3.3 Análisis de output ocupando Bootstrap
3.3.2 Desempeño general para cada uno de los métodos
In the last two case studies, we have considered the role of naval forces, battlespace control/dominance, forward positioning and visibility in operational practice in reference to areas where there have been conflicts. What is necessary and desirable next is to consider a case from outside of conflict zones – a case taken from peacetime constabulary and/or diplomatic operations.
International counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa region fit this requirement well. Counter-piracy is very much a constabulary mission, and in this particular case it has involved contributions from a wide variety of states across the world; not just Western navies.
On the face of it, the multinational anti-piracy effort off the Horn of Africa may not seem like an illustration of the battlespace concept in action. To the casual observer, it might actually appear to be a clear-cut case of traditional sea control, with naval forces from across the world simply patrolling a strategically vital SLOC in order to protect it from the threat of piracy emanating from Somalia. Two major naval coalitions are active in the region: Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), consisting of over 20 states led by the US; and the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Somalia. Up until December 2016, NATO also fielded a naval counter-piracy force under Operation Ocean Shield. Alongside these three established coalitions, individual states such as Russia, the PRC, India and Japan have also fielded naval assets and sought to coordinate their activities with multinational operations372.
372 Ploch, L. et al, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, pp. 25-7; Vego, M., 'Counter-Piracy: An Operational Perspective', Tidskrift i Sjovasendet 3 (2009), 169-80, pp. 172-4; NATO, 'Counter-piracy operations (Archived)', last modified 19 December 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm; Gebhard, C. and Smith, S. J., 'The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation: Counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast', Cooperation and Conflict 50.1 (2015), 107-27, p. 108.
However, to assume that the counter-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa are purely limited to the maritime domain would be mistaken. In reality, the counter- piracy effort crosses the boundaries of operational domains in certain ways, making it necessary for us to regard naval missions in the region as an exercise of 'battlespace' rather than purely 'sea' control. The information domain is particularly significant in this regard, as the control of visibility has been of high importance to the effective functioning of counter-piracy operations.
The EU NAVFOR, for example, makes use of a geospatial information- sharing platform that connects deployed ships with distant HQs (such as Northwood, UK); furthermore, through the establishment of the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) and its information network, EU naval forces can also track the routes of merchant shipping as well as incidences of pirate activity; thirdly, the Shared Awareness and De-confliction mechanism (SHADE), which helps to coordinate action between the different naval forces, has made effective use of network tools to enable rapid sharing and dissemination of information between ships of different states373.
Such mechanisms help to ensure the smooth functioning of maritime forces operating in the region, and in one respect the need for control over the battlespace can be said to account for visibility in this regard. However, this alone is only half the picture. In reality, the need to share information and to build up a clear, sufficient picture of the operational space is, in a manner of speaking, the enabler of successful counter-piracy missions in the region. In reference to the EU NAVFOR example, the importance of this control of visibility has certainly been realised; information dissemination tools are recognised not only as something that assists effective operational practice, but as something that can drive it374. What must be borne in mind
is that naval forces off the Horn of Africa are having to police a vast maritime region encompassing the Gulf of Aden and parts of the wider Indian Ocean; their presence cannot be felt everywhere at once. In such a situation, control in the information domain becomes vital, as it provides a clear understanding of where naval assets need 373 Royal United Services Institute, 'Sharing a Common Picture on Piracy', RUSI Defence Systems (2012), 72-4, p. 73; Daniels, C. L., Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2012), p. 80; Houben M., 'Operational Coordination of Naval Operations and Capacity Building' in Fighting Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Lessons Learned from the Contact Group, ed. by Tardy, T., pp. 28-34 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2014), pp. 28-9; Ploch, L. et al, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, p. 27; European Union Committee, Combating Somali Piracy: the EU's Naval Operation Atalanta, 12th Report of Session 2009-10, UK House of Lords Paper 103 (London: House of Lords, 2010), p. 21.
Requirement for battlespace control in and around the Horn of Africa maritime theatre.
Requirement for information domain control to ensure effective battlespace control.
Effective battlespace control enabled.
Need to overcome challenges of geographical size and coordination between multiple navies.
Development of shared information networks and means of coordinating multiple platforms.
to be positioned in order to ensure effective deterrence and interdiction of pirate activities. Figure 13 illustrates this relationship:
Figure 13: Relationship between visibility and battlespace control off the Horn of Africa.
Thus, in relation to visibility, the need to control visibility becomes an essential driver of effective battlespace control (note that in this instance the 'battle' aspect of 'battlespace' merely means the operating environment - not a 'battle' as a writer such as Mahan envisaged it). It is worth noting that measures such as the establishment of the SHADE mechanism and its online systems or the MSC-HOA were undertaken very early on in the deployments of national and multinational naval operations (2008 and February 2009 respectively375), underscoring their importance to
375 Oceans Beyond Piracy, 'Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)', accessed 13 June 2016, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconfliction-shade; Boon, K. E. et al,
the attainment of battlespace control; they were integral to the effective utilisation of naval assets. By this logic, visibility can be seen as something that is both highly connected to battlespace control/dominance, but also distinct from it - perhaps in a similar way to how a traditional maritime strategic principle such as power projection is highly linked to another, sea control, whilst remaining an important, clearly discernible concept in its own right.
This shows that in the Horn of Africa case battlespace dominance/control are seen in operational practice; furthermore, the case also allows us to see a distinction between this concept and the challenge of visibility control. Visibility control is more than just a component of battlespace control; it can be a driving force of it, and as such is arguably deserving of great attention.
