Desde las referencias a los contenidos desarrollados

More than 60 years ago, the European integration project was created as a political response to the continent‟s post-war devastation. Integration seemed to be a way of safeguarding against intolerance, xenophobia, extreme nationalism and chauvinism. The logic behind the idea was plain and simple: Enmity among European societies would be abandoned once and for all, exchanged for the bonds of cooperation and common institutions. However, the EU‟s success has ostensibly turned into its greatest danger. Europe‟s younger generations know of war, hunger, unrest and devastation only through textbooks. Memories of the two world wars have seemed to fade across the continent. During the Cold War, Europe‟s war-torn history was depicted as its own “other,” and was used as a projection ground for the formation of a collective European identity. Today, we return to geopolitical thinking in sketching patterns of in-groups and out-groups (Diez 2004). Foreign peoples, civilizations and countries are increasingly characterized as Europe‟s “other,” from which the continent needs protection.

Unsurprisingly, we have witnessed the rise of right-wing parties all over Europe. In 2000, Jörg Haider and his Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) became part of that country‟s government coalition, sparking outrage among

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European politicians. The European Union even imposed sanctions on Austria as a reaction against FPÖ‟s participation in government. However, times have apparently changed, as the same right-wing populism that triggered public opposition 10 years ago seems far more normal nowadays, whether it be in the form of the National Front (Front National) in France, the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) in Belgium, the Swiss People‟s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei), the Pro Germany Citizens‟ Movement (Pro Deutschland) in Germany, the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) in the Netherlands or the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna). Right-wing radicalism seems to have regained widespread public support.

All the above-mentioned parties share an ideology that includes a critical and offensive stance toward Islam. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the bombings of London and Madrid, and the cartoon crisis all reinforced anti-Islamic sentiments among European people that have been reflected in these parties‟ electorate success. However, this mistrust and skepticism toward Muslim people is deeply linked with structural and societal factors, namely insufficient, malfunctioning or even a complete absence of integration willingness among migrants and EU citizens with a migration background.

Muslims in Europe are predominantly from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey by origin. This is why the role of Islam and Islamophobia in Europe is strongly intertwined with the issue of migration from the MENA region (see also European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia 2006). The two issues form two sides of the same coin. The fear of an alleged “Islamization” of Europe has been aggravated by highly publicized and opinion-shaping debates over the construction of mosques (see for instance the Swiss referendum banning the building of minarets), honor killings, the juvenile delinquency of children of foreign descent and urban/suburban riots as seen in France‟ banlieues or the United Kingdom. Public rejection of Islam and Muslim migrants therefore does not arise from nowhere, but rather from seemingly comprehensible day-to-day experiences, reflecting the subtle fear of what is presumed to be a foreign infiltration. For many Germans the prospects for Turkey‟s EU membership bid are decided not in Brussels but on the streets of the so-called problem neighborhoods (Problemkieze, a term

describing broken societies in urban neighborhoods) in Berlin-Neukölln and Berlin-Kreuzberg.

EU-wide resentment against people with a southern Mediterranean background is not expressed solely by right-wing parties. Indeed, it has become clear that the political mainstream is increasingly campaigning for support from this part of the electorate. In 2011, the heads of state and government of France, the United Kingdom and Germany publicly and almost simultaneously declared an end to the era of multiculturalism (Laurence and Vaïsse 2011). However, none of the three politicians explained their concrete understanding of multiculturalism, or what kind of integrated society they wanted to see accomplished instead. By failing to dig deeper into the details of how we might be better able to live together in harmony, the whole debate appeared to be just a cheap public-relations move by the governing elites aimed at reaching out to a far-right constituency.

The German government‟s contribution to the integration discourse culminated in 2011 when Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich declared that Islam did not belong to Germany. Such statements are hardly helpful in encouraging migrants to integrate, as they might have a different view on how appropriately to welcome people with a foreign background. Seeing that most are in fact living well-integrated lives, creating jobs, paying taxes and contributing to Germany‟s prosperity, it is legitimate to consider confrontational rhetoric of this kind as nothing less than a slap in the face. What Friedrich did was an act of “othering” – letting a specific group of people know that they will not be a part of German society, no matter how hard they try.

Decision-makers need to realize at last that integration begins with an integrative choice of words. Indeed, it is true that elements within migrant communities all over Europe have seemed to have had difficulties in adopting the societal principles of the majority population, as reflected by their comparatively higher unemployment rates and the statistics on migrants‟ representation in higher education (for the German case, see Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2011, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2009). These problems need to be discussed in a transparent manner, and must not be simply brushed under the carpet. However, at the end of the day,

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the ultimate goal must be to make genuine improvements in the living conditions of people irrespective of their ethnic descent, not simply to gain votes from the far right side of the political spectrum.