Descripción de la metodología para el diagnóstico de la

In the earlier section on normative models, I talked about how we might best think of normative models in terms of (mathematical) formalizations of the problems that people

are trying to solve: the normative model against which we judge reasoning or behaviour is then the optimal solution to that formalised version of the problem. For example,

Bayes’ rule might be thought of as the formal solution to the problem of updating beliefs based on evidence under uncertainty.

Similarly, I think it can be helpful to view judgements of rationality as judgements about how well someone is solving a given problem. Disagreements about rationality

can therefore arise in two ways: disagreements about what the solution to a given formal problem is, or disagreements about what the appropriate formalisation of the problem is

in the first place. I think most disagreements about rationality are actually of the latter kind: about what the appropriate formalisation of the problem is, even though they

often look more like the former: disagreements about the right solution to the problem. Given a mathematical formalization of a problem, there’s simply not much room for

disagreement about what the solution is (which is not to say that finding the solution is easy.)

I think a lot of disagreement can arise, therefore, simply because researchers don’t realise this: they think they’re arguing about different solutions to the same problem,

but actually they’re solving subtly different problems. And if they were able to clarify the ways in which they’re framing the problem differently, they could agree that yes,

given the other’s formulation, their solution makes sense. For example, when someone claims a behaviour is ‘actually rational’ based on arguments about the specifics of the

environment a person is operating in, the cognitive constraints they’re operating under, or assuming certain goals, they are basically building in additional assumptions to the

problem - and asserting that, given these assumptions, the solution looks different. The person who originally claimed the behaviour was irrational can accept that yes,

given these additional assumptions and different framing of the problem, the solution is different and so the behaviour is not so irrational by different standards. This can

also be thought of as essentially terminological confusion - confusion about the ‘kind’ of rationality that is being referred to. To some extent, we may be able to simply accept

that there are different notions of rationality, different ways to formulate the problems people are trying to solve, and do our best to distinguish between them.

However, I may agree with you that given how you have formulated the problem, your solution is correct (given your definition of rationality, the behaviour is rational), but still

disagree with your formulation of the problem (disagree that your definition of rationality is appropriate.) Give our discussion of different types of rationality, I think there are

three main ways in which this disagreement can arise. There is, however, considerable overlap between these different dimensions of disagreement, and they might even better

be thought of as subtly different ways of thinking about what is essentially the same disagreement.

1. Disagreement about the level of generality at which problems should be framed:

For example, theories of normative rationality use broad, abstract models such

as probability theory as the standard against which to judge reasoning on a very wide range of problems. These are construing the problem people are trying to

solve very broadly - in terms of adhering to very general principles or standards (such as consistency.) By contrast, theories of ecological or bounded rationality

are essentially suggesting that we should frame the problems people are trying to solve much more narrowly: factoring in specifics of the situation, and judging

rationality in terms of how well people solve a specific problem, not how well they solve a range of problems in general.

2. Disagreement about the relevant goals against which rationality should be judged:

Theories of normative rationality either seem to assume no specific goals at all, or only the most minimal goals that all people could be expected to have across

all situations, such as consistency/avoiding exploitation. Theories of epistemic ra- tionality suggest that the main goal against which rationality should be judged

is accuracy, whereas theories of instrumental rationality suggest that rationality should be more often judged relative to whatever the goals of the agent are in a

given situation - implying that goals should be more specific than normative ratio- nality suggests, and more subjective than epistemic rationality suggests. Theories

of evolutionary rationality imply that the relevant goals are evolutionary ones, goals at the level of the gene - and we should judge a person’s rationality rela-

tive to whether their behaviour is evolutionarily adaptive. We might also imagine further distinctions where rationality is judged relative to goals at different levels:

rationality relative to more short-term versus long-term goals, rationality relative to individual-level goals versus goals at a larger group or societal level.

There is certainly some room to ‘agree to disagree’ here - we can simply say

a behaviour is rational with respect to one goal and not to another. But I think there is also some substantive disagreement over whether the concept of rationality

should, in the most basic sense, take as given certain goals, or prioritise certain goals over others when they come into conflict.

3. Disagreement about how much we should factor in various constraints (environmental and cognitive):

Theories of normative rationality take very little, if any, account of the constraints people actually face when making judgements/decisions - whereas theories of eco-

logical and bounded rationality suggest that taking these constraints into account is crucial for formulating the relevant problem. Again, there may be room to sim-

ply agree that these are describing different types of rationality - and this also seems closely related to point 1.: whether rationality is defined relative to a spe-

cific narrow problem or more broadly. I think the substantive disagreement here is whether the notion of rationality should take into account cognitive constraints -

which I think is essentially a question about whether the standards against which we judge human reasoning should be realistically attainable or not. Theories of

normative rationality seem to be under no pretense of providing actual processes that people could realistically follow. Whereas theories of prescriptive rationality

(closely related to ecological and bounded rationality), suggest that we should for- mulate the problem in a way that’s realistically solvable by humans, and therefore

judge human reasoning relative to a standard that’s realistically attainable.

At root, I think the main disagreement may come down to whether there is any one

thing we can call rationality, simpliciter, without it needing to be expressed in relative or instrumental terms. Is there such a thing as being simply ‘rational’, or are all attri-

some specific problem one is trying to solve? We often talk about rationality without qualification, suggesting we think of it in this broad sense - but it’s not clear exactly

even what this would mean, and as Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue, the idea of an unqualified notion of rationality raises problematic issues around drawing is-ought infer-

ences. At best, we might follow Oaksford (2014) and Stanovich (2011) and suggest that a broad kind of rationality is one which is judged relative to very general problems and

the most minimal goals and assumptions. But even this kind of rationality is relative.4

I suspect that some substantive disagreement will remain, nonetheless, over what it is

appropriate to call ‘rational’. I’d find it hard to accept someone using the term ‘rational’ to describe how effectively someone was achieving the goal of self-deception, for example,

even if strictly speaking they were behaving rationally with respect to that goal - our intuitive concept of rationality is certainly more closely tied to certain goals than others.

However, I think we could make much greater progress understanding human reasoning and how it goes wrong, if claims of ‘rationality’ were made more specific - if, when

attributing rationality, we could clarify whether this is meant in a broad or more specific sense, and talked more in terms of the specific problems people are trying to solve either

well or poorly.