DETERMINACIÓN DE LAS PROPIEDADES FISICOQUIMICAS

Sensing that the UN was not keen to have Darfur on its agenda, and perhaps sensing an opportunity to legitimate itself, the AU appointed a Special Representative to Darfur, and Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe was quick to hold consultations with the Government of Sudan in Khartoum to ensure that the AU would be recognized as having the lead role in any future responses to the Darfur conflicts (Badescu and Bergholm, 2010: 101). At the same time, frustrated by the unwillingness of the UN to formulate a response, Mukesh Kapila on 21 March

2004 arranged an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in which he described the violence in Darfur as “an organized attempt to do away with a group of people”, and compared the situation there with the early stages of the Rwandan genocide. Kapila’s comments infuriated UN officials, and the ensuing fallout ensured that international attention was focused increasingly on Darfur.

By 31 March 2004 negotiations aimed at establishing a humanitarian ceasefire agreement for Darfur commenced in N’djamena, Chad. Sudanese authorities, considering the Darfur matter an internal one, refused the presence of outside parties, except for the AU, as long as the AU recognized the Darfur conflict to be an internal matter of Sudan (African Union, 2004[d]. By 01 April the EU had called for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Darfur, to be policed by the UN, and diplomats and UN officials in New York were scrambling to find a consolidated position on Darfur (Traub, 2010: 9). On 02 April Jan Egeland was finally able to use the German presidency of the Security Council to deliver a general briefing, and inserted an update on the critical nature of the situation in Darfur. The proposed presidential statement included language condemning the parties to the conflict, but through the efforts of China, Algeria and Pakistan this was watered down to language which called on the parties concerned to fully cooperate in order to address the grave situation prevailing in the region (Traub, 2010: 9).

On 07 April, Kofi Annan, with a sense of increasing urgency, used his speech to the Human Rights Commission to commemorate the 10 year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide to highlight that the unfolding events in Darfur left him with a deep sense of foreboding. He concluded:

Whatever term is used to describe the situation [in Darfur], the international community cannot stand idle. […] States must be prepared to take appropriate action. By “action” in such situations I mean a continuum of steps, which may include military action (Annan, 2004).

Following Annan’s statement, the Commission dispatched a fact-finding team to Darfur, which reported a “disturbing pattern” of disregard for basic principles of human rights and humanitarian law, for which the armed forces of Sudan and the Janjaweed were found to be responsible. The report of the Human Rights Commission, released on 07 May 2004, concluded that a reign of organized terror was being orchestrated in Darfur, and that the government and its proxy agents were guilty of widespread crimes. Before the Commission could vote on a resolution however, its content was leaked to the press. Both Pakistan and Sudan condemned the leak and called for an immediate inquiry, and, unwilling to force the issue and concerned that a strongly worded resolution would be rejected by the Commission’s African and Asian members, European members softened the draft resolution they were preparing. The redrafted resolution thanked the Sudanese government for having allowed the fact-finding team to visit the country, without making mention of the outcomes of the mission. It was passed with fifty votes in favour, with the United States, Australia and the Ukraine voting against the resolution (Bellamy, 2005: 41). Two weeks later, Sudan was elected as a full member of the Commission (causing the United States to walk out in protest), but the High Commissioner on Human Rights quickly moved to issue a statement strongly condemning the large-scale violations in Darfur, demanding that those responsible be held accountable (Scanlon, 2006: 136). Kofi Annan also began to press Sudan’s Ambassador to the UN to allow humanitarian access to Darfur, and Khartoum responded by easing some restrictions on the movement of aid workers, on a temporary basis (Traub, 2010: 9- 11).

While the UN struggled to find either a position on Darfur or a mechanism for engagement, the AU moved swiftly. The Peace and Security Council had already been briefed on the escalating situation at the end of March 2004, and by the end of that month Alpha Omar Konaré, the Chairperson of the Commission, had dispatched a delegation to N’djamena in Chad, were dialogue between the SLM, JEM and the Government of Sudan was being convened by the Chadian Government. On 08 April 2004, and with AU support, the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA) was signed between the Government of Sudan, the SLM and the JEM. On 13 April the Peace and Security Council commended the parties to the conflict for having signed the HCA, and requested the Government of Sudan to implement its commitments in line with the agreement, and bring to justice those responsible for violations of human rights, “in line with the AU’s expressed commitment to fight impunity” (African Union, 2004[e]: 3).

During May, the parties to the ceasefire signed a further agreement in Addis Ababa on the implementation modalities of the N’djamena agreement, and acknowledged the AU as the primary international partner and the operational arm of the ceasefire agreement (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 153). That same month, the Peace and Security Council was officially launched in Addis Ababa. Sudan was one of the inaugural members, serving a two-year term. Despite its engagement on Darfur, in its communiqué on conflict situations in Africa, the Council made only passing reference to the peace process between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM, with no mention of Darfur. The Council did however note that:

With the tenth anniversary of the commemoration of the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, still fresh in our minds, we insist that the findings and recommendations of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities, as contained in theirreport Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, must serve as the basis for ensuring that the ultimate crime of genocide shall never again deface this continent (African Union, 2004[f]: 3).

