diferencias semejanzas 

The mahalla private lot (mahalla fee) shares much in common with the American fee simple, and it is equivalently distant from the Blackstonian fee simple absolute.113 Proceeding from the ideal of the Blackstonian fee, three principal structures (family, mahalla, and state) intrude on the ideal of complete discretion in the enjoyment of private property in Uzbekistan. These intrusions capture what it means in Uzbekistan to be not only an individual, but to be enmeshed in social networks at the family, community, and national levels. Property rights and norms speak as much to individual rights as they do to what duties and expectations lie at the foundation of the interpersonal relations of Uzbek society.

Family members who are not the nominal owners of houses enjoy numerous claims over property, and some of these claims also find expression in legal entitlements. Social norms require that a son who marries receive either a section of the family house for his new family or a new house. Under Uzbekistan law, sales of houses may only take place with the approval of all

113 _{The core elements of fee simple absolute involve single ownership, in perpetuity, with clear horizontal and}

unlimited vertical demarcation, with absolute rights to exclude, with absolute privileges to use and abuse, and with power to alienate the whole or any part of the fee at any time. See Ellickson, Property in Land, supra note 4, at 1362- 3.

individuals for whom the residence is the principal residence.114 Both of these limitations on absolute ownership stress the importance of family obligations in Uzbekistan. Both limitations, regardless of whether punishable by law or norms, are the functional equivalents of subsidies to decrease the payoff for defections from the family.

Property is also subject to a number of easements that derive from mahalla.115 Mahalla residents, especially neighbors, children, and rais, expect free entry into a family courtyard (although not entry into interior rooms). Mahalla also channel social norms that encourage easements on land for expansion or creation of dwellings for needy community members, for passage, and for rights of first refusal for mahalla members in the event of a sale of real estate. These norms are the functional equivalents of subsidies to decrease the payoff for defections from mahalla.

The actual status of these norms is changing, since under the 1999 Mahalla Law violation of mahalla decisions is now a crime.116 This "law from order" change means that mahalla now have powers to levy taxes on landowners.117 It could also mean that some atrophied norms, such as rights of first refusal, may find new enforcement from the state when kengash so desire. In addition to, or in place of, community self-help or even-up, violators of mahalla decisions may now face arrest. Even despite the 1999 reforms, mahalla norms establish that members of mahalla live in a communitarian society. With the 1999 reforms, it is increasingly more difficult to separate the community from the state, or norms from laws.

114 _{Polozhenie o poryadke oformleniya dogovorov kupli-prodazhi privatizirovannykh kvartir, domov (chasti domov),}

Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 180, Attachment 1 (Apr. 4, 1994), Art. 8. [hereinafter 1994 provisions].

115

Completely unstudied in any language is the issue of nuisance law and norms in Uzbekistan. Respondents in both contemporary and traditional mahalla inquired spontaneously whether telephone solicitation was really allowed in the United States, and when told that it was virtually unregulated, they reacted in horror at such an invasion of privacy. On the flip side, Tashkent dairy vendors daily wake residents at dawn by screaming from the street for long periods of time; even disturbed sleepers (who are in the majority in contemporary and apartment mahalla) feel no right to interfere with this practice.

116 _{1999 Mahalla Law, supra note 9, at art. 16.} 117

Finally, the state limits absolute enjoyment of privately owned land through the Constitution, taxes, and regulations concerning sales of land. Under the Constitution, an individual property owner in Uzbekistan does not own the subsoil.118 _{While not in the}

Constitution, citizens also know that they have no rights to the atmosphere. In addition, Uzbekistan levies a property tax based on the assessed value of land and structures on the land; failure to remit this tax can, as is the case everywhere in the world, lead ultimately to

escheatment. Likewise, under the law, private abodes may not be used as business premises without state authorization.119 _{Finally, since all water is owned by the state,}120 _{individuals enjoy}

no permanent privileges to water from streams and rivers by virtue of land ownership or prior claim. Given this set of legal conditions, owners of urban residential land in Uzbekistan enjoy truncated rights to use natural resources, and land is one of the principal spheres through which the state and citizens interact.

In summary, in Uzbekistan, the mahalla fee involves de jure individual ownership, limited rights to exclude, limited rights to alienate part or all of a fee, extensive rights to bequeath,121 and general, but not unlimited, rights to use and abuse the land. While the mix of entitlements in Uzbekistan is singular, and while it is somewhat more communitarian than in the United States, for the most part, the mahalla fee resembles the fee simple. These similarities contradict efforts by some scholars to the effect that mahalla are a wholly unique regime and not suited to comparisons with other residential regimes or analyzable through general social theory.

118 _U

ZB. CONST., supra note 7, at art. 55.

119 _{1994 Provisions, supra note 114, at art. 7.} 120

UZB. CONST., supra note 7, at art. 55.

121 _{Unlike in European legal systems, wills may not be abrogated in Uzbekistan to ensure that estate proceeds provide}