Diagnóstico inicial de la dependencia asignada

Now, more than 100 years after it began, developmental research and theory continue to be diverse, vigorous, contentious, fresh, and in many instances, brilliant. In concluding this chapter, we recall the themes that were identified in the beginning, to both take stock of the last 2 decades of developmental science and to describe the progress made and the pitfalls encountered in more than a century of scientific work (see also Cairns, 2000; Cairns, Cairns, Rodkin, & Xie, 1998).

Knowledge and Consciousness

Understanding the mind and how it develops and func- tions remains a major concern for developmentalists. Because of advances in technology, investigators who study the relations between brain processes and cogni- tive activity have achieved spectacular advances in identifying pathways and plasticity over time. And there is now compelling evidence to support Preyer’s specula- tion that “ the brain grows through its own activity.” Yet, plenty of controversies remain, and certain basic issues

continue to be controversial (e.g., is there an area in the brain devoted to language?) despite impressive advances in understanding and methodology. At least some of the matters that remain unresolved have less to do with how the brain is studied than with how our constructs of the mind are formulated and our measures are organized (Morrison & Ornstein, 1996; see Gottlieb et al., Chapter 5; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter 8; Overton, Chapter 2; Valsiner, Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume). Thoughts and Actions

The self and its distinctive processes (e.g., self- concepts, self-efficacy, self-regulation) continue to be central for modern researchers. What was attributed to the “ will” in the 1890s is attributed to the self and its processes (motives, values, dispositions) in the 1990s. What has changed, however, are methods, measures, and the findings that they yield. The multilevel, multimea- sure methodological procedures of the late twentieth century have exposed some myths. One’s own self- attributions are not necessarily the same as descriptions of the self by others, and the differences are systemati- cally linked to the domains assessed, the contexts of as- sessment, and the meaning of the measures. The story of how the discrepancies between the self and others is now being addressed belongs, however, to today, not to the past. The current state of information on these matters is addressed elsewhere in this volume (see Baltes et al., Chapter 11; Brandstädter, Chapter 10; Rathunde & Csik- szentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume). Ontogeny and Phylogeny

How may development be best defined: in terms of the ontogeny of individuals, the ontogeny of the species, or the ontogeny of both? This was one of the first issues in the systematic development of the science, and it has been one of the last to be reassessed in the present era. But it is now being addressed as a matter of how cross- generational transfer occurs, and how there may be turning points across generations as well as across on- togeny. According to a recent collaborative statement, “Developmental investigation focuses attention to the ontogenies of both embryos and ancestors, and to the process by which pathways may be repeated or redirected across successive generations” (Carolina Consortium on Human Development, 1996, p. 1). Inter- generational investigations may become a primary

methodology of the future as they become feasible and practical (see, e.g., Bronfenbrenner & Morris, Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume; Cairns, Cairns, Xie, Leung, & Hearne, 1998; Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume).

Nature and Nurture

After a century of controversy, the nature-nurture de- bate was still being contested both in public and in the laboratory (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Lehrman, 1953, 1970). Recall that J. M. Baldwin resolved the mat- ter by observing that “most of man’s equipment is due to both causes working together,” and Preyer arrived at the same conclusion.

Today, the split conceptions of nature and nurture, and of the reductionist formulations associated with either a nature (e.g., sociobiology or behavior genetics) or a nurture (e.g., Behaviorism or functional analysis approaches) have passed from the main stream of theo- retical and scientific interest (e.g., see Gottlieb, et al., Chapter 5; Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this vol- ume) and—through the lens of various versions of devel- opmental systems theories (e.g., see Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Lerner, Chapter 1; Magnusson & Stattin, Chapter 8; Thelen & Smith, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this vol- ume)—scientific attention has focused on models and methods that now promise to begin to address the ques- tion of how “ both causes work together ” at the level of biology, interactions, and social networks.

When Does Development End?

