E DGAR M ORIN

Skeptics of robotic emotions might wonder whether the bar has been set too low for the phenomena that count as emotions. They might argue that robots having emotions as defined by the component process model (Scherer 2005, 2010) is trivial, as the definition of emotions pro- vided the CPM does not match the lay conception of emotions; the lay conception of emotions requires that the agent experiences a feeling during an emotional episode, while the CPM does not. The concern is that if feelings are not required for having emotions on the present account, yet feelings are central to how most people define emotions, that the present account has merely adapted an arbitrary definition of emotions.

There is also a related concern regarding the importance of classifying these robots as having emotions. Even if Kismet, Leonardo, and other like robots have emotions on the present account, what is the theoretical advantage of categorizing them as emotional? Categories allow

observers to make inferences about the entity in question, based on what categories it falls with- in. For instance, classifying a whale as a mammal allows the observer to conclude that whales give birth to live young, are warm blooded, and the females have mammary glands, among other features. So what then can be inferred about these robots based on their having emotions?7

When considering whether the present account provides an arbitrary definition of emo- tions, it is important to note that this definition was derived from a shared theoretical understand- ing of what emotions are. While there is no consensus among researchers as to what components of emotions are the most important for the occurrence of an emotional episode within humans, there is general agreement on what components are involved; these components are appraisals of events, neurophysiological responses, action tendencies, expressions, and feelings. However, de- spite the insistence that feelings are necessary for having emotions on the lay account, there is disagreement among researchers as to whether this is actually the case. As was argued earlier, there are a number of researchers who hold that feelings are too poorly understood to be included within the broader definition of emotions at all (see Fellous & LeDoux, 2005), largely because there is no means for directly accessing an individual's phenomenology (LeDoux, 2002). More important is the fact that these robots are able to continually perform what I argue is the central function of emotions: to attribute value to stimuli in the environment with respect to how those stimuli relate to the agent's goals/needs, in order to autonomously select an action or set of ac- tions to satisfy those goals/needs. While other robots may be capable of fulfilling goals through non-emotional processes, Kismet and Leonardo utilize the coordination of the components of emotion in order to meet their goals through emotional processes. Thus, these robots have emo-

7 _{I would like to extend a special thanks to Neil Van Leeuwen and Dan Weiskopf for bringing these concerns to my} attention during the defense of this thesis.

tions in a non-arbitrary sense, even if the layperson may not recognize Kismet and Leonardo as having emotions.

The theoretical advantage of classifying Kismet and Leonardo as emotional is that doing so allows researchers to treat these robots as a viable platform for studying how emotions occur in humans and in other biological life. While it is true that human emotions and the emotions of these robots are far from equivalent, it is important to remember that members of a category need not share every feature in common. For instance, platypuses lay eggs even though they are clas- sified as mammals. If one were to make the prediction that platypuses give birth to live young based on their status as mammals, one would be incorrect. Nevertheless, platypuses' status as mammals allows one to correctly infer that they are warm-blooded, have fur, and breath through lungs. Therefore, a category can be useful, even if some of its members have exceptional features or lack certain features. As the components of emotion are coordinated within these robots such that they are able to perform the central function of emotions, predictions may be made about how the absence or malfunction of one of these components will affect the agent's ability to per- form this central function. The capacities of these robots also show that feelings are not neces- sary for autonomous appraisal and action deliberation towards the fulfillment of goals/needs. Furthermore, the difference between human emotions and the emotions of these robots gives re- searchers an indication of the sorts of mechanisms that must be added to the robots' architecture, such as pain receptors and a means for determining novel actions (i.e. actions that are not pre- programmed), in order for the robots' emotions to more closely resemble humans. Therefore, despite their dissimilarity to human emotions, there is sufficient similarity in the emotions of the- se robots to use them as a means for studying human emotions.