Desenvolupament de negoci

The preparation for the 2005 election campaign was much more professional and detailed than it had been in both 2001 and 1997 (Bara, 2005, p.268; Green, 2011, p.759). Detailed research was conducted with focus groups and surveys to test slogans and policies, and this contributed to the six statements that featured in the manifesto promising: “more police, cleaner hospitals, lower taxes, school discipline, controlled immigration and accountability” (The Conservative Party, 2005a). The strategy was to make what the party stood for as clear as possible; implicitly as a way of countering the known negative connotations people attributed to the party. Obviously, these statements are not especially controversial or likely to encounter significant resistance from many quarters of the electorate. They are also somewhat similar, although less detailed than the pledges Labour had printed on membership cards prior to the 1997 general election (BBC News, 2005c). It is also somewhat similar to the Conservative approach before the 1951 election, where Butler’s policy review had produced a number of themes for the party to campaign on (see Butler, 1971; Ramsden, 1995).

Furthermore, the Conservatives outlined a document called A ‘Timetable for Action’⁵⁵, which was introduced as a way for the electorate to hold a future government to account according to a timetable of pledged action (BBC News, 2004b; Tempest, 2004). It’s a tactic that has been employed elsewhere and is designed to reinforce the idea that a party believes in accountability at a time when trust in politicians was low. (see Bale, 2011b, pp.116-117). However, in statecraft terms, this tactic also had a further goal. In the attempt to make people think about how they could judge any future Conservative government, they were also trying to seed the notion that the Conservatives were an alternative government to Labour which is important for PAH. The idea, similar to that

which Crosby has used elsewhere and is now a common feature in election campaigns, was combined with the six simple statements, and they were repeated (somewhat relentlessly) by senior

55 Hilton, Bridges and Cameron conducted focus group research, and produced a document called ‘A Timetable for Action’ ahead of the 2004 conference, with a long-term timetable for implementation (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005c, p.730-731; Snowdon, 2010 pp.7-14). However, this wasn’t universally popular with the campaign team, or Lord Saatchi (Ashcroft, 2005, p.23), and Howard altered this to speed up how quickly the timetable could be delivered (Snowdon, 2010, pp. 147-148).

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Conservatives, in an attempt to establish this message (Ashcroft, 2005, pp.79; Seldon and Snowdon, 2005c, p.731).

However, despite these slogans, the overarching message of the campaign has been regarded as a failure. One of the principle features that has been criticised was the ‘are you thinking what we’re thinking’ campaign’. It involved a poster campaign, and was the title of the general election manifesto (The Conservative Party, 2005a), with posters going up in the weeks prior to the general election, for example exclaiming ‘Are you thinking what we’re thinking, it’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’(Kettle, 2005). It is an interesting approach to adopt, and seems to fit with the strategy Howard pursued from the outset with his ‘I believe speech’ in February 2004 (Watt, 2004;

Howard, 2004a), and continued until the election. It was intended to demonstrate what the leader and the party believed in, in very general terms, and in a very simple way, and it was hoped it would resonate with the electorate (see Seldon and Snowdon, 2005c, p.732; Whiteley et al, 2005, p.811).

The answer received in terms of seats in the 2005 election was a resounding ‘no’ because whilst there was agreement with some of the party’s statements amongst the electorate, that didn’t automatically translate into support for the Conservative Party (Ashcroft, 2005; Evans and Anderson, 2005, p.820; Quinn, 2008, pp.193-196).

What came to be the most remembered theme of the election campaign; immigration, was, much like 2001, a complicated area to understand. Polling data indicates that there was widespread concern about immigration amongst the electorate, and that the Conservative Party had a strong lead in credibility in this policy area (Ashcroft, 2005, p.81; Kellner, 2005, p.325; Whiteley et al., 2005, p.811). Immigration often featured as a more salient issue in polling in 2005 than Europe had done in 2001, sometimes featuring as a top four issue. It had become a more prominent political issue generally because of an increase in immigration from Eastern Europe (Casciani, 2005). However, it was still a mixed picture, and depended polling on immigration and asylum issues very much

depended upon how the question was phrased⁵⁶ (see Kellner's comments in Ashcroft, 2005, p.41;

Green, 2011, p.760).

