The opportunity for reform embedded in the commitment of the NTC to draft a new constitution and the opening of the political sphere after 2011 was seized by Libyan activists and new NGOs. However, the need for consensus among the GNC, Islamic leaders and federalist factions on the issue of representation within the constitutional drafting committee has marginalised the role of civic organisations. Because of the nascence of the NTC and GNC, the legacy of statelessness prevailed and contributed to postponement of the constitutional process. This came at the expense of the chance that FDL and other civil society organisations could have
108 Confidential, young woman who left Misurata during conflict, interview with author, Misurata February 2012
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used to push forward demands for inclusion and participation in the ‘new’ Libya. Two years after the NTC’s constitutional declaration, in which a 120-day timeline was announced, Libya is yet to have a constitutional assembly. This delay, coupled with scepticism by activists in the role of NGOs, can further lead to distrust between Libyans and the emerging state institutions during the transition. The constitutional dialogues documented here reveal that Libyans are yet to address social, political and religious cleavages. The different views expressed constitute in their core different views about the new state in Libya. If left unaddressed they threaten to jeopardise the criticality of the juncture in 2011 and can brining back old mechanisms of handling divergent views through repression and subordination of minority voices, that us those of women and Amazigh among others.
The dialogue outcomes also reveal the weakness of state institutions in performing basic functions of providing citizenship status, redistributing wealth, and mitigating conflict. This might lead to the rise of non-state power-brokers to whom Libyans will resort to during transition. The weakness of state institutions in providing basic services and fulfilling basic functions further supports the argument that the GNC and NTC were weak players in the process of constitutional development. The path dependent outcomes resonate with Libya’s historical tradition of the state’s incapacity to institutionalise revolutionary outcomes which remain at the level of discourse. In practice, revolutions give more leeway to non-state actors or to specific leadership that controls the political process without reforming it into an inclusive process for citizens, civil society and for minority groups.
The transition phase also brought back the politics of exclusion. The political isolation law brought back Gadhafi’s old practice of sanctioning those public officials who served in the previous regime and the exclusion of civil servants has left out a large segment of the population that has the experience to manage public organisations. In turn, the tendency of the government to give in to the demands of regional forces, Islamists and armed groups brought a form of power- sharing. By guaranteeing representation to some groups, isolating others, and marginalising citizens’ voices, the constitutional process thus far is exhibiting a shift towards a power-sharing formula. Given the significance of the transition phase as a critical juncture, it is likely that this decision will be difficult to overturn in later stages.
While the transition gave citizens the right to formally debate their aspirations and explore their demands from a new constitution, this formal right was not backed by a capable and
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responsive state structure. The lack of governmental response to civil society organisations made advocacy efforts irrelevant to decision-making around the constitutional process and constitutional deadlines. The FDL, along other civic organisations, initiated a nation-wide process of dialogue and proposed concrete ways to resolve differences. However, no effort to consult with citizens was undertaken by the GNC. At least for the period of this study, the political leadership did not provide the required tools for an open and inclusive process of constitutional development. In effect, the new era brought back old players without giving sufficient political leverage to new civic associations. Based on the case study, Libya during its most recent transition continued to exhibit very weak state institutions challenged by old political forces and a vibrant, although ineffective civil society.
Lastly, while the transition phase allowed for a new margin of freedom for civil society organisations to operate, the case of FDL shows that such groups were ineffective in the reform process. The issue of newly found freedoms was regarded as a priority by dialogue participants and a prerequisite for their participation in the constitutional process. However, the data presented in this chapter points to the scepticism of activists that political leadership would respond to their demands. This comprises another limitation on the level of change that could be expected from the critical juncture in Libya. It appears that the juncture led to the establishment of a new form of ‘political’ civic organisations but constrained their role in decision-making due to weak state institutions and the decision to adopt forms of power-sharing that made civil society actors less relevant to the constitutional process.
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Chapter Seven - Comparing and Theorising about ‘Partially’ Critical
Junctures in Lebanon and Libya
7.1 Introduction
The main question this thesis sought to examine was what issues explain the challenges to political reform in Lebanon and Libya? The cases of failed, or partial reforms to the electoral system in Lebanon and to the constitutional process in Libya were examined. Identifying the constraints on political reform first required an understanding of the history and contemporary contexts of both countries. I argued that there were three constraining elements of continuity from the Ottoman and colonial eras as well as from the postcolonial period that remained prevalent in Lebanon after Syria’s withdrawal in 2005 and in Libya after the fall of Gadhafi in 2011. These constraints were weak state institutions, power-sharing agreements, and ineffective NGOs. This thesis then presented an investigation of the mechanisms of path dependence in the context of these two transitions.
The thesis provided a three-pronged analysis of the constraints on political reform during transition, after a critical juncture has taken place. I argued that these constraints challenged the assumption that critical junctures in Lebanon and Libya created heightened possibilities for change. These constraints when explored in detail led to the conclusion that these junctures were only partially critical. This thesis therefore challenged a common argument that significant transformations took place in Libya after the ‘Arab uprising’ and in Lebanon after the Syrian withdrawal. I also illustrated how civil society organisations played an important role during the transition process. However, the analysis showed that civil society in the context of power-sharing and weak states was unable to bring about significant political reform. The strength of the analysis on partially critical junctures is that it showed what changes were possible during transition and explained why some changes were not possible. In this sense, the thesis contributes to a debate on political transition in the region that is not binary, but that is based on in-depth exploration of the grey areas between change and continuity.
This chapter brings together the insights uncovered in the cases of Lebanon and Libya. The objectives of this chapter are two-fold. I first compare the elements of continuity in Lebanon and Libya to specify the mechanisms of path dependence and the partial nature of the critical junctures the two countries underwent. Secondly, I highlight the implications for political reform in this type
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of MENA transition from the perspective of historical institutionalism. As mentioned in Chapter One, Lebanon and Libya are two distinct, but comparable cases, as the following section will show. Whilst the Lebanon case displays deeply entrenched elements of continuity, this research identifies signs that Libya is headed in the direction of evading a certain type of political reform. The findings suggest that the three variables studied in Lebanon are also beginning to be found in Libya, although in different ways.