DESERT ISLAND 18: ICE ISLAND

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Chinese nationalism has deep roots stretching back to the indignities foisted on China by European imperialist powers and Japanese militarists during the ‘century of shame and humiliation’. It was when China was at the hands of foreign powers that had led the forward-thinking elites to search for a new form of national identity that could unite and defend the Chinese nation. The victim-orientated aspect of Chinese nationalism represents China as a nation ruthlessly violated by Western imperialism after the Opium War from the mid- nineteenth century until 1949, when China’s military and political weakness had                                                                                                                

59 _{For examples of generally themed sites, see Strong Nation Forum (强国论坛):}

http://bbs1.people.com.cn/; Utopia (乌有之乡): http://www.wyzxsx.com/; and The Patriots Alliances

(爱国者同盟网): http://bbs.1931-9-18.org/index.php. For issue specific forums on Japan, see for example, China-Japan Net Forum (中日网论坛): http://www.sjhistory.net/site/bbs/; and Anti-Japanese

made it an easy prey to aggressive foreigners (Barme, 1995: 210). Therefore, from the outset, Chinese nationalism was strongly associated with anti-Western, anti-Japanese xenophobic connotations. Throughout the contemporary Chinese history, whenever China is perceived to have been badly ‘bullied’ by these powers, Chinese nationalists will come out and vent their anger. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the anti-American protests of 1999 and anti-Japanese demonstrations in recent years have all epitomised this victim orientation in Chinese nationalism.

This victim-orientated nationalistic feeling also forms part of the cornerstone for the Communist Party’s official nationalism discourses. According to the official narratives, it was the Communist Party that eventually achieved victory against the Japanese ‘invaders’ and ended the ‘century of shame and humiliation’. During the state-led patriotic education campaign, the CCP government not only reminded its people the glories of ancient Chinese civilisation, it also induced a heavy dose of “national humiliation education” that commemorates China’s defeats (Callahan, 2010: 14). School children were made to watch patriotic films, from a compulsory list drawn up by the central government. Museums, war memorials, battle sites, and war cemeteries were designated as “Patriotic Education Bases” (爱国主义教育基地), where school trips were taken to for the students to learn about Chinese heroic actions and foreign (especially Japanese) atrocities. In addition, several important museums on the War of Resistance against Japan, such as Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall, and Museum of War of People’s Resistance against Japan, were extensively renovated, with new ones constructed, including the Mukden Incident Museum in Shenyang.

It may seem odd for China publicly endorsing humiliation, after all, as Callahan observes, “common sense tells us that humiliation is something that is suffered in silence, rather than publicly celebrated” (2010: 16). However, the reason for the CCP to promote this negative victim image was that it would serve as a contrast for what the party had achieved, namely the founding of an independent new China. It helped the CCP to emphasise a strong sense of “redemption” (Callahan, 2010: 16), hence to boost the positive side of popular nationalism that is the pride of the Chinese nation. On 1 October 1949, when Mao Zedong declared, “Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. The Chinese people have stood up!” (Mao, 1977: 17), not only did he announce to the world the establishment of a new independent China, he also conveyed a perhaps more important message that the new country ruled by the CCP would never let its people to be mistreated by foreign powers. The painful historical experiences contrasting with China’s independence, Shambaugh argues, represent “the raison d'être of the modern Chinese Communist state, which came to power on a promise to unify the nation, restore its dignity and never again permit foreigners to subjugate, discriminate against or try to ‘split’ China” (2008). It is precisely due to the humiliation narratives being so deeply rooted in the mind of Chinese people, that people share enormous sense of pride as China’s influence quickly grows. This strong sense of pride after humiliation reflects how Chinese position China on the world stage today. For many Chinese people, China is not a rising power, but a returning power. They argue that China had never “fallen off the world stage”, but merely faded away in the last century or so (Wu, 2007: 1). As China’s profile increases both in terms of politics and economic, Chinese popular

nationalists have been increasingly eager for the CCP leaders to steer China back to its “rightful place on the world stage” (Callahan, 2010: 15; and The Economist, 2010c). Furthermore, the sense of pride and the sense of humiliation are intertwined in Chinese popular nationalism dynamics. Put simply, “pride” comes from overcoming “humiliation”, “humiliation” arises from dented “pride”. Whilst Chinese people often feel immense pride whenever China achieves something on the world stage (e.g. in sport events), Chinese popular nationalism hits back when this achievement is discredited by other countries. Popular nationalists in China have “a very low threshold for foreign criticism, zero tolerance for ‘losing face’ (Shambaugh, 2008).