CAPÍTULO II: REVISIÓN DE LA LITERATURA
2.2. BASES TEORICAS
2.2.3 CLIMA LABORAL
2.2.3.9. Diagnóstico de clima laboral
The discussion of the role of chiefs in the postcolonial State is pertinent because the on–going land reform has been encrypted in a variegated ‘customary’ context. In one shade, chiefs in the postcolonial State have resisted the reform because, as they deem it, it endeavours to erode their power as custodians of land at custom.100 At another level, the postcolonial State advocates the involvement of chiefs in land administration. The chiefs’ position assumes an innate comprehension of their power relationship in relation to land. The postcolonial State assumes an allocative role of the chiefs where the power relationship in relation to land is a conferment and not a natural entitlement.
98 See ‘Chitakale estates transforms [sic] lives’ Nyasa Times available at
http://www.nyasatimes.com/national/chitakale-estates-transforms-lives.html [visited on 5 December, 2009].
99
See note 98.
100 See for example ‘Chiefs reject land bill on land tenure’ The Nation, 8 March, 2006; and ‘Meeting
The position of chiefs becomes challenging when one seeks to establish the source of their authority and their legitimacy.101 Under colonial and postcolonial State power respectively, the chief has been the subject of strategic deployment within the State apparatus. The colonial State often tolerated subservient incumbents to inculcate domination. Deviant chiefs could be suspended or outright banished. The practice has been perpetuated under the postcolonial State and is often buttressed by law. 102 While it is acknowledged that a majority of chiefs assumed their incumbency through lineage,103 it remains to be resolved the extent to which the status of chiefs that is derived from colonial or postcolonial State construction can claim custody over land on the basis of ‘custom’.104
The call by the chiefs in Malawi that they are the custodians of land at ‘custom’ and that the land reform must not erode their custodianship only seeks to reinforce the relevance of their institution as a unit of patronage.105 Building on the related arguments in Chapter 4, this is the case for two reasons: chiefs fulfilled a strategic role under colonialism which was precisely to guarantee colonial domination. The institution was a social construction that sustained a particular power relationship.106 The nature of the social construction and its role has been perpetuated under postcolonial Malawi.107 The social construction is concretized by the fact that the resource base of chiefs is ill–provided for or non–existent.108 In this respect, chiefs
101 See for example M Mamdani; and M Chanock, both in Chapter 2, note 52; DC Williams
‘Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies’
(1996) 28(2) Comparative Politics 207; and B Chinsinga ‘The Interface between Tradition and
Modernity: The Struggle for Political Space at the Local Level in Malawi’ (2006) 54 (1/2) Civilizations
255.
102 See M Mamdani, above; M Chanock, above; DC Williams, above; and B Chinsinga, above. In the
case of Malawi, the President has statutory powers to appoint, promote, suspend or dissolve a traditional authority: See section 89(1) (d) of the Constitution and sections 4, 11 and 12 of the Chiefs Act (Chapter 22: 03), Laws of Malawi. The postcolonial State has entrenched the position of chiefs in the formal State apparatus through the provision of salaries to them from the National Budget: see for example the 2008 / 2009 Budget Statement delivered by the Minister of Finance to the National
Assembly available at http://www.sdnp.org.mw/~stewart/Budget_Speech_2008_09.pdf [visited on 12
January, 2009]. The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal has confirmed the President’s powers at law in Group Village Headman Kakopa, Tsakulani Jonisi Kasambwe v Lotani Njeresa Chilozi and the Attorney General Civil Cause Number 40 of 2000 (Unreported).
103
See F Moto ‘Domesticating the Definition of Democracy’, Bwalo: A Forum for Social
Development, 1998, Issue 2, 24 cited in B Chinsinga, note 101.
104 See M Mamdani, note 101.
105 See for example PE Peters & D Kambewa, Introduction, note 60.
106
See M Mamdani; M Chanock; DC Williams; and B Chinsinga, all in note 101.
107 See B Chinsinga, note 101.
rely heavily on the postcolonial State machinery for their survival and in the process render themselves pliable to the whims of the State’s patronage.
The second reason why chiefs are a unit of patronage directly relates to the land question in the country. Peters and Kambewa have observed that while the Land Policy has reposed considerable trust in chiefs, their legitimacy is suspect since chiefs have been at the centre of land alienation through sales to the Achikumbe. In this respect, the suggestion that chiefs advance the interests of their ‘subjects’ – who partly include the land deprived in the ‘community’ – is tenuous.109
In light of the foregoing, the call of chiefs as custodians of land at custom merely serves to perpetuate their relevance as a unit of patronage in their relationship with the postcolonial State. Further, the call also serves to inculcate the power relationship between them and the land deprived; a relationship that is invariably in favour of the chiefs.
