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hould I take a risk? Should I make a sacrifice? Questions such as these quite often have to be solved . It is clear that here there is not and cannot be a general prescription . The best that readers can be advised to do is refer to books and articles in which this type of situation is analysed . Test them on yourself - try, by deeply analysing the position, to decide how you would act in this or that case, and then check your reasoning with the commentator's conclu sions. By acting in this way, you will not only develop your technique of calculating varia tions, but also learn to determine intuitively the degree of acceptable risk.I should like to show you the analysis of a sharp position, which occurred in a game of the Soviet master Vladimir Simagin (he became a grandmaster much later). Eleven years later (without having any knowledge of that previous game) the same position was obtained by Bobby Fischer. The opin ions of Simagin and Fischer diverged . You have the opportunity to make a choice, to decide which player's handling of the position was more correct.
Shamkovich - Simagin Leningrad 1 95 1 GrOnfeld Defence 1 d4 tLlf6 2 c4 g6 3 tLlc3 d5 4 tLlf3 i..g7 5 'it'b3 dxc4 6 'it'xc4 0-0 7 e4 8 i..e3 9 'iVb3 i..g4 tLlfd7 i..xf3
Black wants to develop his knight at c6, but the immediate 9 . . . tLlc6 ru ns into 1 0 'iVxb7 tLla5 1 1 'it'a6, as in the game Polugayevsky Simagin, played in Leningrad in the 1 960 USSR Championship (however, after 1 1 .. . c5 1 2 dxc5 l1b8, according to the Encyclopae dia of Chess Openings, the position is unclear).
The preliminary exchange on f3, eliminating one of the defenders of the d4-point, does not leave White time to capture the pawn on b7. However, it also has its drawbacks, and therefore the main theoretical continuation became 9 . . . tLlb6.
10 gxf3 tLlc6 1 1 1:[d1 ?
Now Simagin's idea proves justified . As later practice showed , by playing 1 1 O-O-O! White gains an advantage.
11 . . . e5 1 2 dxe5
1 2 d5?! tLld4 is unfavourable for White. 1 2 . . . tLlcxe5 1 3 i.. h3
Leonid Shamkovich plays aggressively, hop ing to exploit the pin on the knight at d7. I n the event o f 1 3 i..e2 Black has the excellent reply 1 3 .. . 'it'h4 ! , and if 14 f4, then 14 . . . tLlg4.
1 3 . . . tLlxf3+! 1 3 .. . 'it'h4!? 14 i..xd7 l:tad8 would also have given Black a good game.
If 1 4 'iti>f1 Simagin gives the variation 1 4 .. . lDfe5! 1 5 i..xd7 lDxd7 1 6 'iVb5 c6 1 7 'ili'xb7 i..xc3 (the immediate 1 7 .. . 'iVh4! is no worse) 1 8 bxc3 'ili'h4 ! . Now 1 9 'iVxd7 lIad8 is not possible, while after 1 9 lIxd7 both 1 9 .. . .:tab8 and 1 9 .. . 'iVxe4 are strong .
1 4 . . . lDfe5 1 5 i..xd7
If 1 5 ':'xd7, then 1 5 .. . 'iIi'h4! ( 1 5 . . . lDxd7 1 6 l:td 1 is less good ). 1 5 f4 'iVh4 1 6 i..xd7 lDxd7 1 7 lixd7 'iVg4+ will also not do.
1 5 . . . lDxd7 1 6 'iVb5 c6 1 7 'ili'xb7 l:tb8 1 8 'ili'xd7
Of course, not 1 8 'iVxc6? l:txb2+ 1 9 'iti>f1 'iVh4 ! .
1 8 . . . lIxb2+ 19 'iti>f1
Here is the position in which I invite you to take a decision for Black. He has a choice between regaining the knight, transposing into a roughly equal ending, and the attempt to attack a piece down by either 1 9 .. . 'iVh4 (from here the queen controls the h3-square and attacks the pawn on e4), or 1 9 .. . 'iVf6 (aiming at the weak f3-square). Which would you prefer?
I n the game Evans-Fischer (USA Champi onship 1 962/63) Black d id not risk going in for the complications and he restricted himself to the simple 1 9 ... 'ii'xd7 20 l:1xd7 i..xc3. A draw became practically inevitable. 21 l:txa7 :te8 22 .l:.a4 i..b4 23 i..d4 ':c2 24 l:.xb4 c5 25 i..xc5 ':'xc5 26 'iti>g2 ':c2 27 a4 l:td8 28 'iti>g3 ':'a2 29 ':c1 %1dd2 30 I:tf1 l:td3+ 31 f3 %:tda3 32 ':'d1 l1xa4 33 l::td8+ 'iti>g7 Draw.