Virtually all researchers in this discipline are develop- mentalists—including arch-maturationist Arnold Gesell. The naïve idea of strict preformism and unidirectional causation has been a straw man since the beginning of the science. But there remain radical differences among investigators in when they believe experiences to be ex- tremely relevant, and when they consider them to be irrelevant. Early speculations on this issue were handi- capped by a paucity of systematic normative and experi- mental information. In the absence of longitudinal information on the behavioral adaptations of human be- ings, there was no adequate basis for selecting or reject- ing these theoretical assumptions about the timing and functions of early experience. Neurobehavioral, cogni- tive, and social developmental research in the modern era has begun to clarify the role of time and timing

across several domains. This information is reviewed, for example, by Baltes et al. (Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume), Brandstädter (Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume), Elder and Shanahan (Chapter 12, this Hand- book, this volume), Overton (Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume), and Valsiner (Chapter 4, this Hand- book, this volume).

Morality and the Perfectibility of Humans

Values and moral development continue to be impor- tant for the discipline, although the work has been handicapped by serious methodological challenges. With a few important exceptions, the conceptual framework for understanding the development of per- sonal values was given less attention than in the ear- lier eras. The importance of this domain has emerged in the past 20 years, as instantiated by interest in moral and spiritual development (see Oser, Scarlett, & Bucher, Chapter 17, this Handbook, this volume), posi- tive youth development (see Benson, Scales, Hamilton, & Sesma, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume), and the use of strength-based models of human devel- opment to conceptualize and study the development of diverse children and adolescents (see Spencer, Chap- ter 15, this Handbook, this volume).

Given this burgeoning theoretical and empirical work, it seems likely that this domain will come to the forefront in the next era. Indeed, the current concern with the self and with self-organization in the social context prepares the way for an integrated view of morality, positive human development, and the capaci- ties for healthy functioning present in all people. As Kohlberg insightfully observed, “An individual is funda- mentally a potentially moral being, not because of social authority and rules (as Durkheim and Piaget thought) but because his ends, his will, his self is that of a shared social self ” (Kohlberg, 1982, pp. 311–312).

Social Applications

Applications continue to present large opportunities and large problems. Sears (1975) concluded that the disci- pline was created to be relevant. In this regard, White (1996) wrote:

Child study of some sort has to be part and parcel of any social design for children. Though developmental psychol- ogy is not, in the traditional sense, a policy science it has nevertheless a significant role to play in the organization

and management of systems of governance directed to- ward children and families. (p. 413)

As research has become increasingly more tied to specific social concerns and social needs, some have feared that the science would be compromised. That has not occurred. To the contrary, carefully evaluated social applications have helped create a more robust, verifi- able, and relevant science (Lerner, Chapter 1, this Hand- book, this volume). Indeed the burgeoning of interest in applied developmental science that has occurred in the past 20 years and, certainly, since the last edition of this Handbook (e.g., see Farmer & Farmer, 2001; Fisher & Lerner, 2005; Gest, Mahoney, & Cairns, 1999; Lerner, Jacobs, & Wertlieb, 2003; and the several volumes of the journals, Applied Developmental Science and the Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology) has derived at least in part from the use of developmental systems the- ories to discuss the plasticity of human development and thus the potential of applying developmental science to promote positive human development.

One other by-product of social applications should be mentioned. The rapid growth of the discipline has cre- ated some unanticipated hazards for developmental study, not the least of which is the intense competition for publication space and research support. In one unfor- tunate outcome, closely knit research groups have formed tight theoretical and/or empirical coalitions that promote inclusion and practice exclusion. Under these conditions, dominant methodologies and ideas tend to monopolize resources while ignoring or distorting com- peting concepts and disconfirming evidence. Although these efforts tend to self-correct in the long term, they may create fragmentation and misunderstanding in the short term. In this regard, efforts to achieve effective applications often act as catalysts to bring ideas and findings to common ground and common standards.

TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE