The Reference to the Ego as Object Is Essential to Self-Determination Self-determination, that is, the will as an essential of the person rooted in self-governance and self-possession, reveals in the dynamic order the objectiveness of the person or, in other words, of every concrete, consciously acting ego. We are not concerned here solely with ontological objectiveness, with the fact a person is objectively and really a being, somebody actually existing, for this was the object of our account in the preceding chapter. What we are now concerned with is that in this action the person is, owing to self-determination, an object for himself, in a peculiar way being the immanent target upon which man's exercise of all his powers
concentrates, insofar as it is he whose determination is at stake. He is in this sense, the primary object or the nearest object of his action.
Every actual act of determination makes real the subjectiveness of
self-governance and self-possession; in each of these interpersonal structural relations there is given to the person as the subject - as he who governs and possesses - the person as the object -as he who is governed and possessed. This objectiveness is, as may be seen, the correlate of the person's subjectiveness and, moreover, seems to bring out in a specific manner subjectiveness itself. At the same time, this
objectiveness constitutes an essential correlate of that complexity which, together with the structure of self-governance and self-possession, manifests itself in man, in the human person.
The objectiveness we are now considering is realized by and also manifested in self-determination. In this sense we may speak of an "objectification" that is introduced together with self-determination into the specific dynamism of the person. This objectification means that in every actual act of self-determination - in every "I will"
- the self is the object, indeed the primary and nearest object. This is contained in the concept itself, and the term expressing it - "self-determination" - means that one is determined by oneself. The concept as well as the word expressing it contain simultaneously and correlatively both the subject and the object. The one as well as the other is the ego.
Nevertheless, the objectification of the subject does not have an intentional
character in the sense in which intentionality is to be found in every human willing.
When I will, I always desire something. Willing indicates a turn toward an object, and this turn determines its intentional nature. In order to turn intentionally to an object we put the object, as it were, in front of us (or we accept its presence). Obviously it
is possible to put in this position our own ego as the object and then to turn to it by a similar volitional act, the act of willing. But this kind of intentionality does not properly appertain to self-determination. For in self-determination we do not turn to the ego as the object, we only impart actuality to the, so to speak, ready-made objectiveness of the ego which is contained in the intrapersonal relation of self-governance and self-possession. This imparting of actuality is of fundamental significance in morality, that specific dimension of the human, personal existence which is simultaneously both subjective and objective. It is there that the whole reality of morals, of moral values, has its roots.
Objectification Is More Fundamental than the Intentionality of Volitions The objectification that is essential for self-determination takes place together with the intentionality of the particular acts of the will. When I will anything, then I am also determined by myself. Though the ego is not an intentional object of willing its objective being is contained in the nature of acts of willing. It is only thus that willing becomes self-determination. Self-determination does not mean merely proceeding from the ego, as the source and initial point of willing and choice; it means also the specific returning to that same ego which is its primary and basic object and with regard to which all intentional objects - everything and anything one wills or wants - are in a way more remote, transitory and just as external. The most direct and innermost is the objectiveness of the ego, that is, of the ego's own subject. This subject is formed by man in one way or another when he desires an object, a value of some kind. At this point we touch upon the innermost personal reality of the action: by forming his ego in one way or another man becomes someone or
someone else. This shows how deeply rooted is the objectification referred to here, that is to say, the objectiveness of self-determination:39 the objectiveness of the ego in self-determination.
The tendency toward this objectification is contained as a function of
self-determination in the dynamism of the will, but its foundations reach down to the structure itself of the person to self-governance and self-possession. Mention was already made of the impossibility of understanding and interpreting correctly the will without a clear idea of the way in which it proceeds from the structure of the person, in the specifically personal structure of the human being. It would be impossible to present the peculiar dynamism of the will if we were to refer only to the
intentionality of the particular volitions. Willing as an intentional act, that is to say, an experience directed toward its proper object, which may be defined both as an end and as a value, differs from the experience of "I will" in its full content. For the experience of "I will" contains also self-determination and not only intentionality. The turning to any external object that is seen as an end or a value implies a
simultaneous fundamental turn toward the ego as the object.