Simagin acted differently. He declined the draw offered at that moment and sacrificed a piece.
19 . . . 'ili'f6 ! ! I n fact, i t is also not easy to refute the move 1 9 ... 'iVh4? ! . 20 'ii'xc6? (or 20 'ili'd3?) is bad in view of 20 .. . 'iIi'h3+ 21 'iti>e1 'iVf3, attacking the rook and threatening mate after 22 .. . i..xc3+. I f 2 0 lDa4?! Black can reply 20 .. . l:txa2 21 lDc5 i..h6 22 'ifd3 'ili'h3+ 23 'iti>e1 i..xe3 24 'iVxe3 'ii'xe3+ 25 fxe3 .:1fb8 with sufficient counterplay. The strongest continuation is 20 lDe2! 'ili'xe4 21 ':g1 (weaker is 21 lDg3 'ili'f3 22 ':c1 f5!) 21 ... l:txa2 22 ':'c1 !?, intending 23 'ili'xc6 or 23 'iVg4 followed by 'ii'c4. White success fully consolidates and retains an advantage. Fischer considered the sacrifice made in the game to be completely incorrect. But Simagin tried to show that Black's combination leads to a win. I think that the truth l ies somewhere in between . Let us examine some varia tions.
1. 20 lDa4? This is what Shamkovich played in the game. After 20 .. J::txa2 21 lDc5 'iVf3 22 'iti>g1 (22 1:[g 1 'ii'e2+ 23 'iti>g2 'ili'xe3) 22 ... i..h6! Black's attack became irresist ible. There followed 23 i..d4 'ili'xd1 + 24 'iti>g2 'iVd2 25 'iVd6 i..e3! 26 lDd7 'ili'xf2+ 27 'iti>h3 'iVg2+, and White resigned .
II. 20 lDe2? 'iVf3 21 lDg3 i..h61 It is apparently not possible to defend the white king, for example: 22 i..xa7 (nothing is changed by 22 i..c5 ':c2 23 i..xa7 lla8! 24
Long-distance Dispute
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1 35l:.e1 .l:t.xa2) 22 .. . l:ta8! (threatening 23 . . . .l:t.xa7) 23 :e 1 (23 i.c5 i.f8 24 i.e3 ':'axa2; 23 l:.a 1 l:1xf2+! 24 i.xf2 i.e3) 23 .. . l:.xa2 24 i.c5 i.d2! 25 l:1b1 l:ta 1 26 'ii'b7 i.c3! with the decisive threat of 27 .. . l:txb 1 + 28 'ii'xb 1 :a 1 (analysis by Simagin).
III. 20 i.d4!? 'it'f3
20 . . . 'it'h4 is weaker in view of the excellent reply 21 ttJd5!, pointed out by Fischer. Then 21 . . . i.xd4? 22 ttJe7+ is completely bad . After 2 1 . . . 'il'xe4 22 ttJe7+ 'iti>h8 23 i.xg7+ 'iti>xg7 24 'iVd4+ (24 :g 1 ) 24 .. . 'ii'xd4 25 J:txd4 White should be able to convert his piece advantage. But even here Black is by no means doomed - he plays 21 . . . cxd5 22 1i.xb2 i.xb2 23 'il'xd5 'il'h3+ 24 'iti>e2 'ii'g4+ with a probable draw.
21 :g1
21 'iti>g 1 ? will not do because of 21 .. Jlc2 or 2 1 . . . c5.
It was because of this variation that Fischer rejected the piece sacrifice. But this was wrong - after all, if Black wishes, he can force a draw by 21 . . . l:tc2!? 22 l:tg3 (forced) 22 .. . 'ifh 1 + 23 1:[g 1 'ii'f3. It is also probably a draw in the endgame arising after 23 . . . 'ifxh2 24 ttJe2 'ifh5 25 'ifg4 'ifxg4 26 J:txg4 l:td8 27 'iti>e1 l:txe2+ 28 'iti>xe2 i.xd4 29 1:Ig5 'iti>f8 30 l:tc5 1i.xc5 31 l:txd8+ 'iti>e7.
