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To understand contemporary processes of social change in Kyrgyzstan, it is necessary to take account of a perspective somewhat oblivious to such ‘politicised’ views. In generational terms, ‘Made in Kyrgyzstan’ refers to the generation who have been born after the fall of the Soviet Union and in its last years, and who, therefore, see the development of the country and their personal life walks not in the same field of tension as is suggested by the other discourses within this imaginary.11 This generational focus also foregrounds an awareness that the political contestations on Kyrgyzstan’s Socialist legacy and its integration into world markets and regimes of democratic governance is less of a question than a presumed necessity to these younger people, for whom the Soviet Union appears a distant past, with the corresponding sentimentality and nostalgia being hardly understandable, much to the chagrin of many middle- aged and older people (Féaux de la Croix 2013a, Satybaldieva 2017).

For young people, it seems to matter most is the fact that Kyrgyzstan is a unique country and that their everyday lives as well as memories of growing up are valuable in and of themselves, regardless of the country’s economic or political situation or its significance in a global perspective (Kirmse 2010, 2009).12 This also foregrounds an ambitious attitude among young entrepreneurs and professionals who are, empirically, a minority within the population, but nevertheless live by the role model of a new entrepreneurial creative group who put their

11 _{Ibanez-Tirado expressed this ostensible unaffectedness by the transition and its political} implications by citing one of her respondents’ question: ‘How can I be post-Soviet if I was never Soviet?’ (2015: 192).

12

For an illustration from Uzbekistan see Liza Premiyak and Hassan Kurbanbaev, ‘We run this town’, The Calvert Journal, no date, http://calvertjournal.com/features/show/7457/tashkent- youth-uzbekistan-photography

country on the map of the world. Kasymov and Nikonova (2006: 123) quote the statement of a member of a working group on the National Poverty Reduction Strategy, that by promoting the ‘Made in Kyrgyzstan’ brand, new firms in niche markets such as handicrafts, food and natural products ‘can become key exporters of local goods outside Central Asia, but only under certain conditions: adequate management, adequate marketing, and adequate technologies’. Although these sectors have indeed developed, the majority of people lack the managerial skills or education to marketise their goods in a national and international market.

People’s perception of political and social issues, as well as their participation in civil society and politics, are thus dominated by the idea that a young person can achieve everything in life if they only work hard enough and start to embrace their personal dreams early enough. In this sense, ‘Made in Kyrgyzstan’ also denotes the idea that life styles, identities and personhood are manipulable and subject to one’s personal effort at self-actualisation. In line with this ethos, which resonates a great deal with perceptions about Western conceptions of individualism (Schröder 2013: 243) and entrepreneurial personhood (Makovicky 2014), Kirmse finds that the context of cultural globalisation in Kyrgyzstan, with multiple media and life-style consumption portfolios available and creating a ‘market place for identities’ (Kirmse 2010: 389 ff.) can lead to contradictory combinations of interests and pastimes13, which are, however, carefully crafted and usually, especially in front of family and neighbours, dismissed in favour of conformity with the frames and role models of gender, ‘Kyrgyz-ness’ and Islam predominating in Kyrgyzstani society (ibid.: 399).

Kirmse and other authors also shed light on the dreams and imaginations of young people in terms of their future life goals, ranging from material riches in the form of cars and houses to professional self-realisation and success at home or abroad (Kirmse 2009, DeYoung

13

Kirmse shows how possible identities and orientations are ranging from Russian gangster rap, Bollywood, Sunni Islam to social relations with overseas Christian missionaries.

2010). While these dreams of the future resonate with the visions of young people all over the world, the opportunity structure for realising them is certainly more limited in Kyrgyzstan, and leads to selection and social stratification (Satybaldieva 2015b).14 The prospects of ‘making it’ to the top quintile of the generation of young Kyrgyzstani professionals are rather bleak, however – a fact often disregarded or realised later by people. Without a foreign university degree or at least experience of working or living abroad, people are often confined to join the local labour market in the NGO or corporate sector, which have on average long working hours and low salaries, making it hard to sustain a family (Satybaldieva 2017).

Given the relatively small size of the business sector, especially the small share of firms paying a living wage and the bleak economic conditions in non-urban areas, people are forced to take on either two or three jobs at a time or by subsidising wages with subletting income (ibid., Sanghera and Satybaldieva 2009). Young people have thus also become a part of the transnational migrant economy that emerged over the 1990s (see next sub-section). Especially in families who do not expect to be able to afford higher education for their children, labour migration is regarded a matter of course, almost a ‘rite of passage’ akin to the introduction of young folks into nomadic herding cycles (Schröder and Stephan-Emmerich 2016). With wealth and luxurious lifestyles on display in most bigger cities, it is understandable how the inequalities among youth are giving rise to rivalries and conflict, and make some young people turn to networks of businessmen-politicians and their sports clubs to fashion a masculine