Furthermore, and again much like 2001, immigration was an issue that could bring the Conservatives ‘airtime’ and policy ‘recall’ which they struggled to get in other policy areas (Ashcroft, 2005, p.54; Green, 2011, p.761 and see Bartle, 2005, for discussion of media coverage of the election).⁵⁷ Howard is also believed to have favoured areas like crime and immigration because he felt, and there was some evidence to support this, it was an area he personally had credibility in⁵⁸ (Snowdon, 2010, p.150; Green, 2011, p.759-761). The issue of policy credibility is discussed further in the section on PAH, but it is important to understand that because this was an area the Conservatives and Howard could credibly present a case, their message was heard (Snowdon, 2010, p.150; Green, 2011, p.759-761). The negative consequences of this approach however would serve to undermine the party’s attempts to establish a credible position in other areas. The focus of attention on immigration and asylum and in particular the discussion of withdrawing from the UN Charter on Refuges also reinforce accusations that the Conservatives were still a right-wing party, despite the fact the 2005 general election has been judged to be slightly more centrist than 2001 and even more so than 1997 (see Ashcroft, 2005).

The preparations for the election were also helped by the increase in donations to the Conservative Party after Howard replaced Duncan Smith, which meant they were marginally less reliant on a small number of prominent donors, than they had been in 2001 (see Fisher, 2004). Howard also made changes to the way the election was fought, creating a ‘war room’ from which the operation could be managed, directed by David Cameron and George Bridges and also appointed the previously successful (in Australia) Lynton Crosby as campaign director although this came only 6

56 Whilst this is always the case with polling, the nature of this issue, as Kellner explains, allows very divergent results to be produced depending upon the phrasing of the question.

57 Policy recall is how some pollsters define the ability of respondents to remember party’s policy pledges.

58 Attention often focuses on Lynton Crosby’s involvement in the camping and his reputation for making immigration an election issue in his native Australia. However, Howard before Crosby arrived, believed this was an area of credibility for the party, and indeed an issue he had experience in being an MP representing Kent which was the first port of call for many of those coming to Britain (Bruce-Lockhart, 2005).

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months before the election which limited the impact he could have (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005, p.46; Ashcroft, 2005, p.2).

One prominent aspect of the Conservative strategy and campaign was the Target Seats operations led by Michael Ashcroft. Lord Ashcroft’s involvement with the Conservative Party has often been seen as controversial in the press, and by opponents. The exact workings of the operation are not entirely clear, and for entirely sensible party political reasons, insights into the management of the operation are rare⁵⁹ and its working have caused tension with the formal Conservative campaign structure because of the independence it has. Despite the tensions, the Conservative Party and the Target Seats operation had a strategy of targeting marginal and winnable seats⁶⁰ to maximize the seat haul at the election.

For the 2005 election, the target seats operation involved advice on the constituency campaigns, and money, although neither of these were to the extent they would reach in 2010. It operated under Ashcroft’s leadership, and worked via the selected local associations own campaign committees.

Whilst the target seats operation was a concern to the Conservatives' opponents, it doesn’t seem to have had a particularly significant effect on the overall result. Ashcroft’s own polling data claims that the swing from Labour to the Conservatives was 3.8% in the targeted constituencies, compared to 3.2% nationally (Ashcroft, 2009, p. 296). The reason he gives for this modest difference is that they spread themselves too thinly, much as the party had done in 2001, by targeting 164 winnable seats (Ashcroft, 2005, p. 11).

It is somewhat strange for the party to make the same mistake as in 2001, and does highlight flaws in the party’s approach to target seats, especially when the party’s own polling data was indicating they may only see a swing sufficient for them to win as few as 34 seats from Labour and the Liberal

59 This author served on a campaign team with advisors from the Target Seats organization, and attended seminars as part of this. It was a well-organized set up that conducted polling and paid for leaflets to be produced, distributed and voter targeting to be conducted. It also set targets for the candidate and team to hit relating to things like encouraging supporters to apply for postal votes (because they are then more likely to vote) and identifying ‘the pledge’ who are the voters who support your party.

60 They were ranked and received variable funding and support according to how marginal or winnable and received variable funding on this basis.