The only question is whether Black should be satisfied with a draw, or whether he has the right to continue the attack with 21 ... c5! ? Simagin thinks that he does. He gives the variation 22 l:tg3 'ii'h 1 + 23 l:tg 1 'it'xh2 24 1:Ig2 'ifh 1 + 25 J:tg 1 'ifh4! with an attack. White can play more strongly: 22 1i.xc5! 1i.xc3 23 'ii'd31 'iff6 24 1:Ig3 . By allowing the opponent to restore material equality, he activates his forces. 24 . . . 1i. b4?? loses im mediately to 25 1i.d4, and Black resigned (McLellan-Kokorin, correspondence 1 968). 24 ... 1i.e5 25 ':'f3
25 . . . 'ii'h4 suggests itself, when 26 1i.xf8? 'it'xh2 27 ':'d2 .l:t.b1 + 28 'iti>e2 'ii'g 1 29 l:td1 lIb2+ 30 l:.d2 l:tb1 leads only to a draw. However, the simple move 26 h3!, pointed out by Larry Evans, sets Black insuperable difficulties. For example: 26 .. . :tfb8 (26 .. . l:.c8? 2 7 'it'd7 ':xc5 2 8 'it'xf7+) 2 7 'ii'd5! (Evans suggested 27 ':'xf7!? 'iti>xf7? 28 'iVd7+ 'iti>g8 29 'it'e6+, but Black has a tougher defence: 27 . . . l1c2! 28 'it'xc2? 'ii'xh3+ 29 'iti>e2 'iti>xf7 with equality; however, after 28 i.e7! 'it'h5 29 ':'f3 White retains the advantage) 27 .. . i.f4! 28 e5! with a winning position (only not 28 i.d6? ':xf2+! 29 ':'xf2 'it'xh3+ with a draw).
I have been able to find a way of strengthen ing the attack: 25 ... 'it'g5 ! ! 26 1i.xf8 1i.xh2 27
'ito>e1 , and now not 27 .. . 'ii'g 1 +? 28 'ii'f1 'ii'g4 (28 .. .'''g5 29 .i.h6! 'ii'xh6 30 'ii'c4) 29 .i.h6! 'ii'xe4+ 30 .i.e3 'ii'xf3 3 1 l1d8+ 'ito>g7 32 .i.d4+ 'ito>h6 33 .i.xb2, but 27 ... .i.c7 ! ! with the threats 28 .. . 'ito>xf8 and 28 .. . 'ii'g 1 + 29 'ii'f1 .i.a5+. 28 .ltb4 'ii'g 1 + 29 'ii'f1 'ii'g4 leads to a repetition of moves. The clever move 28 .i.g7!? would be justified after 28 .. . 'ito>xg7+? 29 "'c3+ i..e5 30 .l:txf7+! ! , but Black plays 28 ... g 1 + 29 Wf1 .i.a5+ 30 .i.c3 'ii'g4 31 i..xa5 'iVxf3 32 .i.d2 We4+ 33 'ii'e2 (33 .i.e3 'ii'b4+) 33 ... Wh 1 + with perpetual check. IV. 20 lId3!? 'ii'f3 . The less accurate move 20 .. Jlc2?! is justified after 2 1 ltJe2?! 'ii'f3 22 ltJg3 .l:tb8! (22 .. . .l:txa2 or 22 .. . h5 is weaker because of 23 .i.d2; if 22 . . . .i.h6 there follows 23 'ii'd4 with the threat 24 .i.xh6) 23 l:.b3 lIxb3 24 Wd8+ (24 axb3 h5) 24 .. . .i.f8 25 axb3 l1b2 26 'ito>e1 h5, and the in itiative is seized by Black.
I n the variation 2 1 .i.d2 l:txd2 22 l:txd2 'ii'xc3 23 .l:tg1 ! followed by ':g3 a position slightly better for White is reached . (23 'ito>g2?! suggests itself, but this encounters the unpleasant reply 23 .. . We5 ! , when defend ing the e4-pawn is awkward : 24 'ii'xc6? Wg5+, or 24 :e1 ? Wg5+ and 25 .. . .i.c3). 2 1 ltJd 1 ! Wf3 22 .l:tg 1 'ii'xe4 23 l:td2 l:txd2 24 'ii'xd2 is more promising for White - the compensation for the piece is probably insufficient.
21 'ito>g1 !
