As previously described, Bodner and Langer (2001) state:
“In a complex environment, individuals use a variety of cognitive tools to minimize the competition for precious cognitive resources. One such tool is a reliance on cognitive structures (e.g., prototypes, schemas, scripts) to organize experience.”
(p3, Bodner and Langer, 2001)
The process of experiencing the environment through combinatorial structures can be understood through the application of prior knowledge as mental “schemas”. As previously described cognition, both cognition and conscious-cognition, plays a critical part in an organisms ability to survive and adapt in a given environment; and this is reliant upon the organisms previous knowledge. The application of knowledge however is often required to be performed in circumstances that are less than identical to the previous knowledge, there is often something that is different, added or missing; and a process is required to ‘fill in the blanks’. For example, not all drinking glasses are identical (e.g. Figure 1.19 below) but I know that they are all drinking glasses without much thinking upon why; the properties of a technology as affordances (a range of ‘stimulus’) together with the context in which they are presented inform me that the most probable type of object it could be is a drinking glass (without needing to explore all of the affordances). There are a set of rules or requirements that also inform me that the object is not a bucket (e.g. Size, placement in environment etc.).
Figure 1.19; Example of various drinking glasses5
Psychologist theorise that this may be due to knowledge being organised as cognitive structures within long term memory, known as schemas (Arbib, 1992). These schemas are formed as central concepts during interaction with the environment and organise experience as mental representations and understandings of others, events, and technologies (Piaget, 1962). Chalmers (2003) states Piaget’s notion of knowledge and interaction with the environment as founded upon schemas with the adaption of existing schemas to incorporate new information playing a central role:
“Piaget proposed that learning is the result of forming new schemas and building upon previous schemas. He proposed that two processes guide learning: (1) the organization of schemas, and (2) adaptation of schemas. He further proposed that adaptation of schemas involves: (a) the assimilation of new information into existing schemas, or (b) the accommodation of schemas to new information, which may not fit into existing schemas.” (p596, Chalmers, 2003)
As described above, when experiencing external stimulus a process of accommodation or assimilation occurs. Accommodation is the process whereby new cognitive structures are formed, e.g. The first time you experience an ice-cream. Assimilation is the process where the current experience is compared to existing schemas to understand the experience of the world around e.g. The second time you encounter the same stimulus (an ice-cream) you recognise it against the previous experience (mapped schema) of ice-cream. Should there be a mismatch, e.g. it is of ice but does not taste of ice-cream (e.g. snow); the process of accommodation again occurs and either creates a new schema e.g. of snow, adapts
the existing schema e.g. Not all ice-cream is good; or places restrictions upon it e.g. ice-cream does not come from the floor. As noted by Wachtel (1980) a human is not just “stimulus-bound”, responding to the environment in a solely reflexive capacity, but selectively organises and makes sense of the input in relation to past
experiences and structures (schemas). Humans, stated by schema theory, do not
primarily learn new information or approach all stimulus as novel; but apply existing knowledge (cognitive structures) toward novel information, stimulus, environment, and contexts; and adapt to ill-fitting models. Therefore, when encountering new information and stimulus that maps close enough to an existing schema (to be functional) the pre-existing schema is applied without need to consciously reflect (think) upon the situation; as noted by Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki (2009) in describing interaction with a familiar interface:
“Schema theory postulates that perception, interpretation, specification and execution can be shortcut when prior schemas are triggered. Action is direct, automatic - we might here say intuitive - if each stage benefits from prior schemas. Conversely, when no schema is triggered, the user has to analyze the interface content. This effortful mechanism is necessary until new ad hoc schemas are constructed.”
(p36, Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki, 2009)
Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki’s (2009) understanding of the execution of schemas, above, is comparable to cognition as stated by Århem and Liljenström (1997). Therefore we can think of assimilation schemas in the same understanding as cognition; and so here are understood as a Mindless state when performed based on environmental stimulus as automatic and intuitive, bypassing an analytical stage. When a schemas do not fit, a new mode of action or behaviour is required (accommodation), a slow process whereby the ‘user’ analyses the information, which here is assumed to be a conscious-cognition and so Mindful.
