Liberal perspectives have provided considerably broad accounts of international cooperation. The liberal perspectives share two key basic assumptions with the power-oriented approach: states are rational actors, and the nature of international system is anarchic – it lacks a supreme authority. But what makes liberal perspectives more fascinating for this research is their extensive explanation for and understanding of why cooperation is possible and pervasive in international politics under anarchy. Although there are different liberal perspectives discussed in this thesis, their central focus is on international institutions as a condition allowing cooperation under anarchy to be achievable.
Studies of international institutions2 can be classified into two groups: an old
institutionalism and a new institutionalism. The old institutionalism refers to the functionalist and neo-functionalist approach, which emphasizes the role of formal institutions in international politics; the new institutionalism – international regime theory and/or neo-liberal institutionalism – has replaced and broadened the scope of the former conceptualization (Stein, 2008: 204).
Functionalism theory in the 1940s and neo-functionalism in the 1950s addressed the role of international institutions in fostering states’ cooperation. Functionalism, neo- functionalism and interdependence theory have emphasized the importance of transnational interactions among state and non-state actors in the process of integration. International economy and social relations is necessary for political cooperation. From a functionalist view, Mitrany (1966) proposes that higher interdependence between countries will lead to peace. In transnational relations, technical experts, not politicians, will arrange cooperation. International activities should be linked like a web (Mitrany, 1966). However, neo-functionalists take a different view by arguing that the intensifying of cooperation – which was developed in Europe – requires political decisions and intentions to enhance cooperation from one area to another. Political integration, according to Hass, ‘is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdictions over the pre-existing national states’. This will form a new political community over the pre-existing ones (Haas, 1968). Both functionalism and neo-functionalism explain the higher level of cooperation, which would finally move to political integration. As a concept, integration refers to both the process and an end-state (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 253). The process of integration occurs voluntarily and consensually, and it is closer to the concept of supranationalism. Even though this old institutionalist approach cannot be practically and completely applied to regional cooperation in ASEAN, it has obviously highlighted
2 In order to develop his systemic and insightful reviews on the concepts in institutional perspectives in IR theories, Stein accepts North’s definition of institutions and defines them as ‘the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, [the] humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990: 3, cited in Stein, 2008: 204).
IGO as an international actor representing states’ mutual interest in international politics. This is helpful in investigating the role of IGOs in shaping international outcomes. International cooperation can be easily identified through the physical presence of institutional organizations and machinery, and those international organizations, in turn, accommodate cooperation among members.
To differentiate institutions referred to in the old institutionalist perspective, neo- liberal institutionalists replace institutions with regimes with the aim of broadening the concept of institutions (Young, 1989; Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 2005; Stein, 2008). A widely accepted definition of international regimes is given by Krasner (1983). Regimes are ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1983: 2).3 As rational actors, states – which basically
have an incentive to cooperate to maximize their gains – purposively create regimes to achieve their mutual goals through the process of bargaining, agenda setting and forming international political coalitions and initiatives (Keohane and Nye, 1989). Regimes function as states’ tools to facilitate international cooperation in anarchy. International organizations, as parts of regimes, are founded to provide a framework for interaction, bargaining, reducing cheating, facilitating transparency and settling disputes. According to Young (1989), international regimes include a wide range of functional scope, geographical domain and membership. From his perspective, the nature of IR is not an extreme level of conflict, but there are well-stocked institutions and organizations to accommodate cooperation (Young, 1989).
In addition, neo-liberal institutionalists explain the advantages of institutions through game theory. Cooperation under anarchy is possible owing to the existence of institutions and the awareness of the repetition of the game. Although achieving cooperation is not easy in an anarchic world since there is no supreme authority to
3 Krasner’s definition of regimes is used in this chapter for illustrating a standard meaning of regimes which can be generally accepted in IR debates on whether regimes can determine international outcomes or/and state’s behaviour in international politics. However, it should be noted that the definition of regimes referred to in this thesis is not exactly the same as Krasner’s. The definition of regime applied in this research is clarified in this chapter under the heading of ‘regimes as parts of global governance’.
enforce the law, Axelrod and Keohane (1986) show that mutual interest, the shadow of the future and the number of players can help us to understand the success and failure of attempts at both military and political economic cooperation. The prisoner’s dilemma game illustrates that institutions can provide mutual interests and future expectations for states. Reciprocity can be a strategy to persuade states to cooperate (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986). Holsti (1988) also highlights that states have learned to achieve some purposes by establishing systems of reciprocity to coordinate policies with others. In an interconnected world, states have acknowledged that reputation will be a crucial component of diplomatic effectiveness so that efficient, successful cooperation can happen. Karns and Mingst (2010) notice that states choose to continuously interact with each other in the anarchic society because they become aware that in the future they will interact with them.