Democrats (Ashcroft, 2005, p. 11). Part of this originated from the disagreements between the senior participants involved in the party’s campaign, and the continued failure to understand how bad their position was, or at least how to respond to it if they did. However, it also would have been damaging for the party to appear to be limiting itself to targeting a small number of seats; it’s effectively an admission that you cannot win the election, with the consequent impact on morale and perceptions, they also hoped Labour’s difficulties would bring them into contention in more seats.

This section has explored the various strategic consideration of the Conservative leadership during this period. It challenges the established narrative that Howard pursued a core vote strategy, and argues that Howard’s approach was principally a continuation of that Duncan Smith established prior to 2003. The main difference was the greater concern with the impact of Howard’s personal and political reputation which was seen as a factor that limited the party's strategic options. Whilst attempts were made to change established beliefs about Howard, his concern was to maximize the benefit the party could reap from the areas in which they had credibility. However, the three most significant limitations on party strategy during this period remained the dominance labour still had over PAH, the time available and factors of party management; and the three are interrelated. A bolder strategy would have struggled to compete with Labour’s statecraft position, and been unlikely to bring significant electoral gain. Because of this, it would also have been likely to increase tensions within the party in a way a cautious strategy, even if unsuccessful, would not. In combination with Howard’s limited mandate as a result of the way he became leader and the limited time before the general election these factors ensured a cautious approach to strategy.

4.4 Political Argument Hegemony

This section moves on to examine political argument hegemony (PAH) between 2003 and 2005. The two areas of principle attention are those relating to the position in the PAH battle of Howard and the wider Conservative party, and the Conservative Party’s policies. Both are related, and dealt with together, and due to the nature of PAH all are relative to the performance of the governing party, its polices and the prime minister, as well as to some extent the Liberal Democrats. It is argued that at

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first, Howard as leader of the Conservative Party surprised some, and seemed to perform well.

However, over time this would diminish as the honeymoon period wore off, and the reality of the wider statecraft position limited the scope for change in the party.

There were political events that could have been better handled, and are discussed at greater length in the following section on competence, but whilst Howard was seen as a strong leader, he would perform badly in PAH terms against Tony Blair, despite the problems the latter encountered. The Conservative Party as a whole performed even worse, despite the appearance of unity that had developed after Duncan Smith left, the party changed little during this period, remained tarnished by the legacy of the previous Conservative government and was not seen as an alternative government Labour’s strategy successfully reinforced this image.

In policy terms the position is mixed. On the issues that mattered most to the electorate like the economy and public services, the Labour government enjoyed an easy predominance in PAH. There were areas where Conservative policy resonated to a greater extent with the public, and on issues such as immigration⁶¹ and Europe the Conservatives could compete for PAH. However, these issues remained of secondary importance when voters chose which party to support, and Labour was also successful in countering Conservative policy on immigration especially.

The reasons the party failed to make progress in PAH are largely a result of the limited mandate and strategy Howard had and that the party pursued, which was cautious in policy terms and the extent to which the party would be changed. However, as has been mentioned in the previous section the strength of Labour’s PAH, and the continuing favourable NRG, despite disenchantment over Iraq, encouraged a cautious strategy. It is the interaction of the various elements of statecraft that explain the limited progress the Conservatives made in competing for PAH.

61 Drawing on the work of Green, who has researched vote optimization (2005; 2011).

As has already been mentioned, in the years immediately prior to 2003 it is likely few would have regarded Michael Howard as the man to turn around the fortunes of the Conservative Party. He was popular amongst the party membership, and indeed the party’s MPs, and he was considered a very able debater and former home secretary. However, his image seemed to sum up much of what many people thought was wrong with the party. He was believed to be on the right of the party, and had the twin millstones of his questioning by Jeremy Paxman over the sacking of Derek Lewis, and Anne Widdicombe’s ‘he has something of the night about him’ comment (BBC News, 2002a; Roth, 2004, p.364). The latter comment would stick, and Howard was often portrayed in cartoons as Dracula like, indeed he even made reference to this aspect of his physical feature in his leadership acceptance speech (Howard 2003b).

