In the first part of this section, I present what I call the structural determinants of Seed Security, and in the second part the intermediary determinants. It is important to notice that the Seed Security dimensions and many of indicators proposed in FAO (2015) for each of these dimensions are what I have called intermediary determinants of seed security. The rationale for this terminology is that there is a pathway leading from the seed security structural determinants to the intermediary factors that determines uneven seed security outcomes, and ultimately food insecurity.
Structural determinants of Seed Security
Unlike food security, research on the qualitative determinants of seed (in) security is scarce, and quantitative evidence is virtually absent. Cromwell (1996) reports that chronic seed security is closely related with poverty, being more prevalent among marginal and poor farmers that experience frequent drought, poor soil quality, weak infrastructure and limited access to land and labour.
Disadvantaged groups, such as women-headed households, landless households, refugees or displaced and ethnic minorities, are usually the poorest and the most seed-insecure in rural communities in developing countries (GTZ & CGN, 2000). Furthermore, poorer farmers are more prone to being caught in a vicious cycle of seed insecurity (Almekinders, 2000). Households suffering from chronic seed insecurity often tend to be the most affected by reduced access to seed following a crisis event (Longley, 1998; Longley, Dominguez, Saide, & Leonardo, 2002). Such households suffer from other forms of marginalisation, namely: i) economic - as seed insecure households are usually poor with little land or labour available; ii) ecological - as they usually live in areas prone to repeated drought and degraded soils; iii) political - as they might be located in unsafe areas (Sperling et al.,
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107 2006), and; iv) institutional - as marginal lands typically have uncertain tenure (Haugen, 2001; Sperling et al., 2006). Insecure tenure results in tenants having to cultivate different areas every year as they move from one marginal area to another, each with distinct agro-ecological conditions. Consequently, seeds saved from the previous harvest may not be adapted to the new land environment, thus contributing to seed insecurity (Haugen, 2001; Sperling et al, 2006). A summary of key findings of studies focused on seed systems in emergency contexts report that farmers who have the conditions to sow – in other words, they are not displaced or landless, generally find ways to obtain seed for at least some key crop during stress events (in Honduras: de Barbentane Nagoda & Fowler, 2003; Haugen
& Fowler, 2003; in Rwanda: Sperling, 1997a,b, 2001a, 2002b; in Sierra Leone: Longley, 1997,2000, and Richards & Ruivenkamp, 1997; in Kenya: Sperling, 2000, 2002a; some initial work in Mozambique on genetic diversity: Ferguson, 2003 cited in Sperling & Cooper, 2003). A more recent Seed System Security Assessment in Haiti (CIAT, 2010) also provides some evidence that land tenure insecurity can negatively affect seed security, as after the 2010 earthquake, 10% of farmers reported concerns about land tenure changes as being one of the reasons for decreased seed use.
Intermediary determinants of seed security
There is also evidence in the literature of intermediary determinants, especially with respect to access and quality.
Seed access can be undermined, even when market channels are available, as not all households have the resources to purchase the required seeds. In the West Nile region, namely in Uganda, farmers' access to seed was largely hampered by low incomes. Low purchasing power is found to affect the affordability of seed from market sources, particularly certified seed, which is a situation that can worsen during stress periods, due to reduced household incomes/assets to finance seed purchases (Kansiime & Mastenbroek, 2016). In Sierra Leone, rice farmers who have more income, accruing from other crops sales, are those that are able to purchase seed in years when production is low, or in cases where they have large families to feed with rice (Chenoune, Belhouchette, Paloma & Capillon, 2016).
Beyond economic capital to access seeds, many households rely on social capital during stress periods.
A study on bean seed supply in Malawi illustrates how the lack of social capital can undermine seed access in local markets, particularly for women-headed households, as they are not part of the social network of farmers who usually have surplus production to sell. Depending on the market, this adds an additional challenge, as chronic seed-insecure households are the poorest and more prone to food shortages and are therefore those with lower purchasing power (Almekinders, 2000). In Syria, there is evidence that access to seeds and new varieties by women was undermined by cultural norms and
“customary discriminatory practices” (Galiè, 2013). Additionally, seed-related social exclusion can
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108 impact already vulnerable individuals, such as widows, orphans, or tenant farmers (Bezner Kerr, 2013).
Communities with weak social networks are more vulnerable to adverse conditions due to constrained access to seed (Poudel, Shrestha, Basnet, Shrestha, Sthapit, & Subedi, 2008). The availability of seeds within farmer seed networks may be depleted, as the majority of members have seed shortfalls, particularly after droughts (McGuire, 2008) or due to increasing commercialisation, labour migration, and livelihood diversification (Bellon, 2004), which together affect seed access from networks (Kansiime & Mastenbroek, 2016). In certain contexts, socio-economic exclusion affects farmers’ access to seeds, which, in turn, negatively impacts on food production and security.
