The 'classical model' of the civil society (Harm, 1996) conceives the political, economic and moral distribution of pow ers through the provision and consumption of housing in general, and the modes of tenure in particular. In
fact, the Lockian distribution of pow er in itself disem powers tenancy.^ The only spatial modes of appropriation that it legally recognises are ownership and joint-ownership (Thomasset, 1987). This model relies upon the alleged 'inherent advantages' and the moral superiority of ownership. For instance, Saunders (1990) claims that ownership is inherently more profitable than renting for it provides an indefinite right of use, a right to give aw ay or bequeath, a right to modify, the right to do w hat one wills w ith the property as well as the security of tenure and the possibility of investing in something one controls. In this respect, ownership is considered as an investment w hereas renting is a loss. As Saunders (1989) says, ownership creates a stronger sense of 'ontological security' because of the sense of pride it provides and enables. The idea that ownership might be 'inherently' more advantageous has been challenged, however, by Kemeny (1981, 1983), Ball (1983), Bourassa et ah (1995), Crook and Kemp (1996), and Werczberger (1997),^’ w ho dem onstrate that ow nership's advantages are socially constructed. The logical implication here is that renting m ay be socially advantageous in a given context. I w ould not go as far as saying that renting is socially advantageous in Montreal. Renting is too often associated with housing precariousness. Too many tenants are constrained to this mode of tenure. For instance, the low est proportion of tenants are found in the neighbourhoods where the average income is the highest and the rate of unemployment amongst the lowest. In contrast, the highest proportion of tenants is found amongst the poorest neighbourhoods:^” Parc Extension, the neighbourhood w ith the lowest average income, includes 81% of tenants and the highest rate of unemployment: 30%. Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, the neighbourhood w ith the second lowest average income comprises 85% of tenants and the second higher rate of unemployment: 18.5%. H aving said that.
See Chapter 2.
In Canada, ow nership has traditionally benefited from a positive government bias despite socially regressive effects. In fact, government subsidisation is the most significant and enduring source of w ealth for homeowners and provides the most substantial base for the economic advantage of home ow nership (Pratt, 1982, 1986); let alone that, unlike almost any other type of asset, hom es are exempt from capital gains tax (Harris, 1991).
See Chapter 5.
I will echo Crook and Kemp (1996), W hitehead (1996) and Bourassa et al. (1995), w ho emphasise how mobility m ay be p art of the advantage of renting. As such, 1 w ould be inclined to believe that moving can be advantageous when one is a tenant in Montreal. A nd I w ül hold that people in M ontreal are not mobile because they are tenants, bu t that moving is a m eans for them to try to take advantage of renting. At least, to make the best of it.
In this respect, we have to question the absolute association betw een renting, mobility and disempowerment and the belief that a sense of Being or ontological security only rests upon ownership. Moving m ay aUow, as deCerteau (1985) w ould probably say, a spatial realisation of place which make practices of spaces ways of Being-in-the-world or, as Deleuze (Vergely, 1993) w ould contend, a w ay of becoming. The situation described here, often that of tenants, is the situation of people w ho do not or w ho cannot own their place. It reveals that subjects often attem pt to constitute themselves through the successive investment of places, though the successive places they inhabit and the changes of places, even though their margin of manoeuvre is thin, perhaps, especially when it is thin. Moving, for them, becomes a means of reahsation of one's aspiration for the appropriation of space, which chaUenges the idea that ownership m ay be the only means of doing it. If we were to paraphrase Miller (1988), we could say that the change of place may counterbalance tenants' sense of powerlessness. It m ay become empowering. This is probably w hy the stabihty policy has been criticised by some tenants' defenders such as Lefebvre (1979), for w hat could be called the 'excess of stability'. Lefebvre suggested that such a policy in favour of tenants' residential stabihty, stripped those very tenants of a certain right to mobility, the move often being favoured to the legal rights by the more impoverished p e r s o n s . I do n o t agree w ith Lefebvre w ho argues that the stabihty policy
To that, Jobin (1982) w ould retort w ithout any doubt that the tenant still has the p ossib ility to move by subletting his or her dwelling or by transferring his or her lease and that the tenant still enjoys the absolute right of not renewing his or her lease. A s such, only the tenant can dispute the content of a notice, the lessor having no means to oppose a tenant's decision to leave.
threatens the right to mobility. W hat is at issue here is n ot so m uch the right to move, b u t the pow er to do so. I believe, however, that the 'stability policy' can legitimately be criticised for failing to recognise the advantage of moving for tenants, m ore particularly, for the least privileged and disem pow ered people: those w ho m ay think that the legal means provided by the FJgie du logement are not for them; those who m ay prefer to manage by themselves and to do so by changing.
Fig. 4 People m oving themselves in M ontreal
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Chapter 6