Limitaciones del estudio y futuras líneas de investigación

We will at this point turn to one more issue, i.e. the Temelin nuclear power plant. Even though it is a partial problem, and therefore not of a systemic character, seeming not to deserve so much space within a chapter on history, the infl uence which the Temelin nuclear power plant has on the formation and devel-opment of the Czech energy sector means we cannot ignore it. We will not look at the importance which the Temelin nuclear power plant has for the energy mix or its technical performance, but rather in the cir-cumstances of the power plant’s completion, as one of the most delicate energy-related topics in the 1990s.

The decision to build the power plant came as early as 1980, with a planned four 1,000 megawatt VVER 1000 blocks. Two years later, a contract on supply of the Soviet technical project followed, while the construction permit was issued in November 1986. When construction was initiated in February 1987 (company Skoda Praha), it seemed that everything would proceed without greater complications all the way through to the launching of the power plant (see ČEZ, a. s., n.d.j.).

After November 1989, the project came to be modifi ed, mainly after re-evaluating whether the Czech Republic needed such a massive power source and after calculating the cost. The Czech Government with Decree No. 103/93 from March 1993 considered building a mere two blocks, which in 2000 produced their fi rst electricity, while in 2002 (the fi rst block), respectively in 2003 (the second block) underwent test operation. They were launched with their full capacity in 2004. The power plant received fi nal approval in 2006 (see ČEZ, a. s., n.d.j.).

This brief description, however, neglects the turbulent atmosphere which had lasted for more than a decade when construction was taking place. Temelin was raising powerful reactions both at local and foreign level, and its completion was more than once given second thoughts.

The fi rst serious obstacles it had to face arrived immediately at the start of 1990s, when its opponents organized themselves within NGOs, such as South Bohemian Mothers against Atomic Danger. Demon-strations against completion were frequent, such as the one, for example, on April 27, 1991, which was also joined by the citizens of Germany and Austria (see Petrlík, 1991, p. 8).

During the same period the awkwardness of the Temelin issue was confi rmed also by the decision of the government headed by Prime Minister Petr Pithart, who closed the question of Temelin’s completion by leaving the fi nal verdict to his successors. The two studies which emerged in 1992 made a contribution of their own; one commissioned by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Development of the Czech

Re-public and the other ordered from the American company Power International by unidentifi ed government offi ces. Without going into detail, we can note that the studies were dramatically at odds with each other – the one ordered by the Ministry argued that the completion of Temelin nuclear power plant was necessary if the country was to escape an energy collapse. Power International, on the contrary, saw the completion of the power plant as leading to a surplus of electricity and the need to close a signifi cant amount of other energy capacity. A similar analysis was introduced also concerning the estimated electricity price, which was supposed to be 0.60 CZK or even up to 2.40 CZK (see Gruner, 1992, p. 5).

The further progress on the construction then continued in a similarly unpersuasive manner. An-nouncements of delays or rising prices were quite regular, until the intervention of the Government headed by Prime Minister Josef Tosovsky, which asked an independent commission to inspect the whole business.

Its fi nal report released a fi nal price ranging around a level of at least 110 billion CZK, while the commis-sion did not miss the opportunity to question the need for the Temelin nuclear power plant in the fi rst place, in terms of expected energy consumption (see Hrubý, 1999; Švehla, 1999a, p. 6).

Tab. 2.4: The Final Report of the Expert Team for an Independent Assessment of the Completion of the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant

The report points out the ineffi ciency of investment into the Temelin nuclear power plant as a whole.

Then it states that the completion of Temelin seems to be quite risky and that the non-completion of Te-melin can be managed with less risk than any alternative based on TeTe-melin’s functioning. The decision on completion or non-completion cannot be, according to these experts, supported with unambiguous economic arguments for going for one or the other solution. Each solution will, according to them, have more negative than positive aspects. The agreements closed with the domestic suppliers and Westing-house are basically perceived as disadvantageous for CEZ as the investor. The credibility of agreed schedules, moreover, for CEZ presents a business risk (prolongation of deadlines, rising expenses). In-vestment assets for the Temelin nuclear power plant and the production costs per electricity unit are far beyond the average when compared to foreign projects. The report also notes that outages ascribed to a lack of electricity as a result of the non-existence of the Temelin nuclear power plant can be dismissed.

The situation after 2015 is being, however, undeclared, when the majority of existing coal will come to an end of their era. A parallel scenario of substituting the Temelin production with alternative energy sources would, moreover, contribute to a greater employment. The report ironically, despite the latter point, sees the completion of building as an option making an economic contribution. It nevertheless warns that a market (either in the Czech Republic or abroad) for electricity produced in Temelin should be found, else completion would render it uneconomic and unnecessary.