The report, commissioned by the OAU following the Rwanda genocide, had heavily criticized the UN, the OAU and the international community at large for failing to prevent and intervene in the Rwandan genocide, and the OAU had subsequently committed to never again allow genocide to take place on the African continent. The Peace and Security Council, in its inaugural communiqué, moved to reaffirm this commitment, yet at the same time failed to even include the events in Darfur in its review of conflict situations in Africa. In a separate meeting, the Council did move to review the situation in Darfur, and called on the Government of Sudan to ensure the protection of the civilian population. The Council further requested the AU Commission on Human and Peoples Rights to dispatch a mission to Darfur to investigate reports of human rights violations, and to report back to the Council (African Union, 2004[g]).

By late May, the Peace and Security Council approved the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission in support of the HCA, and the AU dispatched a small team of observers to Darfur to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement, which commenced operations on 09 June 2004 under the banner of the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS). What was not entirely clear at the time, as Henry Anyidoho argues, was why the AU began by only deploying an observer mission when reports at the time had extensively detailed the plight of displaced persons and shown that refugees were pouring into Chad’s Abeche region (2006: 150). Yet the AU had received the consent of the Sudanese government for the deployment of an observer mission only, and would not have been able to deploy a mission with a mandate which reached beyond the confines of the ceasefire agreement. AMIS thus consisted of 60 monitors and 305 protection troops from Rwanda and Nigeria mandated to protect the monitoring team and to provide security to IDPs receiving humanitarian assistance, within the means and areas of operation of the

mission (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 154). Confusion soon set in however. The United States, which had taken the lead on the humanitarian response and which was playing an important role in the North-South negotiations, began taking initiatives without consulting partners, the EU jealously guarded its role as deputy head of the Ceasefire Commission, and a tangle of responsibilities often saw the UN become a competitor as opposed to a coordinator (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 172). Within this context, the AU sought to monitor a ceasefire agreement which had no tangible impact on the conflict on the ground, contributing to further confusion.

Confusion also arose as to the role of the force itself. Rwandan President Paul Kagame stated that his troops would use force to protect civilians if necessary, and although the AU had indicated in a communiqué to the Security Council that its forces would indeed fulfil this role, some AU members quietly expressed reservations. The Sudanese government itself rejected Kagame’s interpretation of the mandate. Sudanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdelwahad Najeb insisted that the mission of the force was very clearly limited to the protection of the deployed monitors:

As far as the [protection of the civilians is] concerned, this is the clear responsibility of the government of Sudan (in Bellamy, 2005: 44).

Thus when Nigeria deployed the first of its troops, President Obasanjo insisted that his forces would only protect AU observers and operate only with the consent of the Sudanese government (Bellamy, 2005: 44). This sense of confusion was exacerbated once mission personnel had been deployed, as the security situation in Darfur proved to have been grossly underestimated. As the mission was deploying, the conflict rapidly escalated in ferocity, yet the AU had intended only to deploy a small observer mission which could facilitate the maintenance of political dialogue, on the assumption that all parties would respect the ceasefire agreement (Anyidoho, 2006: 149). On the ground, AMIS operations were constrained by the Sudanese authorities, which, amongst others, prevented AU helicopters from flying by denying them fuel, and limited the areas where AMIS personnel could operate, arguing that the mission was an observer mission, and not a peacekeeping mission (Bellamy, 2005: 44).

Whilst the mandate of AMIS was limited, and its operations constrained, the mission did achieve some initial success in Darfur by creatively exceeding its mandate where possible, without incurring public scrutiny (De Waal, 2007: 1041). Yet the ceasefire agreement did not hold, with the Government violating the agreement shortly after its signing, and internal differences between the SLM and JEM surfacing, splitting each of the movements. With the fragmentation of the movements, Khartoum and its allies quickly regained the political and military initiative and continued to pursue a military victory over the movements (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 153). While the N’djamena Agreement had made reference to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed, Khartoum moved to strengthen the militia through the provision of arms and material.

While AMIS continued struggling to deploy in Darfur, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1547 on 11 June 2004, expressing its willingness to authorize a peace operation to oversee the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the agreement which was slowly emerging from the North-South negotiations in Naivasha. Fearing that the Resolution might spark a debate on Darfur, some Council members were quick to reaffirm Sudanese sovereignty, and expressed deep scepticism about the notion of interventions on humanitarian grounds (Bellamy, 2005: 41). Pakistan, for example, reminded the Council:

Sudan is an important member of the African Union, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations. As a United Nations Member State, Sudan has all the rights and privileges incumbent under the United Nations Charter, including to sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity – the principles that form the basis of international relations (United Nations United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2004[a : 4).