14 _{Stipend programmes of academic exchange services and bilateral donors, which enable years} abroad in the US or participation in summer schools and language trainings, or the scholarships and fee waivers to support studies at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek or at foreign universities are the main sources of hope for many young people, who take additional tuition, extracurricular language courses and internships to shape ‘excellent’ CVs and acquire the language skills they need to have a chance in the applications submitted (Schröder 2013, Kirmse 2009). Interestingly, while scholarships and grants are proclaimed to aim at nurturing critical thinking, sustained intellectual engagement and social impact, the salaries in the academic or NGO sector are simply not competitive with those in international corporations (see e.g. Schröder 2013: 252).

identity and gain access to career paths in the world of shady business or organised crime (Kirmse 2010: Radnitz 2010).

IV.2.4 Hard work, perseverance and coping strategies

Finally, ideas about hard work, perseverance, and coping mechanisms and non-interference into politics have become popular among people, not least in light of the political instability affecting the country. This perceived virtue of adapting to the processes of transition thus facilitates the ongoing salience of a Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary in national politics and statebuilding, but appears to equally effect entrenched destitution, individual responsibilisation and biopolitical subjectification. This discourse thus is a crucial materialisation of the historical legacies and perceptions of geographical and cultural specificity that foreground the post-liberal politics examined in this thesis. It works as counterpart to the notion of ‘paternalistic care’ going back to Soviet days (Lewis 2016: 391), according to which authority for economic policy- making and provision of welfare is ‘put into the hands of rational political leaders … for the sake of a better economic life’ (Peshkopia 2009: 27).15

The accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015 is further deepening Kyrgyzstan’s position as marginal economy providing cheap migrant labour and raw materials (Leonard 2015)16 and has further stripped the domestic economy off significant livelihood opportunities apart from labour migration. With almost a fifth (1.5 million; IRIN 2015) of the country’s overall population leaving for Russia or other CIS countries in order to secure a living for their families, the burden on the life circumstances of many Kyrgyzstanis is imaginable.

15

These leaders are, implicitly, supposed to have (or be able to develop) the necessary techno- scientific competencies (Makarychev and Medvedev 2015: 46; Heathershaw 2009: 66, Prozorov 2016: ch. 1, section III.2).

16

A choice that has been constructed as necessities in a way clearly hegemonic discourses of international market integration (see Lewis 2015b, Kudaibergenova 2016, see IV.2.2).

Apart from the dire psychological effects of this reconstitution of Central Asians as inferior citizens in the community of former Soviet states,17 it is obvious that this social dispersion puts a high burden on families and has led to the general deterioration of the nuclear family as an institution within Kyrgyz society (see chapter V). Such hardship notwithstanding, migration to the countries of the former Soviet Union or beyond (e.g. to China, Europe or the US) has become an established practice for sustaining livelihoods (Schröder and Stephan-Emmerich 2016, Thieme 2008). At the same time, the maintenance and engagement with social structures and networks during migration and the attendance to duties in the home community help people to cope with the conditions of a life dispersed by market forces (Schröder and Stephan- Emmerich 2016, Reeves 2011, Thieme 2008). Both ancient traditions and cultures as well as the virtues of Islamic faith are invoked in the promotion of hard work, perseverance and coping strategies for the maintenance of harmony and unity under such harsh conditions (Satybaldieva 2015b, Beyer 2013, see IV.4).18

Whether through such refuge into fatalism or in reference to tradition, spirituality and religion (Satybaldieva 2015b), it appears that many people have become accustomed to deal with the hardship wreaked on them by the transition without complaining, hoping that things will get better at some point in some way or trying to improve their situation with labour migration and multi-local livelihoods (Ismailbekova 2013, Thieme 2008). This discourse on

17

Fryer et al. describe the situation of migrant labourers as such (2014: 172):

Though most migration is voluntary, the conditions for migrants are often difficult, if not outright inhumane. Central Asians have found themselves tricked and trafficked into conditions of near-slavery, abused and deceived by employers, robbed, and victimized by a Russian public that has been increasingly xenophobic and violent against migrants from the former Soviet “South”.

18

Most illustratively, Satybaldieva (2015b: 116) shows how people engage in a ‘politics of patience’ as they ‘tend to accept their circumstances, choosing to improve their own conditions and finding virtues in self-restraint, self-responsibility, endurance and determination … taking pride in not complaining, in overcoming difficult obstacles, and working hard’. Her informants agree with one another that, ‘if we work, things will slowly improve’ (ibid.: 117).

hard work, perseverance and coping is thus an important part of the Western liberal peace imaginary, as it renders the suffering and adaptation required in neo-liberal market reforms more acceptable. On the other hand, it is exactly these discourses and positionings that have given rise to disappointment, resentment and positions decidedly rejecting Western and more general international influence in the attempt to assert the sovereignty of the country.