Diário de campo

6.2.2.1. Sporadic certification with local adaptations

Between opening in 2008 and December 2017, the local land office delivered 728 certificates.49 The price of a certificate is defined by the area of the parcel, starting at 24,000 Ariary for one hectare and an additional 3,000 Ariary for administrative costs.

The price increases at a rate of 10,000 Ariary for each additional hectare, and ten hectares is the maximum one can certify in Ankazomiriotra. Farmers were asked to pay 24,000

49 The statistics provided by the local land office and the CRIF on the number of certificates delivered in Ankazomiriotra do not match. I refer here to figures communicated by the employee of the local land office. The certificates are allocated by parcel and not by person. One person can have several certificates.

Therefore, the number of beneficiaries is lower than the number of certificates allocated.

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Ariary at the beginning of the procedure and the rest at the end. The office noted seasonal variations in applications. Farmers complete applications after the harvest season when they have money to cover the fees. For instance, during the first twenty days in April 2016, there were twelve demands, with only a couple in December 2015.

The applications mainly concern parcels less than one hectare. They target irrigated rice fields in the bas fond that are most valuable and where tensions exist between neighbours. They also focus on housing and agricultural parcels in urban and peri-urban areas of the municipality, where land use change is the quickest. Indeed, most of the applications were received from the fokontanys around the municipal centre. There are three fokontanys where there have been no demands, all located on the periphery of the municipality.

Some local translations of the official procedures can be perceived. In fact, the local land office requests farmers to include petits papiers in their applications, even though this is not required by law. Similar cases have also been observed by Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014) nationally and by Boué (2013) in Faratsiho. The practice entails that farmers procure a petit papier from the chiefs of fokontany before applying for a certificate, which then represents extra costs.⁵⁰ The practice also reinforces concepts of a property ladder where a petit papier is a prerequisite for a certificate.

The existence of these local adaptations can be explained by a couple of factors. First, I find that for the local land office, the petits papiers serve as initial proofs and historic records of land-holding. Boué (2013) has also argued that petits papiers represent a pre-local recognition, diminishing the likelihood of conflict during the certification process.

Such avoidance of conflict was also perceptible in the operational strategies of the local land office in Ankazomiriotra, where responsibility for conflict resolution was delegated to the chiefs of fokontany and village elders. Second, I conclude that the practice stems from a willingness to keep cordial relationships between the local land office and the chiefs of fokontany. It ensures the existence of the petits papiers as a practice and guarantees continued responsibilities and revenue streams for the chiefs (see also Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 2014).

50 The chiefs of fokontany reported that the cost of the petit papier is around 5,000 Ariary.

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These examples show how bureaucratic (local land office) and socially embedded (petits papiers managed by chiefs) institutions merge their strategies to maintain social consensus and solidarity (Cleaver 2003). An institutional bricolage exists in which land administration practices ‘are borrowed or constructed from existing institutions, styles of thinking and sanctioned social relationships’ (Cleaver 2003, p.16).

This bricolage brings together a number of actors and demonstrates how complex it can be to introduce changes that modify authority relations. In the example of Ankazomiriotra, the local land office plays the role of development agents that are supposed to advance the dominant policy narrative, but they also defend their own interests and mediate between local interest groups (Olivier de Sardan 1995). This means accepting the authority of the chiefs of fokontany and the value of the petits papiers, integrating them into the certification process. By doing so, the dominant policy narrative is implemented without major friction. The chiefs of fokontany then act as self-declared brokers in addition to their more institutional roles as members of the local recognition commission. In Ankazomiriotra, they underscore this by handling petits papiers, coordinating demands for certificates and voluntarily disseminating official messages. This role has consolidated their position at the level of the fokontany (they are the first interface for farmers with the statutory land administration) but also at the level of the municipality (they have become an integral part of the certification process) (see Olivier de Sardan 1995; Bierschenk et al. 2000; Mosse 2005). The chiefs of fokontany have consequently kept their responsibilities by finding ways to adapt official practices for their benefit. This example from Ankazomiriotra finally demonstrates that the fokontany remains the most meaningful level of action for local land administration and management, and the choice of officially allocating all responsibilities to municipalities can be questioned (see Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004; and discussion in 5.3.3.)

6.2.2.2. Grouped certification process

Everyday certification is based on a sporadic approach, but at the beginning Kara-Tany Malaky operations were undertaken in four fokontanys. After the two central fokontanys of the municipality, these are places where most of the demands have been made for certificates. The local land office received some 400 demands during the Kara-Tany Malaky process. The applications were handled and digitised by the technical operator

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of the MCA project. Of these, the local land office has issued 230 certificates, meaning that 170 are still pending.

The Kara-Tany Malaky process promoted certificates for farmers at a discount (15,000 Ariary for a parcel of one hectare) for a limited period. Some chiefs of fokontany found that the process was rushed, making it difficult for farmers to gather the documents needed for an application.

Because it was an order from... here it came from... the delegate of the commune.