1.12.2: Automaticity And Intuition
Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki’s (2009) introduce specific terms for the application of schemas (or cognition) without requiring conscious reflection or awareness; “automatic” and “intuitive” (as previously quoted).
Intuition
Intuitive is often understood as analogous to “familiar” (Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010; Raskin, 1994), in that a person “knows” how to achieve a goal, or initiate / react to specific stimulus, without conscious effort through drawing upon
previously gained knowledge and experience (enacted as “implicit memory” (Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010)). This “intuitive interaction” (Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010) is sub-conscious processing of information and facilitates rapid learning/utilisation of how systems of interaction operate (Löffler et. al., 2013; Naumann et al, 2013) and can be understood as “knowing without reasoning or conscious processes” (p379, Sinclair, 2010). It has been noted that this is not just “wild guessing” of potential actions, but is the application of a previous experience and knowledge towards a current perceived similar situation (Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010).
The most apparent effect of intuition is the speed at which meaning or significance occurs (being sub-/ non-conscious) as opposed to slower more analytical (predominantly conscious and reflective-conscious) processes (Baars, 1993; Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010). Intuition here is understood as the process of assimilation of mental schemas toward novel experiences operating without inhibition or failure i.e. Do not require amendment. A conscious or reflective conscious thought is not required or applied and previously existing knowledge is applied sub-consciously. As such, intuition can be regarded as a Mindless act.
Automatic behaviours (Automaticity)
Automatic behaviours are (broadly) described as occurring quickly without the need for conscious monitoring/attending (Wheatley and Wegner, 2001); seen as performing “efficiently” (Bargh,1994) they are fast in action whilst requiring little (if any) effortful conscious thought or control (Moors and Houwer, 2006; Wheatley and Wegner, 2001). As noted by Anderson (1992), automaticity has previously been understood to be the “effortless extraction of features in perception” (p165), though this expression is not accurate. Rather, the automaticity that is discussed here is in reference to “…some cognitive process whose operation is not subject to conscious control” (p165, Anderson, 1992). Differing from intuition, automatic processes are learned actions that following significant repetition (consistent practice) become enacted sub- to non-consciously (Moors and Houwer, 2006, Wheatley and Wegner, 2001), and are performed during the majority of daily tasks (Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010) e.g. familiar password entry, responding to greetings, and typical daily operations such as tying shoelaces. The process of a task becoming automatic is easier if there is consistent stimulus-to-response mapping (Anderson, 1992), whereby new schemes are not required, and existing schemas do not require conscious adaption. And so, automatic processes are considered to be triggered sub- / non-consciously by stimulus from the environment (operating beyond conscious control, such a visceral reaction), or may be consciously motivated (Wheatley and Wegner, 2001) as part of a larger goal (as a nested action). This can
automaticity” (Wheatley and Wegner, 2001) is enacted. Much like Langer’s (1989) skilled typist before being asked to reflect on the process, the key presses that compose the password are pressed in rapid succession with no conscious control (as the action occurs faster than conscious recall of the individual key combinations and conscious hand movements); this is, to an extent, “conscious” in the fact the knowledge of a goal exists (password entry) yet “automatic” in the processes of achieving that goal (for a fuller account see (Moors and Houwer, 2006)). This automatic process (password entry) may be nested in the further goal of e.g. sending an email. While automaticity is beneficial in that it reduces the cognitive effort and time to perform a repeated action it holds central a consequence. The repeated action/thought, previously consciously initiated, becomes so embedded that it becomes the default action for the given stimulus (and any stimulus that maps the schema close enough to function), and initiated non-consciously (Wheatley and Wegner, 2001) and reflexively (Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010). This is further problematic in that the ‘priming effects’ (the stimulus that initiates an automatic behaviour and schema) require effortful processes to inhibit (i.e. A Concerted conscious awareness). Priming effects have been previously described (two-rings problem and Dunker's "Box" problem chapter 1.7). If the automatic action is initiated and performed faster than a conscious inhibition (or any conscious awareness) the automatic action will continue till its completion.
Though intuition and automaticity are differing in their application context, as described above, we can understand them as similar in their process (the application of previously learned schemas).
Automaticity is here proposed as a basis and enactment of Mindlessness.