Throughout the literature, interests, defined as ‘something that brings advantages to or affects someone or something’,95 are considered as being one of the most obvious factors for
coordination (and thus consistency) (MEIJERS and STEAD, 2004:7; JOHNSON, 2005:144; SMITH and VANHOONACKER, 2017:140; PETERS, 2018:5).
As for an MLG system as the EU, there is a vast multitude of interests of various levels of actors and institutions and whilst this diversity of interests of the different stakeholders involved in a policy process has been largely deemed to be a ‘problematic yet well-accepted characteristic of EU foreign policy-making’ within the literature (THALER, 2015:149), interests are not perceived by all scholars as a threat to coordination per se. On the contrary, interests can be both converging or diverging and it is largely assumed that interests that are similar to each other support one another and that higher levels of coordination can be reached amongst like-minded groups (THALER, 2015:135). The basis for this assumption is the fact that so far, high levels of integration have notably been reached in areas of converging interests with intergovernmentalism – a theory developed in the 1960s by Stanley Hoffman as a counter- argument to supranationalistic theories like neo-functionalism96 that brings the nation states
back to the centre of analysis –97 defining integration as ‘…arrangements whereby nation states, in situations and conditions they can control, cooperate with one another on matters of common interest’ (NUGENT, 2006:558).98 Applied to this study, this means that the member states are not
opposed to the idea of coordination in principle, but generally open towards it, at least as long as they are, as just stated, in control of the circumstances.
By contrast, the problem is opposing interests, with Forster and Stokke (2013:24) stating: ‘conflicting interests and values are the main cause of incoherence within most systems and at most levels’. Similarily, the OECD (2003) notes that coherence ‘has always been and will continue to be a function of competing and conflicting interests and values’.99 As for the EU, this assumption is
not inappropriate given the wide heterogeneity of interests, whereby past inconsistencies have, as shown before, often resulted from divergencies in the vertical dimension (MEIJERS and STEAD, 2004:8).100 According to intergovernmentalism, this is because the nation or member
states are the main actors within the EU and the main motivator for integration, so liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), a branch of intergovernmentalism which was first established in 1998 by Andrew Moravcsik and combines liberal, intergovernmentalist and functional elements, is the protection of their national interest, defined as being driven by general geopolitical ideas and policy specific interests (MORAVCSIK and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:69). In other words,
95 Cambridge Dictionary (18 July 2019).
96 Compared to neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism considers international politics to be more important than regional politics
and regional subsystems to have only ’a reduced autonomy’ (HOFFMAN, 1966:865).
97 Contrary to neo-functionalism, the theory considers integration to be the result of the nation state’s own national interest(s), and
not of spillovers (DIEZ, BODE and FERNANDES DA COSTA, 2015:19). Strongly building on the premises of realism in this regard, it is often proclaimed to be the equivalent of realism in the European integration debate. Like realism, intergovernmentalism is a state- centric theory, considering the nation states to be the main actors in international relations and putting strong emphasis on the notion of national interest (LELIEVELDT and PRINCEN, 2015:32). However, despite these similarities, both theories need to be strictly distinguished from one another, notably because they fundamentally differ from each other with respect to their perception of the international relations system.
98 Although this definition refers to the nation states it can be applied to any actor.
99 OECD (Accessed on 07 January 2019).
100 However, it must be stated here that the degree of heterogeneity differs greatly across policies: whereas EU climate change (at
least regarding some sectors) and market policies are partly centralised and homogeneous, supply security policies are mostly centralised and homogeneous and energy efficiency policies are decentralised and heterogeneous.
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integration is understood as the lowest common denominator of the national interests and the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations between the nation states (DIEZ, BODE and FERNANDES DA COSTA, 2015:190).101In this context, the theory distinguishes between areas of
so-called ‘low’ politics, i.e. areas considered compatible with the nation states’ national identity or interests (like economics and welfare) (ROSAMOND, 2000:77)102 and areas of so-called ‘high’
politics, i.e. areas considered to be incompatible with the member states’ national interest such external affairs and energy which is a highly sensitive domain (NEFRAMI, 2012:157).
Indeed, as has been shown, energy is a strategic product vital to all sectors of the economy including international energy, climate/environment, trade, security and development103 and
whose ‘omnipresence within the human life’ involves ‘multiple players with divergent interests’ (MOMETE, 2015:464). This is notably true for the EU where interests are driven by 28 heterogeneous energy systems with different requirements. As a result, the picture of energy policies is diverse, with divergencies generally becoming most apparent at the external and vertical policy levels (DE JONG, 2013:7) (which does however not mean that there are no discrepancies at the horizontal level). Indeed, remaining a policy field highly sensitive to national considerations, the member states rather tend to think of it as a domestic policy domain. Here, one may assume that the likelihood of coordination (and thus consistency) is lower when the stakes are higher. For example, with Russia in its role as the EU’s most important energy supplier being a prime example of a highly politicized context, it stands to reason that convergence is difficult to achieve. Following this line of thought, it is plausible that coordination (and thus consistency) is more likely to occur when it comes to a non-energy producing transit country like for example Morocco where the stakes are lower. Yet, academic and empirical evidence has proved this to be wrong so far (notably as far as large-scale initiatives like Desertec and the MSP are concerned) and this is also the opposite of what is assumed in some of the academic papers which postulate that there is more coordination when vital interests are at stake (DEBAERE, 2013). Likewise, the intergovernmentalist theories assume that the more the member states have to lose, the more likely they are willing to make compromises. Given this unclarity in the literature, it can be noted against this background that whether coordination is extensive or not depends on whether interests are convergent or divergent (KOULAIMAH-GABRIAL and OOMEN, 1997:3; CARBONE, 2013:4-5). This leads to the following hypothesis:
(H2): The less diverse the interests of the different stakeholders involved in EU external energy governance, the more extensive the coordination (and thus the higher the consistency) of their energy policies.
The operationalisation of the variable ‘interests’ will be based on an assessment of the energy interests of the different actors involved in EU energy governance towards Morocco, whereby the focus will be on both converging and diverging interests as well as on the European and third country perspectives. This is important given that whether coordination takes place or not
101 and not of supranational actions as proclaimed in the theory of neo-functionalism.
102 Overall, LI is based on the idea of syncretism, i.e. on the idea that supranational institutions are necessary in order to provide
durable cooperation: not only because they serve as a coordination platform but also as a protector against other and/or a guarantor of national preferences (as they provide states with information), and this particularly in times of insecurity (MORAVCSIK and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:69). ‘Passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules’, they ‘contribute to minimise uncertainty by eliminating
the risk of undesired outcomes’ (MORAVCSIK and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:72).
103 with the political and economic survival of a state clearly depending on its access to it (TOSUN, BIESENBENDER and SCHULZE,
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in a multi-level environment, not only depends on the interests of the EU institutions and the member states but also on those of Morocco.