This seemed a less auspicious reputation for a leader to have, than those which dogged Hague or Duncan Smith throughout their respective spells as leader. Unlike Hague and Duncan Smith, who weren’t well known prior to becoming leader, public awareness of Howard was a double-edged sword. Whilst the negative aspects of his reputation, and his close association with the pre-1997⁶² government did have a deleterious effect on his leadership, and allowed Labour to claim the Conservatives were unchanged from the Major years; his experience was an advantage, as was his reputation for being a strong performer and tough home secretary (Brown, 2003; Economist, 2003a).

His reputation as an experienced and strong politician as well as a good parliamentary performer helped from the beginning with party management, and as has been argued earlier in this chapter, was one of the main factors that contributed to Howard becoming leader in 2003. Duncan Smith had been seen to be weak, ineffective and incapable of controlling his party. Before that, Hague had been considered a good performer, but lacking the judgement political experience brings, and John Major has been considered weak or too consensual⁶³ (Hennessay, 2000).

62 In particular, references were made to Howard’s involvement in the Poll Tax, and he repeatedly had to apologize for this (see BBC News, 2003b).

63 As Von Karajan (Economist, 2011) had said of orchestras, the Conservative party seemed to be in need of ‘the smack of firm leadership’.

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As a result of Howard becoming leader, and the surprisingly moderate tone he adopted in doing so, the way the party was treated in the media and to a lesser extent elite opinion, improved (from a very low starting point) almost overnight (Rallings and Thrasher, 2004, p.335; Johnson, 2005). Howard’s own performance in polling quickly showed a marked increase in the percentage of respondents who considered him as a potential prime minister compared to the ratings Duncan Smith had received (Ipsos MORI, 2011d). Whilst the same data set does show Howard’s ratings dipped a little after the initial few months, they remain stronger than his two immediate predecessors for the duration of his term as leader (Ipsos MORI, 2011d). However despite this, Tony Blair, whose own ratings as a leader had fallen somewhat since their peak in 2001, maintained a healthy lead over Howard despite the Prime Minister’s travails over Iraq (Ipsos MORI, 2011d). Whilst the very fact of incumbency helps with the performance in polling, it is still significant that Blair maintained a lead at a fraught time for him, with Hutton Inquiry and the first public signs of a feud between him and his chancellor (Helm, 2003; Pfanner, 2003).

Part of Howard’s problem remained his prominent time in office during the 1990s. Throughout his leadership Labour repeatedly emphasized Howard’s links to previous Conservative governments, and he was not able to escape this; indeed it has been claimed that it would have been impossible for him to escape this regardless of what he’d done after 2003 (Evans and Anderson, 2005, pp.819-835).

Labour’s strategy for dealing with Howard was to explicitly link him with their narrative of the 1990s which they referred to as a time of public service failure and economic problems (BBC News, 2003e; Roth 2004; Blair, 2020, pp.488-490). Because Howard was so well known, and views of him were well formulated prior to him assuming the leadership of the party, it would prove impossible for him to substantially alter them, despite his limited efforts to do so. Indeed, as discussed in the section on strategy, he claims to have both realized this limitation, and sought to capitalize the potential strengths of his reputation⁶⁴ instead of trying too hard to reshape his public image. There is a complex interaction between the various aspects of statecraft that meant Howard was unable to make more progress in this area of PAH. Blair had an established reputation as a competent and

64 By which he meant a reputation for example of being tough on crime (Nicholls and Katz, 2004).

successful prime minister, despite the problems he faced from 2003 onwards. This, combined with Howard’s close association with the 1990s, and Labour’s strategy of reminding the electorate of his involvement in the Major government meant Howard’s job of competing for PAH was always going to be hard. Whilst it is common to argue that Howard should have been more adventurous in his strategy and attempts to compete with Labour, as already discussed, his objective of keeping the appearance of party unity required a cautious strategy because of the electoral peril of anything else, and the likely negative impact on party unity.

Howard’s limited attempts and ability to alter his own image also have a direct impact on the policies the Conservatives produced and offered at this time. It would take some time after Howard

Howard’s limited attempts and ability to alter his own image also have a direct impact on the policies the Conservatives produced and offered at this time. It would take some time after Howard