Diagnóstico de accidentalidad

Aristotle does not use his standard terms for “universal” and “particular” – katholou and

kath’ hekaston29 – in the Categories. Instead, he relies on two phrases: “being said of a subject” (legesthai kath’ hypokeimenou) and “being [present] in a subject” (en hypokeimenôi einai).30 _{Although the language Aristotle uses might suggest otherwise,}

these two phrases do not merely express linguistic relations, but above all they express ontological relations. More precisely, we will see that Aristotle construes them as

29 _{The term kath’ hekaston occurs once (at 2b3).}

30 _{Aristotle introduces these relations, somewhat abruptly, in chapter two of the Categories, and relies on} them in his discussion of primary and secondary substances in Chapter Five.

relations of ontological dependence – both things that are “said of” and those that are “present in” a subject depend on the subject for their being.

The traditional position31 holds, and I think correctly, that the “present in” relation (often called inherence) distinguishes substances from quantities, qualities, and other categories that the tradition has lumped together as “accidents”, and what we would today call “accidental properties”. Accidents are always present in a subject (they are always accidents of something), while substances (neither primary nor secondary ones) do not inhere in anything further (they cannot be said to be of anything in a similar manner). The “said of” relation (often called predication), on the other hand, is held to distinguish particulars from universals – universals are said or predicated of a subject, particulars are not. This position relies on Aristotle’s “standard” definition of the “particular” and “universal” in the De Interpretatione: “I call universal (katholou) that which is by nature predicated (katêgoreisthai) of many things, and particular (kath’ hekaston) that which is not” (17a38).

Thus, these two relations distinguish substances from accidents, on the one hand, and particulars from universals, on the other. But Aristotle, at least in the Categories, does not see these distinctions as coinciding. Rather, they cut across each other, giving rise to the so-called fourfold division of “of things that are” (tôn ontôn, “of beings”) which is presented in chapter two of the Categories:

Of things that are: (i) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. For example, human being is said of a subject, this human being, but is not in any subject. (ii) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By “in a subject” I mean what is in

31 _{See Ackrill (2002 [1963], 74). Since the publication of Ackrill’s translation and commentary on the} Categories (1963), the traditional position is usually equated with his view. But see also Granger (1980), who offers a well-written overview and defense of the traditional position.

something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) For example, this knowledge of grammar (hê tis grammatikê) is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and this white (to ti leukon) is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject. (iii) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, knowledge-of- grammar. (iv) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, this human being (ho tis anthrôpos) and this horse (ho tis hippos) – for nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject. (1a20-1b4).32

The combination of the “present in” and “said of” relations thus yields a distinction between two types of particulars (i.e., (ii) and (iv)) and two types of universals (i.e., (i) and (iii)). The former distinction has been the main focus of recent literature on the

Categories. In particular, there has been a fierce dispute over the precise nature of these things that are present in but not said of a subject (whether they are recurrent or non- recurrent properties).33 It is not important for my present purposes to take sides in this issue, and I shall be content to agree with the traditional position that Aristotle is

32 _{Here and in what follows I rely on Ackrill’s translation of the Categories (2002 [1963]). However, I do} not follow Ackrill in all the details, and translate some of the expressions differently, e.g. while Ackrill translates ho tis anthrôpos as “the individual man”, I translate it more literally as “this human being”. 33 _{According to one view, Aristotle’s reference to “this white” picks out a determinate property, e.g. a} determinate shade of white, rather than a particular property unique to its possessor. The salient feature of this view is that, according to it, nothing prevents particular properties from being recurrent and repeatable. This view was originated by Owen (1965), and has been defended, most notably, by Frede (1987). But see also Dancy (1975), Furth (1988), Loux (2008 [1991]). According to another and more widespread view, Aristotle’s reference to “this white” picks out a non-recurrent property, i.e., a property that is peculiar to the particular to which it belongs. On this view, each white thing has its own, entirely distinct, property of whiteness (we might call such properties “tropes”). Owen calls this view “dogma” and equates it with Ackrill’s (2002 [1963]) view. See also (for a criticism of Owen) Moravcsik (1967), Allen (1969), Hartman (1977), Granger (1980), Heinaman (1981), Wedin (2005). According to a third view (which is a version of Ackrill’s view), defended by Matthews (2009), particular properties are non-repeatable instances of universal properties. This view emphasizes that although each white thing has its own property of whiteness, these particular properties themselves are instances of the universal property of whiteness (we might call this view “tropes plus universals”). As we will see, my interpretation offers indirect support to the latter type of view. I will argue that particular things (primary substances) are instances of universals, and hence it is reasonable to think that particular properties are likewise instances of universals.

referring here to particulars in categories other than substance. I will focus on those things that are neither said of nor present in a subject – these are the ones Aristotle calls in chapter five of the Categories “primary substances”, such as “this human being” and “this horse” (2a11-14). It is generally agreed that when Aristotle speaks about primary substances, he has in mind concrete particulars, and, above all, naturally existing particulars (humans and horses).

What is important for present purposes is the distinction between two types of universals: those that are both said of and present in a subject (e.g. knowledge, white), and those that are said of but not present in a subject (e.g. human being). The first type indicates universals in categories other than substance, whereas the second type corresponds to what Aristotle calls in chapter five “secondary substances” (2a14-19). Secondary substances include the species and genera under which primary substances fall, e.g. human being, animal, etc. This distinction is important because it can and has been interpreted as Aristotle’s (perhaps first) attempt to distinguish between essential and accidental predication: what is said of but not present in a subject is essential to its being what it is, whereas what is both said of and present in is accidental to its being what it is.34 In order to make referring to these types of universals easier, I will reserve the term “universal” for secondary substances, i.e., species and genera under which primary substances fall. When I want to refer to universals in other categories, I will use the term

34 _{See Duerlinger (1970), who suggests that the predication-inherence distinction represents Aristotle’s} “first attempt” to distinguish essential and accidental predication: “Aristotle does not exactly say that he is trying to distinguish what is essential from what is incidental to the nature of an individual thing, but his examples and statements strongly suggest that the attempt is being made” (p. 181). See also Loux (2008), who argues that all parties to the dispute over the precise nature of particular properties agree that “a distinction between two forms of metaphysical predication (what have been called strong or essential predication and weak or accidental predication) is operative in the Categories” (p. 21).

“accidents”. Now I will turn to Aristotle’s argument – sometimes called the “priority claim” – that is supposed to establish the ontological priority of particulars.