DETECCIÓN DE NECESIDADES DE CAPACITACIÓN Concepto y generalidades

‘Personal identity is not what matters.’105

In this section I outline Parfit’s reductionist view and his use of thought experiments, namely those involving Replicas and teletransportation, in establishing his conclusions. I also outline the implications of these views for personal identity and the first personal perspective. I briefly outline Parfit’s own psychological account and solution to the thought experiment; however, my main aim is to outline his reductionist methodology which proposes an impersonal description of psychological continuity, in which the first-person perspective is not required.

Parfit proposes a reductionist or impersonal approach to questions of personal identity. This approach claims that we can give a complete description of the facts of a person’s life - whether relating to a psychological or bodily criterion, without explicitly claiming that persons exist. For Parfit, the unity of a person’s life is constituted by impersonally describable causal interrelations. Parfit argues that a reductionist view makes two claims:

[T]he fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more particular facts … [and] these facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of this person, or explicitly claiming that the

103 _{Although, as Mackenzie notes, and as I will be discussing in this section, this assumption is}

not shared by Parfit, who argues that numerical identity does not matter. Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 24 fn.4.

104 _{Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 3-4.} 105 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 217.}

experiences in this person’s life are had by this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These facts can be described in an impersonal way.106 For Parfit what makes for continuity over time is not numerical identity, but the causal connections between distinct temporal parts or stages of the person, whether or not brought about by numerical identity. Moreover, these connections can be explained from a third-personal perspective, without reference to the first- personal perspective.

Parfit argues that the only alternative to his reductionism is non-reductionism, which assumes a “further fact” about identity. This further fact is a Rationalist commitment to the self or person as some kind of special entity, something over and above one’s body and brain. This assumption is compared by Parfit to the notion of a Cartesian ego or a spiritual substance. Parfit writes:

Many Non-Reductionists believe that we are separately existing entities. On this view, personal identity over time does not just consist in physical and/or psychological continuity. It involves a further fact. A person is a separately existing entity, distinct from his brain and body, and his experiences. On the best- known version of this view, a person is a purely mental entity: a Cartesian Pure Ego, or spiritual substance.107

Using a Kantian inspired critique Parfit argues that this rationalist notion of the self is an illusion, that there is no ‘I’ over and above our experiences. So, argues Parfit, Reductionism follows:

On the Reductionist View, each person’s existence just involves the existence of a brain and body, the doing of certain deeds, the thinking of certain thoughts, the occurrence of certain experiences, and so on.108

Whilst Parfit argues the Reductionist view is shared by proponents of both the biological and psychological criterion approaches, he endorses a psychological continuity approach. Parfit writes:

Our identity over time just involves (a) Relation R—psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity—with the right kind of cause, provided (b) that this relation does not take a branching form, holding between one person and two different future people.109

Parfit’s solution involves denying that numerical identity matters110_{, he argues} that it is qualitative identity that matters to survival, and not numerical identity.111

106 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210.}

107 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210. Parfit also distinguishes the ‘Further Fact View’, another}

Non-Reductionist view which whilst it denies that we are separately existing entities, still asserts personal identity as a further fact, which does not consist in ‘just physical and/or psychological continuity.’ Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210.

108 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 211.}

109 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 216. Parfit argues both psychological and physical criteria}

approaches share the same reductionist assumptions, as set out the two reductionist claims above. ‘On the Physical Criterion, personal identity over time just involves the physically continuous existence of enough of a brain so that it remains the brain of a living person. On the Psychological Criterion, personal identity over time just involves the various kids of psychological continuity, with the right kind of cause. These views are both Reductionist.’ Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 209-10.

Qualitative identity is achieved through strong connectedness of overlapping psychological states. Parfit’s thought experiments aim to show that numerical identity is not what matters to personal identity, and so personal identity is not what matters, but survival is what matters to us. Parfit argues that this conclusion has moral implications, namely the renunciation of the moral principle of self- interest and the adoption of a sort of ‘quasi-buddhist’ effacement of identity.

Parfit illustrates his argument with the use of thought experiments, which he says highlight some of the ways we commonly think about personal identity and our continued existence, as well as reveal the incoherence of those beliefs.112 _These are beliefs about the self which presuppose a further assumption about persons. Here, I outline Parfit’s teletransportation and replication thought experiment.

When I press the button, I shall lose consciousness, and then wake up at what seems a moment later. In fact I shall have been unconscious for about an hour. The Scanner here on Earth will destroy my brain and body, while recording the exact states of all of my cells. It will then transmit the information by radio. Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach the Replicator on Mars. This will then create, out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like mine. It will be in this body that I shall wake up.113

Parfit describes this example as ‘simple transportation’. In order to test our intuitions concerning numerical identity further, Parfit modifies the example. In the modified narrative a new Teletransporter is built which does not destroy my brain body at each time of teletransportation, but rather sends a blueprint to Mars for assembly. This allows the protagonist to see and speak with his Replica on Mars. A problem develops, however, when the scientists realise that the machine on Earth, whilst allowing for perfect replication, is destroying the person on Earth. The protagonist learns he will soon die from organ failure, but is told not to worry, because his Replica is fine.

Since my Replica knows that I am about to die, he tries to console me with the same thoughts with which I recently tried to console a dying friend. It is sad to learn, on the receiving end, how unconsoling these thoughts are. My Replica then assures me that he will take up my life where I leave off. He loves my wife, and together they will care for my children. And he will finish the book that I am writing. Besides having all my drafts, he has all of my intentions. I must admit that he can finish my book as well as I could. All these facts console me a little. Dying when I know I shall have a Replica is not quite as bad as, simply, dying.114 The question which arises here, in both cases of teletransportation is whether I survive as my replica; that is, whether, because we share a set of memories,

experiences, desires and so on, I would invest in my future self (the replicant) the

110 _{Schechtman recognises that this move by Parfit solves problems of transitivity. We shall see}

in the following chapter that this is also Parfit’s way of addressing the charge of the extreme claim; a move which Schechtman argues fails.

111 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 201.} 112 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 200.} 113 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 199.} 114 _{Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 201.}

same degree of concern that I would in my own future.115 _{Parfit’s view is that these} thought experiments create puzzlement, for it is impossible to tell if I survive or not. As Ricoeur explains:

The question at issue is whether in either case I survive in my replica. Clearly, the function of these puzzling cases is to create a situation such that it is impossible to decide whether I survive or not. The effect of the undecidability of the answer is to undermine the belief that identity, whether in the numerical sense or in the sense of permanence in time, must always be (able to be) determined. If the answer is undecidable, says Parfit, that is because the question itself is empty. The conclusion then follows: identity is not what matters.116

If it is impossible to determine this is problematic for numerical identity which must be determinate. This puzzlement belies a faulty logic in our thinking about personal identity.117 _{And this stems from the further fact view - the assumption} that the person or self is some kind of special entity, something over and above one’s body. The further fact view is untenable because it allows for the possibility of the duplication of my identity in another body. From this it follows that the belief in a determinate identity, or self, is an illusion (the first-personal self is ‘no self’). So, for Parfit, the question of personal identity is empty, and therefore ‘identity is not what matters’.