Source: Hrubý, 1999; prepared by P. Bendlová

Tab. 2.5: The Increasing Costs of Building the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant in 1993–1999 (billion CZK

According to Government Decree No. 109 from 1993, the construction of two Temelin blocks was supposed to cost 68.8 billion CZK. During the delayed construction, not com-pleted until 2000 (the Government originally planned commencement in 1995-1997), the price rose by almost 30 billion CZK, therefore, by approximately 43 % of the orig-inal budget. This was a result of a change of technologies and docu-mentation processing, change in the works’ timetable, transformation of contractual relations, a change of cabling and Westinghouse’s under-estimates. The expense of chang-ing technologies between 1991 and 1993 was also a part of the price.

Source: “Údaje o Temelínu,” n.d.; “Temelín – termín dostavby neznámý,” 1998; Sviták, 2010; pre-pared by P. Bendlová

In terms of the economic profi tability of the whole power plant, it was said that the investments would return economically only if the power plant were to be completed in three years. Traditionally reserved towards Temelin, the weekly Respekt commented on the conclusions of the report with open sarcasm:

“Throughout the year CEZ was providing us with two sorts of information. Firstly, that electricity from the nuclear power plant is absolutely the cheapest, and secondly, that the republic would break down in the aftermath of an energy collapse without this super-cheap electricity. Today marks the fourth year from when we were supposed to live in a country sunk in darkness, where trains do not run, factories stand still and hospitals are closed. This is how CEZ experts painted the future of the Czech Republic after 1995, if Temelin were not completed. The power plant is still not standing, but dark forecasts, nevertheless, have been proven wrong. (…) Together with postponing the date of completion, the energy lobby also pushed its prophesy of an energy emergency further off. In the mid-1990s, CEZ predicted it at the end of the dec-ade, now in 2005 we will supposedly “make it” without Temelin” (see Švehla, 1999b, p. 5).

In any case, (already Zeman’s) government decided to proceed with the unconditional completion of the Temelin nuclear power plant, where the major role was played by the convincing proponent of the project, Minister Gregr. “I do not believe the arguments that Temelin is unnecessary,” commented one of completion’s proponents, Minister of Interior Affairs, Vaclav Grulich. “ After all, we need to get industry on its feet. And then it will be necessary” (see Švehla, 1999c, p. 4).

By this the last obstacle to completion fell and on November 3, 2006, with effect from November 6 of the same year, Temelin was supposed to be put to the test.

At this point it would be appropriate to use yet more available information and decide what was ac-tually true in the discussion over the completion of the whole power plant. Unfortunately, it is even with a certain distance in time impossible to provide an unambiguous answer. It is in the fi rst place complicated by the problem’s complexity itself – the lifespan of a nuclear power plant is estimated at several decades, therefore, posing the diffi culty of calculating the return on investment even by using more sophisticated economic methods. Moreover, such a massive building to a particular extent infl uences the whole devel-opment of the Czech energy mix and, by the same token, in a specifi c manner adjusts its setting.

In parallel, a number of arguments are by their nature very hard to quantify; particularly the issue of the entire power plant’s safety. The latter mainly depends on one’s personal point of view. ... We will regardless try to at least comment on the most frequent arguments used during the debate.

Temelin nuclear power plant is not and, with respect to trends in electricity consumption, will not be necessary.

One of the key trumps of opponents was to challenge the need for Temelin itself with respect to the constant export of electricity from the Czech Republic.

Tab. 2.6: The Production and Export of Electricity in the Czech Republic from 1989 de-clined from almost 79 % to less than 70 %, in 2002-2007 (when Temelin was started up) it in-creased to almost 84 %, while it in the forthcoming years again that almost 90 % of net exports consist of an amount equivalent

x – the subject does not exist/does not produce electricity

Source: Sviták, 2010; Peterková, 2007, p. 5; Energetický regulační úřad, 2011f; ČEZ, a. s., 2010c, p. 21; prepared by P. Bendlová

“In 1998, CEZ, for example, declared that we could manage without electricity from the Temelin nucle-ar power plant until 2003, but then we would stnucle-art to feel its absence. In 1999, it said that this would happen in 2005, while the analysis of the Temelin Commission noted that the new capacities would not be necessary before 2010”, summarized the weekly Ekonom in 2000 (see Geussová, 2000a, p. 10). If we look at statistics, it shows that net exports of electricity from the Czech Republic constantly increase, and from 2003 even exceeds, sometimes only matching, the whole production of Temelin (see “Bilance elektrické energie”).

In that context, the argument over the necessity of Temelin as a replacement for the closed down coal-fi red power plant blocks was also questionable, when CEZ had between 1991 and 1998 taken 2,020 MW of installed capacity out of operation (see 90. léta – program “vyčištění” uhelných zdrojů).

Tab. 2.7: CEZ Coal-Fired Power Plants – decommissioned capacity (reduction program of coal)

Year Decommissioned capacity [MW]

1991 320

1992 320

1993 55

1994 310

1995 50

1996 160

1997 0

1998 905

Total 2,120

As part of the coal reduction program, CEZ had in 1991-1998 reduced installed capacity by 2,120 MW.

