Diferentes usos de las NTIC en el proceso de enseñanza – aprendizaje

It is well worth understanding, at this stage, a little more about how climate policy was treated within this energy governance model. Clearly climate objectives had not represented a formal commitment for energy policy under the Conservatives. The primary commitment to ‘clean’ energy under the Conservatives had come in that they did openly recognise the idea that greenhouse gases cause global warming (Thatcher 1995: 640; Helm 2003: 346; Vogler 2009: 2685). This recognition led to a report entitled ‘This Common Inheritance’ (Department of Environment 1990), which included a target to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 2005, and some environmental legislation – most notably the bans on leaded petrol and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) refrigerators. The carbon dioxide reduction target was, however, easier to meet than expected given the large reductions in coal usage and the decline in UK manufacturing, and it was met early, by 2000 (Helm 2003: 347; cf. DETR 2000; Mitchell 2000). It is also worth noting that the emissions target was not legally binding, and reiterating that it was not an objective that energy policymakers were formally required to achieve. Outside of specific laws to phase out leaded petrol, the prevailing UK view was that the markets would, in time, “demand” renewables (IEA 1998: 67), that competition would provide for renewable energy (DETR 2000; cf. Rutledge 2007) and that targets to reduce carbon dioxide emissions would need to be balanced by other economic demands (DoE 1990; cf. Bernstein 2001; Carter 2001). In the late 1980s, partly to take account of the politics of the early 1980s recession, the UK adopted a definition of ‘sustainable development’ that included possibilities for economic growth, a definition which became widely adopted.50 Indeed, economic growth was understood as key to achieving sustainable development, and it was further argued that that the UK economic model already conformed to such sustainable growth (Jacobs 1991: 59; see also DoE 1988). This clearly implied commitment to bearing the future environment in mind, without having to change many energy governance practices today.

As already suggested in chapter one, questions of which definition of ‘sustainable’ should be used to underpin policies towards the environment raise another important

50  _{‘Green’  environmentalists  argued,  on  the  other  hand,  that  economic  growth  and  environmentally}  

sustainable  development  are  not  positively  inter-­‐related  in  that  environmental  protection  does  mean   constraints  on  economic  activity  (Jacobs  1991:  59)    

question, of how dominant political ideas had come to colour responses to environmental science and claims about man’s relationship to climate change. Even once political elites had accepted the need to act to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, a wide variety of political action, or inaction, and other responses emerged dependent upon dominant ‘worldviews’ (Rayner 2009).51

This is where we return to Steven Bernstein’s notion of the liberal-environmental compromise, otherwise known as ‘climate capitalism’, whereby neoliberally informed political elites take on responsibility to act in response to climate change but do so on their own ideational and political terms (Bernstein 2001). Bernstein’s excellent analysis provides a detailed account of how scientific concerns about environmental protection emerged, through concern about economic growth and poverty reduction, into a single framework of ‘sustainable development’ (Bernstein 2001: 29). Terminology, previously common in environmental reports such as the ‘Brundtland Report’, of “managing” the environment moved to terminology of “developing”, more in line with notions of a reduced role for government institutions (Bernstein 2001: 59).

As already suggested New Labour could be marked out from the Conservatives in that they claimed a greater degree of political commitment to the need to mitigate climate change, as well as narrative in opposition to nuclear. Their 1997 election manifesto had committed to specific carbon dioxide emission cuts of 20%, over 1990 levels, by 2010 (New Labour 1997). They also put forward a target whereby 10% of electricity should be supplied by renewable sources, also by 2010 (Mitchell and O’Connor 2004: 1937). Not much was included in the manifesto, however, about how this target might be achieved which has been, perhaps, one of the key weakness of climate policy under New Labour – the gap between stated aspirations and ability to meet them. For example, after taking office a review was conducted into the feasibility of meeting the renewable target, the Renewable Energy Review (DTI 1999). The ensuing response suggested that the UK would work towards the 10% target, but provided very little in terms of concrete policy to facilitate the target (Mitchell 2000: 287).

51  _{For  example,  in  Germany  and  Sweden  much  legislation  has  already  been  passed,  including  ‘risk  free’}  

feed-­‐in-­‐tariffs  (Germany)  and  carbon  taxes  (Sweden).    Bothcountries  have  managed  to  substantially   increase  the  percentage  of  renewable  energy  in  the  overall  mix,  as  well  as  reduce  carbon  dioxide   emissions  (Ragwitz  et  al  2005;  Mitchell  2008;  Giddens  2009).    

Also not long after taking office the ‘Marshall Report’, led by an industrialist Lord Marshall, was commissioned to look into which economic instruments could be used to enable carbon dioxide emission reductions (Kern 2009: 129). The Climate Change Programme was launched, a key component of which was the establishment of a Climate Change Levy (CCL). The levy was to be advanced on business, not residential, energy users ostensibly in replacement of the Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL) which had been in operation since 1989 (DTI 2000b: 27).

