DIAGNÓSTICO SITUACIONAL:

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“The revolution of January 2011 has changed the concept of political participation in Egypt and encouraged people to take part at both formal and informal levels. Whilst the former still enjoys greater levels of support than the latter, it is important to note that just as concepts and means of political participation evolve over time so can citizens’ perceptions of them” (Refaei, 2015, p. 21). This begs the question of how and why the country is still being run like a one- party state. The people of Egypt desperately want to take part in formal elections, however, “The March vote will in no way confirm President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s popularity among the Egyptian people. This election campaign is merely an extension of the internal power struggle among the military and the regime’s security services, and it has nothing to do with democratic mechanisms worthy of the name"(Khorshid, 2018). It is clear to see that president al-Sisi, although claiming to give fair and free access to democratic elections in Egypt still has a heavy- handed approach to picking political opposition:

Candidate Party Votes %

Abdel Fattah al-Sisi Independent 21,835,387 97.08

Moussa Mostafa Moussa El-Ghad Party 656,534 2.92

Invalid/blank votes 1,762,231 –

Total 24,254,152 100

Registered voters/turnout 59,078,138 41.05

Source: HEC

“The January 25th Egyptian Revolution was an attempt to shake off the chains of the past for Egyptian subjects towards an Egyptian citizenship. The new or renewed identity as an

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Egyptian citizen and the knowledge about social and political issues encouraged the participants to transform their reimagined ideas and identity of citizenship into actions.” (Dorino, 2016, p. 321). This conclusion of the revolution echo Pateman’s concept of active participation allowing for a more politically educated and engaged citizenry. The underlying issue within Egypt remains, regardless of the level of participation in the country, the government and consequently the military still are in control. al-Sisi’s strangle hold on opposition parties leaves Egyptian voters with little choice regarding the outcome between an authoritarian leader versus a specifically chosen bad opposition.

To return to the data, there is a higher level of participation formally, but Egyptian citizens have become disengaged with informal political participation, this may be because of the events of the revolution. However, by becoming disengaged with informal political participation there is a lack of checks and balances to counteract al-Sisi’s regime. “Only seven percent of the respondents claim to support demonstrations organized by students and political movements since October 2014. On the other hand, 63 percent of respondents said they were going to vote in the upcoming, yet delayed, parliamentary elections.” (ES, 2015). The Egyptian people seem to be uninterested in informal political participation as Egyptian Streets explains “since 2013, participation in protests has decreased to eight percent under al-Sisi’s rule. Nevertheless, formal means of political participation increased since Mubarak was toppled. While before 2011 only 37 percent had engaged in formal political processes, that number reached 83 percent after the revolution.” (ES, 2015).

Post Arab spring, the Egyptian people did not secure their means of production, the people of Egypt put their trust in the military, as they long had, this flipped the switch on who controlled the most important sectors of the economy. “The military that overthrew Egypt's first democratically elected president last summer is positioning itself to become the country's uncontested economic power” (Hauslohner, 2014). The move to what has been describes as Military Inc. “In every government authority now, there is a military officer. You deal with him” (Hauslohner, 2014). Although Egypt has been a patronage-based economy for decades now, with bribery and corruption rampant, the move by al-Sisi to consolidate control has raised the bar far higher than previous governments. Although it is tough to find exact numbers, on the percentage of the economy controlled by the Egyptian military, Egypt’s military amounts to 30-40% of the country’s GDP (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 212). This explains why the military is able to amass so much political power. However, a secondary side effect of the military being at the helm of the country is that the state can award contracts to the military for public infrastructure projects. A high-ranking military officer “insisted in an interview that the armed

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forces are not engaged in corruption. He agreed that the military appears to be getting more infrastructure contracts than it had previously, but he said that is because "the people trust the final product from the military” (Hauslohner, 2014). It is not a surprise to hear someone within the military saying this.

To counteract this, the Egyptian people must do as Alperovitz describes, and take back control of their countries means of economic production. By doing so, the people will push the military’s purpose back to protection of the country against outside threats, rather than the self- appointed authoritarian saviour, that holds all the cards. The Egyptian Military are now using their political power to shut down attempts at informal political participation “Last month, the military stepped in to cripple a strike by Cairo's public transport workers – a sector beyond its usual control – by providing 500 buses and drivers to keep the system running.”(Hauslohner, 2014). Therefore, there must be a move by Egyptians back to informal means of democratic participation such as protests and demonstrations, which could also work well in conjunction with the union actions (such as strikes) proposed within the economic solution.

A real-world example of a successful transition from autocracy to what is in its final phase of democratic transformation is Tunisia. A country that had its revolution during the same ‘Arab Spring’. Tunisia unlike the military state that Egypt has long been, was rules by Ben Ali with the help of the police, while keeping the military underdeveloped and underfunded. With the toppling of Ben Ali, the police state of Tunisia was disbanded, with his party also being banned. Alongside this the government turned to the military to help stabilize and provide legitimacy. However, unlike Egypt the country has not fallen back to its autocratic style, and instead has made solid, although slightly stagnating movements towards democratic reform.

· Management of the military has transitioned from the personalized rule of previous autocrats to more decentralized channels.

· The changing face of Tunisia’s political leadership has spelled the end of privileging officers from the wealthy coastal regions from which Bourguiba and Ben Ali hailed. · Tunisia’s grave security threats have forced post revolution governments to enhance

the military’s budget, weapons, international linkages, institutional capacity, and political influence.

· Ex-military officers have enjoyed more transitional justice than other Tunisians. · Retired officers have become active members of Tunisia’s robust civil society,

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(Grewal, 2016).

This seems to go against the concept of taking away military control and giving it to the people as previously stated, however, “Actors interested in democracy may naturally fear the growing influence of the military in the new Tunisia. Retired officers, at least in interviews, have expressed deep respect for the principle of civilian control over the military and the concept of democracy” (Grewal, 2016). However, the Tunisian government seems to be making active steps to ensure that civil society is balanced with the military and the police.

The Tunisian government have begun to reform in a way that has really opened up the chance for civil society, “The Tunisian parliament recently passed the long-awaited municipal elections law and is expected to hold its first democratic local elections by the end of 2017. In my discussions with Tunisian officials, it was clear that they see municipal elections as a chance for youth to play a more influential role in politics” (Yerkes, 2017). Although Tunisia is not the perfect example of a fully functioning democracy, it has made the most progress politically compared to its other neighbours who also took part in the spring. If the Egyptian people want the chance at democratic change within their country, they must remove al-Sisi and his military from the helm of the country and fix the institutionalized corruption within the production and manufacturing sectors of the Egyptian economy.

Political Power:

Re-engage through Pateman’s theory of participatory democracy

Egyptian public tired of informal participation after failures of revolution, more involved in formal participation.

Educate people that participation can make change. By taking part in workplace democracy people feel more politically inclined to reform their political sphere

Establish an accountability system and so remove the patronage system that places military leaders in key positions

Military Inc own large percentage of economy, and therefore can be self-sufficient.

By ensuring that a participatory democracy exists, accountability will follow. This will break down the rent-seeking systems within Egypt.

Everyday Socialism: Redistribute contracts and ownership of economy

Military is unique in sense that it can survive attempts at political change, if the military can keep producing then it can sustain itself.

Once the accountability system exists and is functional, Everyday Socialism can be pursued as a policy to break down the military’s control over the economy and so its source of power.