Elaborating extensively upon the budding notion of ecological habitus provided by Smith (2001), Haluza-DeLay defines ecological habitus as “a routinely ecologically attuned lifestyle” (2006b, p.6) or “practices of reducing ecological impact and living socially and ecologically well in place”28 (Haluza-DeLay, 2006b, p.11). This definition foregrounds the significance of specific ecological contexts and social fields in shaping the lived, everyday practice of ecological habitus (as opposed to others’ more abstract conceptualisations, outlined below). Haluza-DeLay argues that recognition of both social fields and contexts (e.g. familial, economic, religious, and historical) and specific material/ecological contexts (e.g. landforms, weather, ecosystems, and animals) are needed to fully conceptualise how ecological habitus forms and evolves.
28. This is a necessarily broad definition, as ecological habitus is contextually specified in the same way as Bourdieu’s habitus. The additional descriptions and examples that follow will further clarify the ways that ecological habitus can be conceptualised
He describes this multifaceted social-ecological context, within which ecological habitus emerges, as “place”, asserting that (forms of sustainable) ecological habitus necessarily include a “sense of place” and sense of what practical form such an ecologically and socially harmonious lifestyle might take in a given place (Haluza-DeLay, 2006b, p.11); and Code (2006) perceives the same place-basedness in habitus more generally.
Universally applicable rules for living well in every place could not exist. What is suggested instead is a modus vivendi, a sens pratique, [where] ... the practices generated by … ecological habitus are attentive to its place as a socioecological milieu (Haluza-DeLay, 2008, pp.213-214).
Thus, the modus vivendi (another descriptor of a socially reflexive ‘way of life’ or ‘mode of living’; see Archer, 2012) or sens pratique offered by ecological habitus enables individuals to respond appropriately to the social and ecological conditions within which it is practically enacted. For example, the embodied ecological habitus of someone living in an arid country (e.g. Australia) and striving for sustainability might involve the routine and reflexive practice of strict water conservation (e.g. limiting shower duration or flushing of toilets), while such practices might be less significant in water-abundant countries (e.g. New Zealand), where other practices might be more significant (e.g. cleaning boots, boats, and other equipment as part of biosecurity control29).
Haluza-DeLay’s discussions focus on ‘sustainable’ or ecologically-positive forms of ecological habitus exclusively. However, the concept of place-basedness can be applied equally to alternative forms of ecological habitus (e.g. ecologically-harmful, unsustainable, ambivalent, or apathetic). Pearson (2015) offers an example of less environmentalism-centric place-based, describing how people interacting routinely with ecological phenomena in New Zealand (e.g. by hunting in the forest or swimming in the ocean) embody ecologically relevant capitals (i.e. skills and knowledge) through these practices that are valuable and necessary for their performance of ecological habitus in place. However, the same individuals, deploying the same capitals as part of ecological habitus in another place (Paris and Beijing are exemplified) might find them to be “[not] particularly advantageous or seem especially natural” (Pearson, 2015, Box 7.3). This exemplifies how in different places, different ways of interacting with the natural environment are needed. Thus, embodied ecological habitus and its practice, while flexible to a degree, can be linked inextricably to the particular material/ecological context (ocean, river, forest, city, etc.) where habitus develops or is typically practiced, in much the same way as habitus is linked to formative and everyday social fields.
Like Bourdieu’s habitus, ecological habitus involves both flexibility and creativity (i.e. it is non- prescriptive). However, it is also constrained (in this case with regards to the ecological contexts and
consequences of one’s actions). This is equivalent to the ‘feel for the game’ described by Bourdieu, which responds innovatively and creatively to the social world, but is nonetheless constrained by the specific conditions of its genesis and fields of practice.
The significance of this place-basedness is further highlighted when considering people’s relationships with ‘nature’ (i.e. ecology) as part of a sustainable ecological habitus. Such relationships develop in a place, and even more abstract, depersonalised concerns of ecological habitus such as energy conservation are somewhat place-reliant (rather than ubiquitous). Correspondingly, developing a sense of nature-connectedness and caring; and an understanding of socio-ecological interdependency is a core tenet of environmentalism (Barnhill, 1999; Lake, 2010; Louv, 2011; Smith, 2001; Suzuki, 2007 [1997]), and familiarity with specific places (e.g. a garden or park) is seen as an important factor in this (Beatley, 2011; Clayton & Opotow, 2003).
Tying of place-based ecology to self is also evidenced in many indigenous cultures, where routine practice of ecological habitus occurs within the particular context of local ecologies (and facets of ecological habitus are often culturally foregrounded). For example, the place-based notion of ‘tūrangawaewae’ (roughly translating as ‘place to stand’) of New Zealand Māori links people’s ancestral origins and identities not only to social groups (tribes or ‘iwi’ and subtribes or ‘hapu’) but also to specific landforms such as mountains and rivers (e.g. Smith, 2004). This contrasts with the orthodox and ‘unsustainable’ ecological habitus of contemporary Western society, where the “imperial mode of living” (Brand & Wissen, 2012, p.1) favours dominating and exploiting both people and ecology at far reaching scales. This abstracts or divorces people’s everyday experiences from ecologies of particular places (and the natural environment in general), precluding the embodied-experience of ecology-in-place that is discussed above.
Particularly, Haluza-DeLay’s exploration and exemplification of (sustainable) ecological habitus focuses on the social fields of environmental organisations. These, he argues, are charged with challenging the socio-ecological status quo, offering a vision for desirable alternatives, and demonstrating the practical application of these alternatives (Haluza-DeLay, 2008). He applies ecological habitus to theoretically frame this argument. The dilemma in creating wider social change towards more ecologically sound practices, Haluza-DeLay postulates, lies in the recursive nature of habitus and the field, which reproduces the dominant, environmentally unsound norms of modern society (Haluza-DeLay, 2006b, 2008). To progress beyond this impasse, he asserts, requires adjusting habitus and field simultaneously, and he presents environmental organisations as sites where this two-fold intervention can occur.