Given the opposition it generated this was the first real test of Labour’s commitment to carbon dioxide reduction targets. The CCL was introduced in 2000 but when, particularly fuel-intensive, industries objected a number of exemptions and alterations were made along with the notion of giving something back to business (Kern 2009: 129-30 and 147; see also Carter 2001: 120; Helm 2003: 356). Negotiated agreements were reached such that large industrial energy users, companies and regions, could agree carbon dioxide emission reduction plans in exchange for reductions in CCL payable. Fuels for electricity generation, petrol, and diesel were exempted, and reductions in national insurance contributions were put in place to offset some of the effects of the CCL (Rutledge 2007: 906).52

A second key component of the Climate Change Programme was the establishment of a Carbon Trust (CT) which was set up as a ‘business lead’ organisation, separate from, but funded by, Government, in order to assist in the transition to a low carbon economy (Kern 2009: 160). The CT was seen as a body which could help in the ‘delivery’ of transition through improving communication and dialogue, and also by recycling some CCL receipts (Kern 2009: 130). One in depth review of this organisation, based on a wide range of interviews within the CT, has suggested that it represented yet another attempt to keep energy and climate change free from political interference. The dominant assumption was that by having the “freedom to operate” separately from government departments this organisation would be able to make objective, non- political decisions and therefore achieve much more (Kern 2009: 131)

52  _{This  is  another  example  of  New  Labour’s  understanding  that  in  order  to  get  policy  through  they  would}  

need  to  design  it  such  that  key  corporations  would  be  able  to  accept  it.    For  more  detail  on  this  see   (Kern  2009:  147-­‐149).  

In that the CCL can be seen as a replacement for the Conservatives’ FFL, and in that it was overtly committed to being independent of state interference, continuity in actual climate policies adopted can be claimed, despite the greater rhetoric on targets. Also consistent with Conservative policy on renewable energy, New Labour continued initially with the Renewable Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), which had been in place to support ‘low-carbon’ energy production since 1990. Given the status of nuclear energy as ‘low carbon’ the NFFO had gone largely to supporting nuclear energy production since its inception, in 1988, such that in 2000 renewable energy accounted for only 3% of electricity production (Helm 2003: 350; cf. Mitchell 2000; Mitchell and Connor 2004; van der Horst 2005). One analyst and government advisor has suggested that the NFFO was never about supporting renewables specifically in that it had been adopted in 1990 only in order to facilitate the privatisation of the electricity system (Mitchell 2000: 293-4).

When the NFFO came to an end in 2000 a new obligation, the Renewables Obligation (RO), was placed on electricity suppliers to purchase certain percentages of low carbon electricity from renewable sources. Commitment to a renewables policy was an achievement in itself given the long debate, which took place within the Energy Advisory Panel, prior to this as to whether to have a specific renewables policy or not. Despite a high degree of opposition, from the pro-nuclear lobby and ‘laissez-faire’ economists, it was decided to go ahead with a specific renewable policy in place of the NFFO (Interview 14; cf. Mitchell 2000).

Alongside the RO a new aim was adopted which was to achieve 3% of electricity generated by renewables by the end of March 2003, rising to 10.4% by March 2011 (Rutledge 2007: 906). The RO was, however, technology non-specific in that it was recognised that “…it is no longer the job of Government to pick winners or to introduce artificial distortions into the marketplace” (DTI 2000b: 3; cf. Mitchell 2008: 126). Furthermore it was decided that a price cap would be applied - ostensibly to protect consumers given New Labour’s commitment to keeping electricity prices in the “…lower half of the EU/G7 basket” (DTI 2000b: 3; see also Rutledge 2007: 906). The price cap operated as a ‘buy out’ element whereby electricity companies could escape the obligation if it appeared too costly (Rutledge 2007: 906). The RO was accompanied by some, given the overall requirements of developing renewable research, development and production, small capital grants which, despite protestations about not

picking winners, were allocated to particular sources of energy over others, i.e. onshore wind over energy from waste (DTI 2000b: 3).

A further institutional problem for Labour, other than being seemingly out of new policy ideas, was the existing set-up of energy and environmental governance structures. If the plan was to use energy policy to meet climate goals, as was implied in DTI documents, then this was made more difficult given the omission of specific climate objectives for energy policy. In addition the Department for the Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR) had historically held ultimate responsibility for ‘sustainable development’ (DoE 1990; DETR 2000), but elements within the DTI considered their analysis to be “wooly”, non-quantitative and unconvincing (Interview 5; Interview 13).53 Under the PEPP as of 2000, the UK’s Climate Change Programme was more of a DETR affair pursued largely alongside, rather than integrated within, energy policy (cf. Helm 2003: 361). As such there was an understandable sense within the DTI’s energy division was that climate change was not their priority (Interview 13). Again, as already mentioned above, there was still considerable belief within the DTI’s energy division that markets would deliver on investment in and production of renewable energy (DTI 2001: 2).