Eni Malo and Obwera: The ‘Internecine’ Conflict of the Land Deprived
The discussion here primarily stems from the events in the wake of the redistribution of Makandi Estate in Thyolo, southern Malawi, and the preliminary findings from the resettled communities under the Community Based Rural Land Development Project.110 The Makandi Estate was established in the 1920s and was owned by Lonrho Agribusiness Limited. The area of the Estate is part of the land that was part of the land expropriation by white missionaries and entrepreneurs in southern Malawi just prior to the declaration of British colonialism.111 The black population that worked on the Estate comprised Anguru migrants from Mozambique. A key informant confirmed the point:
The chieftaincy [...] was established in 1930 when our forefathers migrated to the area from Mozambique. The Estate found us. Previously, the Estate used to cultivate cotton, tea, coffee and beans. Things changed. Recently they were just growing tea and coffee. Villagers used to
109 See PE Peters & D Kambewa, note 105. Cf. the position in Tanzania where villagers demanded, and
the Land Commission recommended, their greater participation in land administration matters such as land allocation, determination of boundaries and sales: See Government of Tanzania Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, Volume I (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Lands, Housing and
Urban Development, 1994) 94; and I Shivji Not Yet Democracy: Reforming Land Tenure in Tanzania
(Dar es Salaam: IIED and HAKIARDI, 1998).
110 On the findings: See B Chinsinga, note 31.
work on the Estate until the Government bought the Estate and redistributed the land to obwera.112
In 2002, the postcolonial State purchased the estate from Lonrho Agribusiness Limited for redistribution to the land deprived living in its periphery. In total, 1,400 hectares were to be distributed to 498 beneficiaries; an average of 2.8 hectares per beneficiary.
In the run up to the redistribution of the land under the Makandi Estate, the postcolonial State urged the land deprived in the periphery of the estate to identify those households that were in dire need of land for their dignified livelihood.113 The redistribution exercise immediately degenerated into conflict between the land deprived in the periphery of the estate – the so–called eni malo114 – and the land deprived from elsewhere that benefited under the exercise – the so–called obwera.
The conflict arises because out of a population of approximately 2,000 of the community in the periphery of the estate only twenty people benefited from the redistribution.; representing a paltry 1 per cent of the ‘targeted’ community of the land deprived in the periphery of the estate.115
In the wake of the redistribution, violence and general acrimony ensued where
eni malo invaded the redistributed pieces of land and vandalized property belonging to obwera. Eni malo felt cheated under the land redistribution exercise as they could not conceive any discernible difference between their statuses as a land deprived constituency from that of obwera. The ‘ring leaders’ of the land occupation were arrested, charged with encroachment contrary to section 36 of the Land Act, prosecuted and convicted. They were sentenced to pay a fine of 5,000 Malawi
112 Key Informant Interview: 24 April, 2008. The establishment of the Estate actually predates the
arrival of the community in the periphery of the Estate. The community traces its settlement in the area only as far back as the 1930s. The Estate had been established by then: See S Holden et al., Introduction, note 59.
113 The then incumbent State President, Bakili Muluzi, held a political rally in the area where he made
this assurance: Focus Group Discussions: 30 April, 2008 & 2 May, 2008.
114 The village headperson of the community in the periphery of the estate makes the claim to
ownership based on direct ancestral lineage to the ‘ancient’ ownership of the land in question: Key Informant Interview: 24 April, 2008.
Kwacha or, in default, nine months imprisonment. One of the defendants served the term of imprisonment; the rest paid the fine. 116 One of the defendants states:
We did not elect leaders. There was fluid ‘leadership’ based on one’s ‘bravery’ and the willingness to ‘occupy’ Makandi. A formal committee would have been counter–productive as the police would have just targeted the leaders. We occupied the Estate for a week. The police came to forcibly remove us; those of us who resisted were arrested. We were initially held at Luchenza Police Station. Our fellow villagers threatened violence to ‘rescue’ those of us who had been arrested. We were then moved to Thyolo Police Station; then to Thyolo Prison. The villagers petitioned our Member of Parliament, the Minister of Lands and the Ombudsman to secure our release. Delegations from the village were sponsored by donations from within the village. Five of us were tried at the magistrate’s court in Limbe. The arrests were meant to ‘intimidate’ us. The rest of the villagers were afraid to ‘occupy’ Makandi after our arrest.117
The relationship between eni malo and obwera is less than cordial for two primary reasons: The existing power structure among eni malo feels undermined as
obwera created their own power structure and does not recognise the authority and legitimacy of the structure of eni malo. Second, and perhaps more tellingly, the Estate provided a source of livelihood to eni malo in the form of wage labour. The sale and subsequent redistribution of the land comprising the Estate has meant a loss of livelihood on the part of eni malo.118
Further, the conflicts between eni malo and obwera under the Makandi scenario have been replicated in the receiving districts under the Project.119 First, the ‘socio–cultural integration’ of obwera – from a predominantly Christian background – into the community in the receiving districts – which is predominantly Moslem – has had its problems.120 The problems have had their toll on the lifestyle of obwera.121 A key informant states:
There is less cooperation in Mangochi [a receiving district under the Project] because Muluzi campaigned there saying the obwera from Thyolo [a sending district under the Project] are bent on destroying UDF [an opposition political party] in favour of Mutharika
116 See Republic v Flyton Jumbe, Simon Andaki Likoswe, Wyson Muhiye, Alfred Mpwitikizi and
Rozario Henderesoni, In the Senior Resident Magistrate’s Court at Dalton Road, Limbe, Criminal Case Number 331 of 2003 (Unreported). The fine is equivalent to GBP20.80 (1GBP=240.38MWK).
