Diagrama de Ishikawa

The medium view offers the most intuitive answer to the ontological question posed above, for it assumes that an acousmatic work is little more than an encoded medium (such as a CD, DVD, length of magnetic tape or vinyl disc). In some respects, this view is entirely plausible; the medium is numerically, temporally and spatially distinct from the performances that derive from it and, further to this, there are precedents for this ontological view. For example, in Tape composition: an artform in search of its metaphysics, Linda Ferguson presents a version of the medium view (Ferguson 1983). We shall briefly consider Ferguson’s argument.

Linda Ferguson’s medium view is directed at a particular acousmatic tradition known as tape composition⁴⁹. Ferguson argues that the works found

47 This point becomes clearer in Section 3.2.3, in which acousmatic works are described as abstract formations.

48 The ideas presented in this section are further elaborated in Through Thick and Thin: the Ontology of Tape Music (Stansbie 2010).

49 Ferguson employs the term tape composition: “to mean those orderings of sounds which exist on magnetic tape (and generally made available through phonorecordings), selected, arranged, and manipulated by the composer, and reproducible at will through playback equipment”

(Ferguson 1983, p.17). She goes on to offer elektronische musik and musique concrète as examples of tape composition traditions, identifying a range of practitioners involved in such

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within this tradition are “commodities” (Ferguson 1983, p.23) and “products”

(Ferguson 1983, p.23) and she goes on to suggest that: “the owner of the tape composition recording holds the genuine object” (Ferguson 1983, p.24). Thus, for Linda Ferguson, works of tape composition appear to be little more than lengths of encoded magnetic tape.

Ferguson arrives at the above conclusion following a lengthy discussion of the compositional methods and techniques employed in the creation of tape compositions, starting with a reference to musique concrète; like Schaeffer, Ferguson claims that the tape composer: “works in the concrete […] directly with the sonorous matter of his art” (Ferguson 1983, p.19). She goes on to note that the tape composer uses “lengths of tape” to manipulate the “physical reality of his object, as painters [and] sculptors […] do [with] their visible physical realities.” (Ferguson 1983, p.19). At this stage, Ferguson’s arguments are agreeable, since she is merely employing established terminology to describe some of the compositional processes and techniques employed in the creation of tape compositions. However, as her argument progresses, she moves away from a discussion of compositional processes, ultimately describing tape works as

“particularized and concretized” entities (Ferguson 1983, p.20). At first, this claim appears to be a logical development of her earlier argument. However, there is a notable shift in emphasis; she is no longer referring to the processes or techniques employed during the compositional process but to the end product. In this context, the term concrete refers to the work itself, which Ferguson deems to be a length of magnetic tape.

One may note that Ferguson’s argument is out of date; contemporary acousmatic composers rarely use magnetic tape during the creation of their works and, as a result, the physical object, along with the term tape composition, has virtually disappeared. Despite this, contemporary acousmatic composers continue to work directly with sound materials and, in order that they may do so, require some sort of sound recording or storage medium. Contemporary media (such as CDs, DVDs or computer hard-drives) may, as Robert Wilsmore

traditions whilst outlining some of the compositional techniques that they typically employ. One may describe tape composition as an acousmatic tradition.

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recently pointed out, be far harder to describe as physical objects⁵⁰ (Wilsmore 2010, p.10). However, it may be possible to update Ferguson’s argument and, with this mind, her medium view must be considered.⁵¹

One of the main problems with Ferguson’s argument is the ease with which the tape compositions may be copied or transferred from the original medium to another; providing that some copy of it remains, one may destroy the original without destroying the work itself. This implies that the work and the medium are (like the work and the performance) numerically distinct. Ferguson may reject this argument, perhaps claiming that a new copy is simply a new work of art. However, this would imply, incorrectly, that composers generate new works each time their compositions are copied. With this in mind, it is perhaps sensible to agree with William Echard who, in Subject to a Trace: The Virtuality of Recorded Music claims that: “no particular medium in which a work might appear can be seen as identical with the work itself.” (Echard 2008, p.29).

There is a further problem with Ferguson’s argument that may be exposed by reference to an ontological theory proposed by Andrew Kania (Kania 2008), who claims that a work of art must be: “the primary focus of critical attention within a given artistic tradition” (Kania 2008, p.5). He demonstrates this point by discussing a particular paint-covered canvas:

The Mona Lisa is a work of art, in part because it is a painting produced in the artistic tradition known as ‘painting’, while none of the sketches for the Mona Lisa is a work, since sketches are not a primary focus of critical attention in the painting

51 This point is compounded by the fact that Ferguson’s medium view has been expressed (albeit with less vigour) elsewhere. For example, in 1976, James Urmson presented an ontological thesis in which works of tape music were shown to be closely related to works of painting on the grounds that they are both physical objects (Urmson 1976). A similar view is suggested by Levi-Strauss (1969), who compares works of musique concrète with works of painting, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, who notes that some works of music are created using magnetic tape rather than musical scores before suggesting that this distinction associates tape music with the plastic, concrete arts, resulting in music that is not for performance (Wolterstorff 1980).

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In another publication, Kania uses his notion of critical attention to discuss musical scores, noting that a musical score contains a range of properties which the associated musical work necessarily lacks; scores have various visual and typographical properties whereas musical works have various sonic and musical properties (Kania 2005, p.36). The sonic, musical properties are more likely to be described as the primary focus of our critical attention within the artistic tradition of music and therefore the score and the work are necessarily distinct.

One may consider Linda Ferguson’s discussion of tape composition in relation to Andrew Kania’s critical attention theory. In doing so, one may find certain cases in which the length of magnetic tape, and therefore the encoded medium, fulfils a certain aesthetic role in relation to a work⁵². However, even in such cases, as rare as they may be, one cannot realistically entertain the idea that the medium is the primary focus of a listener’s critical attention; no matter how visually stimulating the tape may (or may not) turn out to be, it is unlikely to occupy the primary focus of critical attention. With this in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that the medium and the work are distinct. As James Mooney pointed out, the medium is: “only ever a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.” (Mooney 2005, p.11)⁵³.