(see diagram)
The natural 2 1 :g 1 ? is incorrect in view of 2 1 . . . .i.xc3 22 .l:txc3 l:tfb8 (th reatening 23 ... l:txf2+!) 23 Wxc6?! (more tenacious is 23 i..d2 Wd 1 + 24 'ito>g2 'ii'xd2 25 'ii'xd2 :txd2 with an extra pawn for Black in a double rook endgame) 23 .. . .l:.d8 24 1:.c1 'ii'e2+ 25 'ito>g2 Wxe3, and Black wins (Simagin).
After this Simagin examined 2 1 ... .i.xc3?! 22 l:txc3 l:tbb8 (an unexpected retreat: Black creates the threat of 23 .. . .l:tfd8) 23 l:tc1 .:tfd8 24 'ii'xc6? l:td 1 + 25 J:[xd 1 Wxd 1 + 26 'ito>g2 'ii'g4+ 27 'ito>f1 l:td8! and wins. However, instead of the capture of the c6-pawn , 24 'ii'c7! is far stronger. By returning with his queen to g3, White parries the attack. Black still retains some initiative, but it should gradually evaporate.
Black's prospects are hardly improved by other attempts on the 22nd move:
22 . . Jie2 23 'ii'd 1 ! Wg4+ 24 'ito>f1 'ii'f3 25 lId3! l:txf2+ 26 i..xf2 Wxh 1 + 27 .i.g 1 ; 22 .. . :t.fb8 23 l:txc6 l:tb1 + 24 .l:tc1 l:txc1 + 25 .i.xc1 .
The exchange on c3 is bad - instead 21 ... lIc2 ! can be recommended . In reply 22 .ltd2? is a mistake in view of 22 . . . ':xd2! . After 2 2 .ltc5?! Wf4 23 Wd6 Black achieves a favourable ending by 23 . . . 'ii'xd6! 24 .i.xd6 1:.d8 25 ltJd 1 .lte5. I n the event of 23 'ii'e7 Black's resources are illustrated by the following curious variation : 23 .. . Wg4+ 24 l:tg3 'ii'c8! 25 'ii'xa7 (25 . . . l:te8 was threat ened) 25 . . . l:td8 26 ltJa4 l:txa2 27 'ito>g2 'ii'e6 28 :e1 'ii'e8! followed by 29 .. . l:ta8, and the knight at a4 is lost.
22 .ltxa7!? is possible, although after 22 . . . l:tc1 + 23 ltJd 1 Wxe4 24 .i.e3 l:ta1 Black retains quite good counter-chances.
Long-distance Dispute
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1 37The same assessment applies to the posi tion arising after 22 �d 1 !? Wxe4 (or 22 .. . 1:[e2 23 �d2 Wxe4 24 h3 c5). Here the outcome remains unclear.
V. 20 l:tc1 ! This move, suggested by the Brazilian grandmaster Gilberto Milos, may cast doubts on Simagin's bold idea. Having defended his knight, at the same time White does not allow the reply 20 .. JIc2, which gave the opponent counterplay after 20 l::td3. He is not afraid of 20 .. . l:1d8 in view of 21 'ii'h3, while in the event of 20 .. . .th6 he can choose between 2 1 Wh3 and 2 1 'it'xa7 l:txf2+ 22 �xf2 �xc1 23 Wd4. There only remains 20 . .. Wf3 21 �g1 ! (but, of course,
not 21 1:[g 1 ? .txc3 22 1:[xc3 l:fb8), when 2 1 . . . .th6 22 'ii'd 1 is hopeless, while 21 . . . .txc3 2 2 1:[xc3 leads to a situation favour able for White, familiar to us from the 20 l:ld3 variation .
I t is time to s u m up. I n the long-distance dispute between Simagin and Fischer, it is Simagin who was the more correct, al-
though he overestimated his position. One can argue about the analytical correctness of the piece sacrifice, but from the practical point of view it is certainly justified . The probability of the opponent figuring out the complications and finding all the strongest moves at the board is pretty small. White is in far more danger - after the slightest inaccuracy the attack will become irresist ible.
It is curious that Bobby Fischer, a fighting player who always aimed only for a win , did not risk sacrificing the piece and satisfied himself with a draw. The American grand master valued clarity, did not like to lose control of what was happening on the board , and therefore mistrusted irrational, intuitive sacrifices of material. I n this respect his style differed sign ificantly from that of brilliant chess artists such as Vladimir Simagin, M ikhail Tal and Alexey Shirov, for whom risk, involving problematic sacrifices, is natu ral and usual.