Self-Determination and the Distinction between the Experiences of "I will"
and "I am willing"
Volition as an intentional act is embedded in the dynamism of the will only to the extent self-determination is contained in it. Introspection informs us of various types of volition that arise in man's interior life and are authentic intentional acts but which are not embedded in the proper dynamism of the will. We may then say that some kind of volition is "happening" in the subject even when man does not will - it does not emerge with the experience "I will." An important point to note in this connection
is that it lies in the nature of the experience of "I will," in the nature of the will itself, that it never consists in something that only happens in man; on the contrary, it always occurs as an instance of "acting," indeed, is the very core of every acting. It is the person as such that is then "active." All the same, volitions, including those that are not within the frame of self-determination, are - according to the
phenomenological conception - intentional acts. We see them directed toward a value which they adopt as their end; their directing toward it may sometimes be very acutely experienced and, for instance, their "appetitive" character then becomes specially evident. Even such acuteness is, however, insufficient to ascertain the will.
This situation becomes clearer when we compare the experience of "I will" with that of "I want." In either case we deal with a type of volition, but only the former contains in it the true dynamism of the will.
The Experience of "I will" Reveals the Transcendence of the Person in the Action
The dynamism of the will cannot be reduced to volition with its specific intentionality.
An essential trait of this dynamism is that it involves the person in its own specific structure of self-governance and self-possession. It is thus that every genuine "I will"
reveals the person's transcendence in the action. The significance of this
transcendence, noted in the preceding chapter, will here be submitted to a more comprehensive analysis. At any rate, it is connected with self-determination and the objectification peculiar to self-determination and not solely with the human ego's
"subjectiveness" or the intentionality of volitions that arise within the ego and are directed outward to various values as their goal.
The term "objectification" is here used to bring to attention the objectiveness of the ego itself, the objectiveness that manifests itself every time man says "I will." In philosophical and psychological tradition the tendency seems to have prevailed to consider the human willing somewhat one-sidedly, mainly from the point of view of the outside object, emphasis being laid on the "willing of something," rather than from that of the inner objectiveness, of the simple willing itself. From the latter point of view human willing has special significance first for the philosophy of the person - in our considerations the acting person - and then in a more distant perspective for personalistic ethics. Occasionally one should be attentive not to confound in the consideration of action as human action, the acting person with the action of the person. This is by no means a mere play on words but a meaningful distinction relevant to the interpretation of the action. The problem lies in defining how the human act, the action, is the real act of the person; for in it not only is an individual rational nature actualized, but also an act is performed - as evidenced in experience - by the unique individual person. The performing of an action is at once the
fulfillment of the person. Here "fulfillment" may be regarded as having a correlative meaning with "actualization" and thus with the metaphysical meaning of the term
"act." Nevertheless, experience, intuition, and the phenomenological analysis connected with it allow us to take a new look at the person-action relation, and this may play an important and fruitful role in the interpretation of the action as the act of the person.
In Self-Determination the Reference to the Ego as Object Is Influenced by Consciousness
From the metaphysical point of view the person is both the object and the subject.
He is an objective being or somebody - a being existing as "somebody" in contrast with all other beings existing as "something" - at the same time he is his own ontological foundation, which means he exists as the subject of his own structures and dynamisms. Already in the discussion of the preceding chapter, in which we dealt with the person and the action in relation to the general dynamism of man, we noted that in the person we had to consider a kind of synthesis of efficacy and subjectiveness. Since we are now considering the integral dynamism of the will we have first to gain a deeper insight into the problem of efficacy. This will bring us to view, as it were, a new dimension of the synthesis of efficacy and subjectiveness; for we shall now see the objectiveness appropriate to efficacy, the dynamic core of which consists in self-determination identifiable with the experience of "I will." Self-determination puts the ego, that is to say, the subject, in the place of the object.
Thus simultaneously it effects the objectiveness of the ego in subjectiveness.
The objectification of the ego that is derived from self-determination has as its
correlate in the integral dynamism of the will, and also in the specific structure of the person himself, the subjectification that consciousness reveals in the personal
structure. The person, so far as he is a specific existent possessing consciousness, lives in his own peculiar fashion (to "live" is here understood in the sense of the vital existence of living beings); he lives - or exists - not only in his own reflection, the mirrored image the person has of himself, but also in that specific self-experience which is conditioned by the reflexive function of consciousness. Owing to this function the man-person has the experience of himself as the subject, as the subjective ego. The experience of his own subjectiveness is, as it were, superimposed on the "metaphysical subjectiveness" of the human ontological foundation.