For comparison, the Temelin nuclear power plant has 2,000 MW of installed capacity.

Source: ČEZ, a. s., n.d.h; modifi ed by P. Bendlová

This argument was deployed in 1993, for example, by the then General Director of CEZ, Petr Karas:

“We are not building Temelin for today, but approximately for 2000. In 1996, CEZ is bound to take out of operation all polluting energy sources... [Temelin] is not to add capacity to the system, but to substitute for those coal-fi red power plants, which are being put out of operation” (see Wanke, 1993, p. 8).

It seems that the defenders of Temelin’s completion went rather too far with their estimates and anal-ysis at least concerning the assessment of demand and consumption of electricity in the Czech Republic.

On the other hand, the key factor of nuclear plants was often understated, which is their major role in en-suring a base load³⁹. Unlike coal and gas power plants which are more suitable for covering the demand for peak energy, nuclear power plants prove adequate exactly for delivering a stable, non-oscillating volume of electricity to the grid. In the whole debate focused on the necessity vs. dispensability of Temelin power plant, this argument was brought up only marginally.

Profi tability of Temelin Nuclear Power Plant

“There is no reason to question the whole sum necessary to build the Temelin nuclear power plant, which is 68.8 billion CZK”, responded the Head of CEZ’s Press Department, Michal Kacena, in 2004 to objections of the Green Party regarding the increasing costs of this power plant (see ČEZ popírá, že Te-melín bude dvakrát dražší). The fi nal cost in the end rose to roughly 95–110 billion CZK.⁴⁰

39 See the chapter on the electric power industry.

40 The difference is caused by the fact that lower estimates do not include expenses such as interest on the loan for completion of the project.

Deciding whether the construction will pay off is, however, overly complicated. The calculation also involves the changing market price of electricity, which is, with regard to Temelin’s lifespan, extremely hard to estimate. Political pressures have their impact as well, for example, in terms of the fi nancially demanding enhancement of safety, which was certainly brought into connection, for example, with the events following the accident at Fukushima. The traditional objection of Temelin’s opponents is that the costs of the power plant are to a certain degree covered by the state, which in the case of a potential acci-dent guarantees the reimbursement of damage exceeding a particular limit.

When speaking of the increasing price, we must hereby declare the fundamental argument – the price to a great extent rose also due to a change of technology during the building of Temelin. The originally So-viet-Czech reactor was in the middle of the 1990s supplemented with a control system from the American company Westinghouse, imposing estimated costs of 320 million USD, or approximately 9 billion CZK.

Perhaps the greatest problem of Temelin was, however, that, as time passed, its potential liquidation without completion was became progressively more economically meaningless. In 2000, CEZ’s spokes-man Ladislav Kriz, for example, estimated that not launching Temelin would cost 84 billion CZK within the arranged investment, and another 1.7 billion for fuel and 10 billion of additional payments arising from closed contracts; all that versus the then value of the company set at approximately 60 billion (see Geussová, 2000c, p. 10).

Power Plant Safety

It is exactly the power plant’s safety that has been and remains the most stimulating and most fre-quently discussed issue in the public debate.

“We think that the operation of the Temelin nuclear power plant is at the frontier of risk even under normal circumstances. This may be evidenced by constant interruptions of operation, during which the whole primary sector is burdened beyond the bearable, especially the reactor container. The experimental observation of clusters’ behaviour during the power plant’s full operation is being carried out, as well as the separate monitoring of fuel deformation related to its leakage. A number of smaller and seemingly un-related technical problems can, however, result in serious malfunctions, which would mean fatal jeopardy of residents’ health and lives, not to mention property damage” (see Jihočeské matky, 2007). This is, for example, is the stance of the NGO South Bohemian Mothers, for a long time opposing the power plant, declared in one of the open letters to CEZ.

It is, however, exactly here that the issue of personal perspective on the matter arises most evidently.

Safety as such cannot be absolutely ensured in any device, its setting is a techno-political consensus over what safety level implies a minimization of risk proportional to the investment.

In that respect, building basically proceeded in a responsible manner. The originally questioned Sovi-et technology was enhanced by the systems of Westinghouse. It is true that the power plant (in comparison to, for example, Dukovany nuclear power plant) suffers from a greater number of planned and unplanned interruptions, which are in the majority of cases related to the non-nuclear parts of the facility. From the perspective of EU and Czech standards, the Temelin nuclear power plant is in safety terms, however, un-problematic.

From a decade-long perspective after the power plant was put into operation, the whole construction can be judged from two different points of view. The fi rst emphasizes the importance of a stable, low-emis-sion and predictable power source with unproblematic fuel supplies and with the prospect of decades-long

functioning. On the other hand, the building process itself does not bring too much optimism. The effort to complete the power plant at any price without considering public opinion, rising cost and fi nancial risk, too frequently appeared as an expression of the personal preferences of the relevant decision-makers rather than as a result of the unbiased assessment of the need for, advantages and costs of this power plant.