117 Focus Group Discussion: 2 May, 2008.
118 See S Holden et al., note 112, 26–27.
119 The receiving districts are Machinga and Mangochi while the sending districts are Mulanje and
Thyolo: See Government of Malawi Community Based Rural Land Development Project: Project
Implementation Manual, note 73. The land for redistribution is purchased from estates in the receiving districts is available for resettlement by the landless and land poor from the sending districts.
120 See B Chinsinga, note 31. 121
The obwera cannot rear livestock such as pigs nor take alcoholic drinks which are considered taboo
among the Moslems in the receiving districts: See B Chinsinga, note 31, 16; and Key Informant Interview: 24 April, 2008.
and DPP [a ruling political party]. Our attempts to negotiate with the people of Mangochi have always failed at the ‘last minute’ all the time because of the politics.122
There have been ‘myths’ perpetrated by the chiefs in the receiving districts that
obwera are vampires and Satanists.123 The chiefs propagate the ‘myths’ as they perceive their authority is under threat since obwera resettle in the receiving districts under trusts.124 Finally, the friction between obwera and eni malo is aggravated by the dynamics of neopatrimonial nature of the postcolonial State as discussed in Chapter 4. Party politics in the postcolonial State is ethnic–based and the receiving districts are considered the stronghold of one of the opposition parties while the sending districts are considered the stronghold of the party in power.125 Hence an influx of obwera in the receiving districts undermines the opposition’s political power base.126
The interests among the constituency of the land deprived are nuanced and marked by dissensus. Eni malo agitate for a superior claim to land under the postcolonial State’s land redistribution programme on the basis of history, context and culture. To the extent that the alleged basis is tenuous, it amounts to a strategic manoeuvre on the part of eni malo to access a scarce resource; namely, land.
II PRESERVATORY CALCULATED CONFORMITY
The notion of preservatory calculated conformity is the converse of predatory calculated conformity. Preservatory calculated conformity refers to the conformity that is a ‘coping mechanism’ used by the ‘dominated’ to ensure that any disadvantage is minimized as far as possible within the reality of their social setting. Under the on– going land reform, the postcolonial State, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the
Achikumbe, and the land deprived, in various ways, ameliorate the effect of the capture and overbearance at the various levels of the various relationships. This process of amelioration is reflected in the relationship between the Bretton Woods
122
See Key Informant Interview, above.
123 The undertone of the ‘myths’ is that obwera will annihilate eni malo: See B Chinsinga, note 31. This
is comparable to James Scott’s ‘hidden transcript’: See JC Scott Domination and the Arts of
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990).
124
See B Chinsinga, note 31, 17.
125 On the role of ethnicity in party politics in the country: See W Chijere Chirwa ‘The Politics of
Ethnicity and Regionalism in Contemporary Malawi’ (1994) 1(2) African Rural and Urban Studies 93.
126 Former State President, Bakili Muluzi, who hails from one of the receiving districts held a political
rally in one of the receiving districts where he called on the community to be uncooperative to the land reform under the Project: Key Informant Interview:24 April, 2008; and B Chinsinga, note 31, 17. The incumbent President, Bingu wa Mutharika, hails from Thyolo; which is one of the sending districts.
Institutions and the postcolonial State; the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe; the
Achikumbe and the land deprived; and in the intra–‘community’ dynamics of the land deprived. At the macro level, the nature of the preservatory calculated conformity is shown through an analysis of the relationship of the postcolonial State and the Bretton Woods Institutions. At the micro level, it is shown through the relationships at four tiers: the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe, the Achikumbe and the land deprived, and the intra–‘community’ dynamics with a focus on the chiefs and their relationship with the ‘community’.