Through attempts in explaining how institutions affect international outcomes and actors’ behaviour, neo-liberal institutionalists have clearly added the characteristics of decentralized institutions and complex interdependence into the nature of IR. Decentralized institutions, which are potentially enacted and coordinated by the individual members of regimes, create international compliance and sanction mechanisms despite the absence of a supreme authority responsible for enforcing them (Young, 1979: 35; Keohane, 2005: 98). Even though states have an incentive to violate the rules, they instead choose to comply with them. Interactions through regimes offer open-ended prisoner’s dilemma and make them realize that violation of a commitment in a particular issue may lead to negative reputations and consequences in other issues and regimes in the future (Keohane, 2005: 103). Since normally states do not cooperate only in one area, this consideration creates complicated relationships and unforeseen opportunity costs which constrain states’ behaviour. When regimes are established this will facilitate cooperation as well as form a basis for the necessary conditions – including information availability, dense patterns of issue linkages, and members’ future plans – for fostering further cooperation (Martin, 2001). Examining cooperation through this perspective reveals the complex interdependent structure implicitly existing in IR which states have to calculate before choosing any course of action.
The neo-liberal institutional perspective importantly forms a basis for the understanding of the nature of IR under anarchy in world politics for this thesis. It clearly and extensively highlights the crucial functions of international institutions in addition to the physical presence of international organizations and mechanisms emphasized by the old institutionalist perspective. This broadens understanding of how and why inter-state cooperation can be created, maintained and developed pervasively under international anarchy. It explains the important functions of regimes in shaping international outcomes in world politics on various cooperative areas and issues, the linkages between which construct complex interdependence in IR. Through international interactions, states can identify mutual interests and cooperation occurs when states create and/or adjust existing regimes as a tool to achieve members’ goals. Moreover, under international anarchy, where decentralized institutions and regimes are plentiful, regime theorists demonstrate how international compliance and sanction mechanisms – through multilateral efforts – can potentially operate to secure what states have agreed, even though there is no supreme authority or hegemony in the world system. Cooperation can occur when states can identify their mutual interests. Once institutions are established, it forms a cooperative mechanism for achieving members’ goals and enhancing necessary conditions, which pave the way for future cooperation. This seems to be an endless process of enhancing mutual interests and expectations, which importantly explains why international cooperation is pervasive in IR according to this perspective.
Although neo-liberal institutionalists substantially contribute a comprehensive understanding of the nature of IR for analysing the effects of regimes on international outcomes, some limitations can be pointed out as a reason why this perspective cannot be fully applied in analysing international cooperation on environmental issues. Firstly, the neo-liberal institutionalist view limits the study of international cooperation in world politics on interaction among states. International cooperation can be explained only by focusing on the role of states in establishing regimes for achieving members’ goals where mutual interests can be identified. Cooperation can occur only when at least one state raises its concern and calls for others to address it through the international negotiation process. Without states’ incentive and the
ability to identify mutual interests, cooperation cannot be achieved and regimes cannot be established (Mitchell, 2010: 116).
Secondly, since the concept of cooperation in neo-liberal institutionalism does not by itself clearly explain how regimes emerge without pre-existing cooperation, it is questionable how environmental cooperation can be created and developed. In examining the development of economic cooperation, a hegemon who possessed superiority of economic and military resources has historically been responsible for providing collective goods to secure international order, which in turn serves its interests. Under the hegemonic period – the British Empire in the nineteenth century and the leading role of the United States after World War II – economic regimes were established and maintained. Thus, in the period after the decline of hegemony, these economic regimes were well established for fostering further economic cooperation by leading capitalist states (Keohane, 2005). However, a hegemon dedicated to bearing the high cost of collective goods to protect the environment cannot be obviously identified. At the core of the concept that emphasizes cooperation in states’ incentive and interest, cooperation can happen when states realize that they can gain some benefit or some cost reduction, or when the benefits outweigh the cost. Environmental cooperation can occur as a result of states realizing that collective action is needed; however, with different incentives and interests, established environmental regimes have different effects on international outcomes. The neo-liberal perspective does not offer other factors which can change states’ incentive to cooperate in areas where mutual interests are hard to find and develop by rational state actors.
While this thesis accepts the neo-liberal institutionalists’ assumption on the nature of IR, the approach does not offer a sufficient explanation of how regimes can be improved for better functioning after they have been established. In international politics, regimes are pervasive for fostering cooperation in different concerned areas; however, their effects on international outcomes and states’ behaviour are various. Focusing only on states’ initiatives on cooperation on the environment through a neo- liberal institutionalist perspective can merely understand why cooperation is antagonistic to commerce, while looking at other environmental collaborations can
broaden understanding of how non-state actors react to the slow progress of inter- state cooperation. The roles of non-state actors are well constructed under the umbrella of liberalism in the context of globalization. The following part delves into the concept of governance, which is still under the liberal perspective. However, more attention is given to analysing the increasing role of non-state actors as a kind of international mechanism in shaping international politics.