The communal delegate receives orders from the land services that everyone must make the certificate, and everyone rushed to do so.

Interview with a chief (FOK007), 31.05.2016 Also, even with the discount, farmers felt that the fees were too high, demonstrating that the perception of farmers regarding the prices differ from the concepts of the proponents of the dominant policy narrative, who promoted certificates as a cheap way to access statutory land administration. In reality, the certificates still remain out of reach for most farmers.

It is perceptible from the interviews that the Kara-Tany Malaky created frustration among the municipal actors, chiefs of fokontany and farmers. After the withdrawal of MCA, the municipality was left with pending applications. However, it has not agreed to pay the difference between the price of the normal certificate and the Kara-Tany Malaky, and the farmers do not wish to pay higher fees either (they should cover an additional 12,000 Ariary as they have already paid 15,000 Ariary). As underlined in Chapter 7, this situation is likely to create a negative reputation for certificates and damage the motivation of farmers to make further applications. Yet, the local land office and the municipality did not seem aware of the loss of credibility, nor did they show determination to resolve the pending cases. Hence backlogs remain, and farmers are impatient to receive their certificates.

The Kara-Tany Malaky process is yet another example of the limits of project and result-based practices. The actions were rushed and there was no thought given to institutional sustainability. With the withdrawal of donors, all activities ended and the municipality and the chiefs of fokontany as the local actors were left alone to deal with the consequences.

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6.2.2.3. Local recognition with limited ability to deal with power plays

The work of the local recognition commission is the most concrete step of the certification process. Under the law, its purpose is to allow competing claims to be reviewed and mediated by a committee constituted of a representative of the municipality, the chiefs of the fokontany and the elders of the village in which parcels are located (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2006). The process brings together the owner of the parcel and all neighbours of the adjacent parcels. The employee of the local land office plays an administrative role and does not, for instance, take part in conflict resolution.

Local recognition is supposed to be the moment when the social, cultural and power relations influencing the sources of and conditions for tenure security are dealt with. It builds on practices undertaken when signing petits papiers. The proponents thus view it as a local social process in which reciprocity is created between neighbours: if I am present for my neighbour, my neighbour is also more inclined to testify for me. It is not without risks, however. Local recognition can lead to situations where neighbours only testify in favour of each other. Some neighbours could also build a strong front, excluding people who are afraid to step forward and testify against them. The social process has also taken on some administrative characteristics. In fact, local recognition results in the elaboration of minutes of meetings, which are important for retracing the legitimacy of rights holders (Observatoire du Foncier 2007). The Land Observatory (2007) qualifies these minutes as the masterpiece of the whole certification process, used to resolve contentious cases. Yet, if power imbalances exist during the process the views of the dominant actors alone end up being recorded.

I observed three local recognition processes (Appendix 7). These were straightforward

events. They gave a feeling of theatre, rather than being a moment for mediating differences. In the first two cases, local recognition seemed to be conducted out of obligation. The parties walked the borders, took measurements and completed paperwork. No other importance was given to the process. The third case was supposed to be more contentious; indeed, the local land office mentioned that some unresolved issues existed between the neighbours, but the parties tried to negotiate the case prior to the meeting. On the ground the process followed the same procedures as above,

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suggesting that the disagreements had been resolved elsewhere, but it is not clear how this was done. It also reinforces the position of the local land office as unwilling to engage in disputes. Local recognition thus confirms pre-agreed cases without being a true moment for dealing with the cultural, social and power relations influencing tenure security.

The examples from Ankazomiriotra suggest that the local recognition process and the steps taken behind the scenes are not exempt from power dynamics. For instance, in interviews one farmer laconically expressed how the certification process had been executed quickly and orchestrated by the local land office. Another farmer said that there had been many people demanding a certificate, sometimes under pressure:

They took the shape of the plots. They put them in a big notebook. They... each wrote his name and certificates were issued

Interview with a farmer (PEA010), 03.06.2016 Also, the parties supposed to be involved in the process are not always present. In the observed cases, only one neighbour was present at each time. The local land office also mentioned that some neighbours might live far away or were difficult to reach, and extra costs might be required to ensure their participation. These could fall onto the applicant.

Indeed, in one of the observed cases money changed hands to cover transport and meal costs of all the participants.

The rapidity with which the local recognition process is conducted depends also on the location of the parcel. The local land office finds it uncomfortable to go to the furthest away fokontanys, which might require an hour on a motorbike and a couple of hours of walking. Therefore, the office tries to group the local recognition processes of these fokontanys. Considering the small number of applications, someone making a demand might have to wait a while before recognition takes place. Similar logic was seen in the work of some agricultural services that avoided the most remote fokontanys due to lack of access and problems of insecurity. This indicates that the ‘development’ endeavours focus around fokontanys conveniently reachable from the main road RN 34. This leads to what Chambers (1980) call roadside bias, in which development action follows main communication axes and does not reach out to more remote areas, thus failing to reach the poorest segments of the society.

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