While the Council debated the emerging CPA and the role of the UN in support of this agreement, Pakistan, China and Russia argued that the scale of human suffering in Darfur was insufficient to provoke serious reflection on whether Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities towards its population, and the United States, the United Kingdom and France proved reluctant to force the issue in the Council (Bellamy, 2005: 42). Germany however noted that peace in Sudan was indivisible, and required an end to widespread human rights violations. The United States, keen to avoid becoming entangled in Darfur and happy to let the AU take the lead, highlighted a range of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, before asserting its firm support for the AU initiatives to end the conflict (United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2004[a]: 4).

Germany, a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time, following the passage of Resolution 1547 informally began to propose the deployment of a UN operation to Darfur, yet support for this was not widespread outside of the Nordic countries, and although the Nordic countries offered troops for such a deployment, no other countries did. The notion was quickly, and quietly, dropped. Yet while no solutions could be found at the political level, calls for action grew louder in other fora. The New York Times ran a series of articles exposing the massive human rights abuses taking place in Darfur, and called for action on the part of the United States, incurring severe criticism from Sudanese Embassy in Washington in the process. Non- governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group also began to actively lobby for action in Darfur (Bellamy, 2005: 41). In the United States advocacy groups were perhaps the most active, and in response to mounting pressure from lobby groups and increasing levels of interest on the part of the American Congress, the American State Department in May 2004 launched an investigation into whether the atrocities being committed in Darfur constituted acts of genocide (Bellamy, 2005: 47).

Kofi Annan, sensing that the mounting pressure might create an opening for engagement, travelled to Darfur and met with al Bashir in Khartoum, where a joint communiqué was signed, committing the Sudanese government to removing all obstacles to humanitarian efforts, to ending impunity for human rights abuses, to disarming the Janjaweed, and to resuming political dialogue on Darfur. A Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM) was established, jointly headed by the UN representative to Sudan, Jan Pronk, and Sudanese government, tasked with monitoring compliance with the agreement. Yet Annan’s aircraft had barely left Sudanese airspace before aerial bombing in Darfur resumed. Annan later conceded that he had not been able to meaningfully engage with Sudanese government as the Security Council had not mandated him to warn Sudanese authorities of the consequences of inaction (Traub, 2010: 12). Pronk, seeking guidance from New York, received instructions from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) not to push for a greater role in Darfur beyond his two mandated areas of overseeing humanitarian efforts and providing good offices on behalf of the Secretary General (MacKinnon, 2010: 86).

Reporting to the Peace and Security Council on the situation in Darfur on 4 July 2004, Konaré noted that he remained “very concerned” about the abuses of international humanitarian law and

the continued human rights violations in Darfur, and again appealed to the Government of Sudan to ensure the protection of the civilian population and to disarm the Janjaweed. Konaré also reported that the AU Commission was working to ensure the rapid deployment of the observer mission to Darfur, and requested international assistance to ensure that the mission could meet its mandate as soon as possible (African Union, 2004[h]). Sudan, a member of the Council from 2004 to 2006, was not pleased that the matter had been brought before the Council. Given the Council’s consensus-based style of decision-making, Sudan was able to play a powerful role in the debates of the Council. Reacting to the report of the Chairperson the Council did move to reiterate its “serious concerns” over the situation in Darfur and the need to bring to justice those responsible for human rights violations. However, the Council argued that, despite the gravity of the crisis, the situation in Darfur could not be defined as genocide, and called on the Government of Sudan to assist in ensuring the protection of civilians and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Sudan also worked to ensure that international attention on Darfur be as limited as possible, and was instrumental in urging the Council to assert the primacy of the AU in dealing with the crisis in Darfur. The Council thus stressed that:

the African Union should continue to lead the efforts to address the crisis in Darfur and that states should continue to support these efforts (African Union, 2004[i]: 1).

Noting the rapid deterioration of the situation, the AU at its Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa from 06 to 08 July 2004 registered its “serious concern about the humanitarian crisis”, but went on again to state that “even though the humanitarian situation in Darfur is serious, it cannot be defined as a genocide” (African Union, 2004[b]: para. 2). That same month, negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the armed movements were convened under the auspices of the AU in Addis Ababa, before being moved to Abuja, Nigeria, in August 2004 under the auspices of the Nigerian Chairmanship of the AU. Yet the negotiations were centred primarily around securing an enhanced ceasefire and humanitarian agreement, and did not relate to a broader political process, let alone to the CPA negotiations underway at the time (Seymour, 2010: 61).

From 15 to 17 July 2004, the AU again convened a meeting for representatives of the Government of Sudan, the SLA and the JEM in Addis Ababa, this time to deliberate on the conditions necessary for the establishment of a comprehensive political settlement on the crisis in Darfur. Acknowledging the serious humanitarian conditions unfolding in Darfur, AU mediators nonetheless argued that the conflict was a political one, and that a political dialogue which would address the root causes of the conflict needed to be established (African Union, 2004[j]). This position was reinforced on 27 July by the Peace and Security Council, which welcomed the support of the UN Security Council, but stressed that the AU should continue to lead efforts to resolve the crisis in Darfur, and called on the parties to the conflict to enter into a political dialogue (African Union, 2004[k]).

Members of the UN Security Council however began to view the situation in a more serious light, and with progress on the North-South negotiations seemingly secured, the United States, with the