4.1 Pruebas de caja negra
Diagrama 26 Diagrama de prueba caja negra
The previous chapter described and discussed many aspects of the development of ACCESS policy, concluding with the programme of winding down all existing programmes and their replacement, from April 1987, with the ACCESS policy as the central governmental response to youth unemployment; a response which was described by the Minister of Employment as offering 'vocational skills' training. This chapter will discuss the implementation and the breakdown of the ACCESS policy. It will be argued that, due to a wide variety of factors, the breakdown of the ACCESS training p olicy.-/ began to occur simultaneously with its implementation. Two sets
of factors account for this. The first is aspects of the policy itself, or 'internal' factors; in p articular, I will argue, the regionalised structure of ACCESS . The second set of factors relate to the social and economic policy context within which ACCESS was established, which led to certain material and ideological conditions inimical to the development of ACCESS as it was conceived in the policy formation stage.
My analysis of the 'breakdown' of ACCESS may seem to be premature. The policy of ACCESS, at the time of writing, is still in existence, and there are no public documents in circulation that argue for its demise. I will base my case for the breakdown of ACCESS on the premise that it no longer serves any useful purpose for any significant sector of civil society, of capital, or of the state itself. This chapter will focus in particular on the state and its management of the continuing crisis of unemployment. The central argument will be that the limits of the state, both institutional and ideological, have severely circumscribed the ability of ACCESS to function as it was intended. As well, there has been a: marked reduction, stemming from the monetarist
the state, in the capacity for state action, either to retrieve the ACCESS policy or to offer effective alternatives.
In
chapter one it was argued that dominant theories of state action over unemployment focus on the needs for capital accumulation, legitimation of both capital and state forms and the need for social control. This chapter will demonstrate that, in reality, the ACCESS policy serves none of these functions. In questioning what role it does play, I will demonstrate that the breakdown of ACCESS can be explained by its ideological and material failure to adequately address the needs of any sphere of society, or any necessary functions of the state.1 . The structure of ACCESS
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the struggle for control over the ACCESS programme was won by "free-market" monetarists, through the Department of Labour/Minister of Employment, at the level of policy. However, it would be misleading to argue that this policy agenda was then unproblematically transmitted into practice. The main reason for this is that the implementation of ACCESS depended on the Regional Employment and ACCESS Councils (REACs) and on numerous individual trainers. This section will examine the structure within which ACCESS was implemented, noting that the shape of what was called the "delivery system"1 exercised particular constraints on the policy implementation process; understood in the terms of this thesis as aspects of state limits.
The structure of ACCESS was to be as follows. The Minister of Employment would "determine the bulk funding for each regional ACCESS committee" (Press Release 4.6.86 p .7). The Minister would take into account the number of unemployed people
1 Ministers of Employment, Education and Maori Affairs, press releases, 'Notes for Editors
Ill'p.6., 4
in the area, the 'socio-economic status' of the young people and "a judgement of the relative requirement for ACCESS training in the District" in determining the funding (ibid pp.7-8).
The purpose of the REACs, according to the Government, would be to provide "the best understanding of prevailing and anticipated local labour market conditions and knowledge of the needs of local unemployed people" (ibid p.6). Each REAC would be made up of half union and employer representation and half community representation. It would be the task of each Council to determine priorities for funding and then disburse the funding, gain additional information as required and oversee the schemes. The knowledge of local conditions that REACs brought to the policy process formed the basis, it is argued here, for both the implementation and the breakdown of ACCESS.
This policy had all the trappings of a liberal democratic approach that gives real power to local communities; in Gramsci's terms (see chapter two), ,it appears as a retreat of the state back to the centre, and an increase in control by local communities. In contrast, however, I wish to argue that the structure of ACCESS actually formed an extension of the state into local communities and a concomitantly increased central control. In particular, the struggles between state agencies that were outlined in chapter four extended out from the central to the local level. Within the analytical framework of this thesis, I will argue that the structure of ACCESS placed severe limits on state action, but partially enhanced, and also partially constrained, the capacity of the state, as the hegemonic settlement of supply-side discourse was exported downwards to the regional level.
The central reason for arguing that this policy signals an extension into, rather than a withdrawal from, civil society lies in the power relations inherent in the policy structure. In essence, the REACs would do all the work and the Minister would
determine the resources. This, in fact, opened up a whole new site of struggle, of the periphery against the centre. However, it confirmed the nature of the policy as a 'structural' supply-side intervention. The policy expectations of REACs, however, were very much more in line with demand-side or 'conjunctural' policy approaches. This meant, for example, that their specific knowledge of local labour market conditions would allow them to argue for more or different resources.
The structure of the policy had a further effect, again linked to the power relations. It attempted to export downwards not only the work of implementing ACCESS , but also the responsibility for ACCES S and, in a strategic ideological move that linked the success of ACCE S S to the level of unemployment, implied that REACs held the responsibility for unemployment in the regions. This allowed the Government to express concern about unemployment without taking any responsibility for correcting
The structure of the ACCES S policy, on one level, forced local cormnunities to become, in effect, arms of the state. The policy allowed for fairly close oversight and accountability of "training providers" to the REACs; much closer than could have been achieved by existing agencies such as the Department of Labour. It also brought both employers and unions into the ACCESS structure, forcing some measure of consent for the policy3.