In reference to forward positioning, the counter-piracy case suggests an affirmation of the reciprocal relationship between visibility and the former given in Figure 10. The reasoning here is as follows: surveys of the effectiveness of naval forces positioned forward in the Horn of Africa maritime theatre have concluded that they are the most effective deterrent against pirate activities376. Deterrence is very
much a visibility challenge; it relies upon the engendering of a certain perception regarding an actor's capabilities. In the case of counter-piracy, deterrence is based on the use of conventional naval weapons and platforms. However, given the sheer size of the geographical area where international naval forces are having to operate, for deterrence to work most effectively naval presence has to be tailored to where it is needed. Simply positioning forces forward in the region alone is no guarantee that pirate actors will be deterred from engaging in criminal activities, if the deterring force is not close enough to the specific areas where the pirates are suspected to be operating.
This is where the value of information domain activities connected to networked mechanisms such as SHADE and the MSC-HOA are significant. By maintaining a shared operational picture of where merchant and pirate actors are reported to be operating, and by coordinating activities so that no naval asset is wasted, forward operating naval forces can position themselves far more effectively than they otherwise could377.
Press, 2012), p. 274.
376 Oceans Beyond Piracy, 'Somali Piracy in the Western Indian Ocean Region', last modified 2016, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop2015/east-africa.
Thus, control of visibility enables effective forward positioning since information networks allow multinational naval forces off the Horn of Africa to tailor their presence according to where the threats they seek to deter lie (see Figure 14 below). The results of naval presence and networking have been seen in the decrease in pirate attacks since 2011, with far fewer attacks recorded in 2015378. Forward
positioned naval counter-piracy operations and their effective information sharing and coordination systems are one of several key factors attributed to the decline in pirate attacks379.
Figure 14: Relationship between visibility control and forward positioning off the Horn of Africa.
Furthermore, forward positioning of naval forces has also been used by some states as a means of fulfilling other strategic, visibility-related tasks. For some non- Western navies, engaging in counter-piracy efforts has been a means of improving perceptions of prestige and capability. Reading the PRC's 2015 white paper on national defence, for example, one can find numerous implications that China’s armed forces – including its navy – are to be used not only for physical operations, but also for the engendering of perceptions of Chinese international status. Part of the goal for the armed forces is to be able to “create a favourable strategic posture”, a statement loaded with implications in terms of the perception-interpretation elements of the 378 EU NAVFOR Somalia, 'Key Facts and Figures', last modified 2016, http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts- and-figures/; Oceans Beyond Piracy, ‘Somali Piracy’.
379 Other factors also attributed include use of private security personnel on merchant shipping and capacity-building efforts within Somalia. See Pigeon, M., 'United Nations Security Council Passes New Resolution on Somali Piracy', Oceans Beyond Piracy, last modified 2013, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/publications/featured-story-united-nations-security-council-passes-new- resolution-somali-piracy; United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 2125’, last modified 18 November 2013, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/N1356844.pdf.
visibility triad380. Considering that the PRC’s long-term national strategic goals
include independent development, the building of a prosperous society, the discouragement of foreign interference and the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation following a “century of humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers381, then part of the
PRC’s aim is to create a state with an image of strength and power.
Chinese military forces, including the PLAN, play their part in achieving this aim. As the PLAN has modernised its capabilities, it has begun to undertake missions further afield from the Chinese homeland – including counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa. In this particular instance, such operations are not only a case of the PRC seeking to protect the essential sea commerce that it relies upon to feed its domestic economic growth, but also as a means of leveraging strategic influence in the wider Indian Ocean region and increasing its prestige382. Given that the region is of strategic
significance to the PRC due to it being a major transit route for maritime commerce, and bearing in mind the PRC’s determination not to suffer from undue foreign interference, then the PLAN plays an important role at the Horn of Africa. It engenders the perception of Chinese protective capabilities, warding off potential regional rivals (such as India) whom the PRC might wish to keep away from certain waters383. In this respect, then, forward positioning can be said to be a means of
controlling visibility, whilst at the same time being driven by a visibility requirement – very much a reciprocal relationship (see Figure 15).
380 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Missions and Strategic Tasks of China’s Armed Forces’ in China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: Ministry of National Defence, 2015). 381 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Path of China’s Peaceful Development: What It Is About’ in China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2011, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354_2.htm; State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Foreign Policies for Pursuing Peaceful Development’ in China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2011), http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354_4.htm; State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Preface’ in China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: Ministry of
National Defence, 2015),
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586686.htm.
382 Willett, L., 'Pirates and Power Politics: Naval Presence and Grand Strategy in the Horn of Africa',
RUSI Journal 156.6 (2012), 20-25, p. 24; Murphy, M. N., Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2011), p. 130.
Visibility Requirement
Display credible naval force and capabilities. Political Context
Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
Discouragement of potential foreign interference.
Forward Positioning
Counter-piracy posture at the Horn of Africa region.
Visibility Control
Display of Chinese naval power and capability aimed at other regional actors (e.g. India, the US).
Figure 15: PLAN forward positioning and visibility control at the Horn of Africa. In conclusion, the case of international counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa maritime theatre appears to affirm two things: firstly, the validity of the relationship established earlier in Figure 12, and secondly, the validity of the relationship given in Figure 10. In these instances, visibility, and the control of visibility, occupies a unique position in relation to concepts of battlespace control and
forward positioning. It is unique in the sense that it can be both a product of these approaches as well as something that drives them, further affirming the reciprocal relationship between them. This case, then, appears to corroborate the Russian case in terms of the relationship between battlespace control and visibility in operational practice. It also goes further than merely corroborating the relationship between forward positioning and visibility outlined in reference to Operation Enduring Freedom; whereas Subsection 3.3.2 yielded a mixed picture about this relationship, the picture from the Horn of Africa case has been clearer.