Food crops with high seed rates further challenge off-market access to seeds. Rice in rainfed lowland production systems is mainly planted through direct seedings, which requires a high seed rate, varying from 80 to 200 kg/ha (Virmani, Mao, & Hardy, 2003). Crop-specific seed rates are a critical factor for the demand for seed, where crops demanding a greater availability of seeds than others place greater pressure on the different seed access channels. Hence crops’ technical idiosyncrasies can determine the level of influence of the access (and availability) dimensions of food production and security.
According to Tripp (2006), in accessing seed off-farm, farmers generally seek small quantities for crops with low seed rates or with relatively small areas, in order that the cost of seed is a small proportion of the total cost of production. However, this is not the case for lowland rain-fed rice. Additionally, seeds with more availability in the formal market are usually from cash crops with a more limited selection of food crops/varieties (Tripp, 2006; FAO, 2004; Louwaars & De Boef, 2012; Almekinders, 2000). Accordingly, as informal seed systems are not market-oriented, seeds are usually produced for consumption, where some limited surplus can be bartered with neighbours or sold in local markets (FAO, 2003). Crops’ idiosyncrasies determine the level of off-farm access to seed, with implications for food production and security.
The source of the seed is usually associated with its quality. Usually, farmed-saved seeds are of good quality (Tripp, 2000; Almerkinders, 2000; Sperling & McGuire, 2011) and do not present significant differences from seeds from the formal system (Bishaw, Struik, & van Gastel, 2012; Bishaw, Struik &
van Gastel, 2013; Gibson, 2013). Research in Ghana and Zambia has shown that seed saved by farmers, or obtained from neighbours or markets is usually of acceptable quality (Tripp, Walker, Miti, Mukumbuta, & Zulu, 1998a; Tripp, Walker, Opoku-Apau, Dankyi, & Delimini, 1998b). A study looking at local bean seed quality showed that in 11 of the 13 reviewed cases, farmers’ seed quality was at least as good as seed from the formal sector. Another study on cereal seed quality in many countries in Western Asia and Northern Africa showed similar results (Almekinders, 2000). A study assessing the
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109 health quality of wheat and barley from formal and informal sectors in Ethiopia and Syria found weaknesses in seed health from both sources (Bishaw et al., 2012).
A possible explanation is that off-farm seed provided by the informal seed system is subjected to some kind of quality control. Networks and social relations also are important in assessing the quality of local seed traders and may serve as a form of quality control, which is labelled by Catholic Relief Services as “social certification” (Sperling et al., 2008). An example given by Okry, Van Mele, Nuijten, Struik and Mongbo (2011) is that farmers exchange information about local rice seed traders so that possible cheating, or the provision of misinformation would spread quicklyly in their network. Farmers at informal markets assess the quality of the seed, and also the quality of the seed provider (Sperling
& McGuire, 2010). Futhermore, seed exchange at local markets is regulated through “social norms of reciprocity” or “good neighbourliness” (Jones, Bramel, Longley, & Remington, 2002). Trust plays a very important role when searching for quality seed. When markets provide poor quality seed, farmers may prefer sourcing from reputable neighbours (Badstue, Bellon, Berthaud, Ramírez, Flores, & Juarez, 2007; Bicksler, Bates, Burnette, Gill, Meitzner Yoder, Ricciardi, & Srigiofun, 2012). Conversely, if farmers lack confidence in seed produced within their social network, they seek seed in local markets (Sperling & McGuire, 2010).
This does not mean, however, that there are no problems with the quality of farmers’ seed, for there are situations where farmers have sub-optimal seed quality. It has been found to be critical that appropriate varieties and good quality seed are delivered, particularly in the context of seed relief operations, because otherwise, unintended results can contribute to food insecurity (FAO, 2004;
Sperling et al. 2007). Additionally, farmers under duress may be forced to rely on low-quality seed.
Weltzien et al. (2001) illustrate examples of farmers’ use of low quality seed in stressful situations in Mali, Western Rajasthan, and Rwanda, including farmers sowing seed of varieties/crops that they know are suboptimal for their field conditions and sowing seed they know to be of inferior quality (germination, health status), and also buying low quality seed from the market with a considerable proportions of broken seed, pest-damaged seed, pebbles, and small twigs. This has been similarly found in Syria, where seed purchased in the market was frequently of poor quality, with a low germination rate (FAO/WFP Syria, 2015). Additionally, poorly endowed, chronically insecure seed farmers face systematic difficulties in accessing good quality seed (Longley et al., 2002; Weltzien et al., 2001). Seed system studies show that wealthier households are more likely to conserve and control their own seed, while poorer households more often supplemented their limited seed stock with
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110 whatever was available to them, which was often seed of poor quality, or varieties unsuitable for the local environment (FAO & ICRISAT, 2004). Hence seed quality is also a function of poverty.