angry landowner. ‘Well’, said the Welshman,

‘take your coat off and I will fight you for it now.’ (National Assembly for Wales, Official Record 11/7/2002, p 103)

Central to Rawls’ theory of justice is the ‘veil of ignorance’. A new society is to be constructed in which you will not know which place you will be in – the Original Position. People decide on the rules to adopt without knowing who they are going to be. In so far as people are who they are because of their history, then this, in effect, neutralises any individual’s history. Another way of thinking about this exercise is that you would not bring to this new society your own, actual past. Yet, it is difficult to think of being allocated the past of another member of society, for example the least advantaged person in the ‘old society’. Therefore, Rawls seems to imply the elimination of the past as a consideration in determining a just society.

Sen and Nussbaum are concerned that all have a set of capabilities.

This requires both personal resources and the appropriate economic and social context. They do not elaborate on inequality or social justice as such but rather talk in terms of a minimum necessary to ensure each of a set of capabilities. If people lack the skills or other resources to achieve that set of capabilities then the implication is that they should be brought up to the necessary level, offsetting past inequalities. Similarly, if the economic and social context restricts capabilities then it must be

brought up to the necessary level – for example by ensuring wheelchair access into public buildings. They in effect imply that achieving a fair starting point for all is a prerequisite for substantive freedoms and social justice. Whether that fair starting point requires some minimum level of capabilities or requires equal capabilities is not made clear.

Thus, all three theories make different assumptions about the past and how it should be taken into account. Both Rawls and Sen and Nussbaum treat some degree of equal opportunity as essential for social justice.

Time present – what is the measure of inequality?

In what way should present circumstance be assessed in judging the justice of society? There is a tendency to treat any inequality as synonymous with inequity. This is clearly nonsense. Hours of sunshine in Barbados and Bradford are unequal but scarcely unjust.

The most commonly used measure of social inequality is income inequality. Yet, many inequalities in income are entirely just in most people’s reckoning. For example, income may be higher because of years invested in training on a low income, because of longer hours put in, or because of worse working conditions. It would not be just if such differences were ignored although how large the differences such factors warrant is contentious. Some justifications for differences in incomes are, however, less widely agreed. Often the very highly paid justify their incomes on the basis of the responsibilities they bear. Yet, responsibility, even great responsibility, is for many an added advantage of a job, not a burden that must be compensated; certainly there are many willing to serve as government ministers, although how many of these are suitably qualified is open to question.

What is clear is that none of the three theories discussed here treats income as a good measure by which to assess social justice. On the other hand, none of them gives an entirely clear answer to the question of ‘inequality of what?’. Nor do they answer the related and crucial question of ‘what degree of inequality is just?’. If the top decile has on average twice the income of the bottom decile then most would agree that this was a more just society than one where the top has 20

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