Although objectification is brought about by the will as self-determination, this takes place within the frame or, we may perhaps say, in the current of the simultaneous, actual subjectification by consciousness. After all, man has the experience of each of his willings, of every act of self-determination, and this makes of it a thoroughly subjective fact. We then see the subject as if it were ceaselessly disclosed in its innermost objectiveness; we witness the disclosing, so to speak, of the objective constructing of the ego's own subject. When consciousness brings all this into the orbit of experience, then the inner objectiveness of the action, the objectification proper to self-determination, stands out sharply in the profile of the full
subjectiveness of the person who experiences himself as the acting ego. Then the person, the acting ego, also experiences the awareness that he is the one who is determined by himself and that his decisions make him become somebody, who may be good or bad - which includes at its basis the awareness of the very fact of his being somebody.
The Will Is Governed by the Objectifying Function of Cognition
While it is true that the experiencing of self-determination is conditioned by consciousness, there are no grounds to suppose that it is also guided by consciousness. In point of fact, the guidance of the cognitive function, which is indispensable in self-determination, in the dynamization of the will (as confirmed by experience and supported by philosophical tradition as well as empirical psychology), should on no account be confused either with the mirroring or the reflexive function of consciousness. The last of these functions plays an important role in
objectification, which has an essential significance for man. The guidance of the cognitive function, on the other hand, has an objectifying character. Thus, if self-determination and the whole dynamism of the will are to be guided by anything (this applies first of all to the intentionality of the will, to its orientation toward values or aims in general), then this can only be self-knowledge together with man's whole knowledge of the existing reality, in particular, his knowledge of values as possible ends and also as the basis of the norms that he refers to in his acting.
The objectiveness of self-determination and volition can only be correlated with the objectiveness of cognition. It is only by its objectifying function that cognition guides the will: nothing may be the object of will unless it is known. In its subjectifying function of consciousness, on the other hand, it accompanies the will and
supplements it within the framework of the specific structure presented by the
person, but it does not guide or control the will. Failure to recognize this fundamental difference leads inevitably to solipsism, subjectivism, and idealism, that is, to a situation in which the subject seems lost in its own specific reality or objectiveness.
This assertion also has a vital significance for the interpretation of the action. When speaking of conscious acting we stress primarily and basically the guiding function of cognition in acting and not only the awareness or the aspect of consciousness that accompany it.
The Dialectics of Objectification and Subjectification Appropriate to the Integral Dynamism of Will
This is how the acting person - the person acting consciously - reveals himself as a specific synthesis of objectiveness with subjectiveness. Looking at the two - as representing the "inner" and "outer" aspect of the integral human experience - and taking into account the experience of morality, we come to the conclusion that objectification and subjectification mutually supplement and in a way balance each other out. In this sense consciousness supplements and is the counterpoise of self-determination and vice versa. While consciousness, as was already asserted in Chapter 2, brings with it subjectification as well as a certain measure of inwardness:
self-determination introduces also some outwardness.
The Immanent Act Is Also an External Manifestation of the Person Every action is an external manifestation of the person, even when it is wholly performed internally. But an action confined strictly in its process as well as manifestations to the performing subject alone may be called an "immanent act."
Such action does not even involve anything of what in man makes his acting externally manifested and discernible. An act that carries the features of a manifestation external to the performing subject has been termed by some
contemporary philosophers "transcendent." But the external discernibility is not the only, and even less the best, test of that outwardness with regard to the person which we assert in the action. For the person is not only objectified in every one of his actions but also manifests himself externally even if its actions have, from the point of view of the criterion of discernibility, all the traits of immanence. On the other hand, parallel to the subjectification due to consciousness every action, however external it may appear, also remains to a certain degree immanent to the subject who performs it. We now see that the synthesis of objectiveness with
subjectiveness is thus projected in the dynamic image of the person as the synthesis of externality with immanence.
3. FREE WILL AS THE BASIS OF THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE ACTING