Such organisations present opportunities for social and experiential learning (see Le Cornu, 2005), operating as ‘communities of practice,’ that provide routinized environmentally-sound practical experiences and application of knowledge, in addition to the cognitive aspects of learning (Haluza-
of environmental issues and “what real people do in real life” have been neglected, according to Haluza-DeLay (2006b, p.2). Therefore, recognising the principles of ecological habitus and particularly the role of everyday practice could enhance environmental organisations as situations of social learning. Developing and routinising new practices in such pragmatic ways within everyday social settings could change individuals’ ecological dispositions over time, thereby modifying their habitus (in procurement and deployment), and potentially introducing this positive change into other social fields.
Haluza-DeLay argues that supportive social fields can furthermore reinforce positive-ecological habitus and support this through doxa. Thus, environmental organisations may provide such social spaces where people’s ecological habitus can develop, and where it makes practical sense. They offer the doxic field necessary for the incubation of environmental practices until they become routine, embodied dispositions of the individual, and part of a broader ecological habitus that can resonate across the other social fields of people’s lives (Haluza-DeLay, 2008).
An example of this is a Canadian permaculture network (Haluza-DeLay & Berezan, 2013), where individuals who have studied and practiced permaculture maintain contact and routine communal practices to support and grow their ecologically sustainable dispositions. In this instance, there is not one specific location where the practice occurs, or a united and fixed social group, but rather a “distributed eco-village” from across the region that forms and disbands variously for short-term events of mutual interest and for ongoing learning (Haluza-DeLay & Berezan, 2013, p.139). The social field, where common values are held, is maintained by this periodic joined practice (e.g. weekend workshops or working bees), and is supported in the interim through digital communication.
Before publishing her adaptation of ecological habitus, Kasper (2008) conducted similar research into the lifestyle support offered by ‘eco-villages’30, with concurring conclusions (discussed below). As a social field orientated to ecologically sustainable lifestyles, eco-villages support sharing of knowledge, opportunities for ecologically sound practical experience, emphasis on reflexivity, and a harmonious social field in which ecological habitus can develop. Moreover, eco-villages can support this on a comprehensive, day-to-day basis, both socially (e.g. through governance systems and philosophies, workshops, meetings, conferences, shared meals, and work projects) and materially (e.g. through sustainable systems of food production, infrastructure, ecosystem conservation, and construction of homes; Kasper, 2008). Finally, eco-villages offer objective, material conditions that support such lifestyles through deliberate design, for example shared facilities for recreation (e.g. naturalised swimming pools) and amenity activities (e.g. gardening and composting), space reserved for wildlife, and construction that prioritises recycled materials, solar energy, or waste minimisation.
This is another example of how ecological habitus is situated within specific social, material, and ecological ‘places’ and how these inform its development and enactment.
While participating in alternative, ecologically-orientated social fields of these kinds can enhance ecological habitus in individuals by disrupting the everyday reproduction of dominant ecologically unsound habitus (Haluza-DeLay, 2008) and making sustainable alternatives seem normal and easy, upholding ecological habitus within the social structures of other (e.g. inherently ecologically harmful/unsustainable fields) requires greater reflexivity on behalf of individuals and benefits from supportive social structures. Accordingly, Haluza-DeLay asserts that environmental organisations must also facilitate people’s reflexivity of the nature of habitus and field, the power of illusio, and how this conserves dominant social paradigms; and must critique the social structures of the mainstream that inhibit sustainable ecological habitus (Haluza-DeLay, 2006b).
Concluding his study on environmental social change organisations, Haluza-DeLay claims that individual ecological habitus and change to wider social norms can be cultivated through practical learning, supportive social fields, and development of ecologically attuned reflexivity within individuals. He affirms that the intentional cultivation of sustainable ecological habitus is possible, and suggests that if this was proliferated it could serve as a counter-hegemonic tool for contesting the legitimacy of environmentally unsound practices (Haluza-DeLay, 2008). I explore further how such ecological habitus might be cultivated in the mainstream of city people in Chapters 9 & 10.
Reflecting on Bourdieu’s formula for habitus and practice (see end of 2.2.2), Haluza-DeLay’s works focus on the role of social fields, everyday practice, and dispositions in swaying ecological habitus. He only briefly mentions capitals (specifically symbolic capital, and naming/recognising socio- ecological efforts). Complementing this is a convergent, but completely independent strand of research (not citing, or cited by any other ‘ecological habitus’ scholars), where Karol and Gale (2004) elaborate on the role of ‘environmental capital’, both material and embodied, in creating a ‘habitus of sustainability’. Karol and Gale’s research sits within Bourdieuan education literature, which is a large but specialised field of research unto itself. The siloed31 publication of habitus research may explain the separate32 evolution of these similar concepts.
31. The term ‘silo’ is applied in the literature to describe a unit, especially a discipline, which is separated from others, as discussed at length in Chapter 8. Silos can inhibit the whole-systems understandings that are necessary for sustainability, making them an increasingly popular research topic. Bourdieuan research as a whole is not siloed (i.e. it is discussed in different disciplinary literatures), however these discussions can be siloed from one another (e.g. within independent publications dedicated to education, anthropology, or marketing). Reviewing ecologically relevant Bourdieuan concepts from within such silos, rather than across them, may explain the separate evolution of ‘ecological habitus’ and ‘habitus of sustainability’, for example.