• No se han encontrado resultados

Having identified the tasks of railway operators and conducted the corresponding HTA, on- site observations within train cabins and control centres were performed. As ROSA was primarily developed on the characteristics of the UK mainline railway operations, the aim of the observations was to introduce an architecture that is transferable and could be applied to more than one types of network and between countries.

To satisfy the criterion of transferability to other types of network, observations were conducted in underground metro services. Thus, collaboration was established with the Piccadilly Line of the London Underground Limited. The main reasons for the selection of the Piccadilly Line were: its manual operation; the characteristics of its network, which combines both underground and over ground operations; its good reputation in terms of safety and punctuality; availability and accessibility of its personnel. The Piccadilly Line is

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

the second longest and fourth busiest line of London Underground, serving 53 stations along the route, with approximately 210 million passengers per year (2012 figures personal communication with Ms. Erica Hudson, LUL Improvements Service Manager).

In addition, to satisfy the criterion of transferability to other countries, observations were conducted in collaboration with a widely recognised European integrated company, the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB). The main reasons for the selection of SBB were: the organisation’s excellent reputation for safety; easy and complete access to both trains and control centres; availability and accessibility of SBB personnel and the complexity of its network. The SBB network, although small, is complex and dense. Its complexity is characterised by 804 stations within a 3,139 km network length, almost 347 million passengers and 50 million tonnes of goods transported every year (2010 figures, personal communication with Mr. Andreas Hönger, SBB Safety Manager). The extremely high percentage of its punctuality, combined with the lack of a dedicated freight train line and the multiple maintenance procedures on the network underpin the characteristics of its complexity.

Moreover, observations with additional two UK mainline operators were also performed in order to consolidate the findings from the literature and the HTA. These operators were the First ScotRail and First Hull Trains. The former is the main train operator in Scotland, primarily considered as a commuter service. The latter is the intercity train operator between Hull and London.

Observations at SBB were conducted in the period April-June 2011 on freight, commuter (inter-regio) and intercity passenger trains. In addition, a visit to a shunting yard took place, where trains are secured and stabled after completing service. Observations at FirstScot and First Hull Trains were conducted in December 2012 and February 2013 respectively on stabled trains. Finally, the Piccadilly Line observations took place in March 2013.

Figure 2-10 shows the layout of a typical train cabin of the Piccadilly Line, which has been in use since 1973. Figure 2-11, on the other hand, displays a part of the signalling and controlling system. Both Figures indicate some of the most critical parts of the on board equipment and external infrastructure.

Figure 2-11 Part of signalling and controlling system, Piccadilly Line, London Underground

While travelling in train cabins, the author monitored and recorded the tasks and activities of the train drivers, starting from the time they commence the service until the time that they secured the trains. Such activities were then compared with the findings from the task analysis. In addition, the information that train drivers were receiving from the different sources along the route were also recorded and compared to those described in the Figure 2-5.

In addition to train observations, onsite visits were made to two different control centres of the SBB, in May 2011. The first was the master railway control centre located in Zurich airport responsible for monitoring all services in the northern part of Switzerland. The control centre was staffed with both signallers and controllers. The second control centre, located in

1. Passenger emergency alarm brake override foot switch

2. Speedometer 3. Combined traction

and brake controller 4. Passenger doors

control

5. Communication handset, radio screen and keyboard

6. Cab audio display unit 7. Selector key

Wetzikon of Zurich, is in charge of train movements on a smaller dedicated part of the network and is operated by signallers only.

Observations, in both trains and control centres, confirmed the findings from the literature, in addition to providing further insights on operational procedures and system design. For example, although passenger trains operate on a strict time schedule, this is not the case for freight trains, when running on non-dedicated freight lines. The time planning of such services depends on the passenger train services with the implication that priority is given to a passenger trains over freight trains. The same applies to intercity and commuter trains, where priority is always given to the former. Another example is related to the information train drivers receive along the service. While the SBB train drivers are equipped with personal computers, where not only the route but also stops, speed limits and any unplanned maintenance works are displayed, such equipment is not provided to train drivers on the underground services of the Piccadilly Line. For these operations, train drivers are updated at the depots before starting their duties. During the operation, if something unexpectedly occurs they then contact or are contacted by dedicated signallers via the communication handsets.

Documento similar