LAPUZ SY v. EUFEMIO
G.R. No. L-30977, 31
G.R. No. L-30977, 31 January 1972January 1972
F
F
ACTSACTS::
Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio, thereafter, moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" mainly on the ground that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
II
SSUESSUE::
1.
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
2.
If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
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ULINGULING::
1.
YES. YES.
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines (now governed by the Family Code) recognizes this by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its ArticleSan Beda College of Law San Beda College of Law
108 (now Article 66 of FC) by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the
subject-matter of the action itself.
2
. YES.. YES.
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved because these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.CERVANTES v. FAJARDO
CERVANTES v. FAJARDO
G.R. No 79955
G.R. No 79955
,January 27, 1989January 27, 1989
Facts:
Facts:
This case is a petition for writ of Habeat Corpus over the minor Angelie Cervantes, daughter of common-law spouse Conrado Fernando and Gina Carreon. It appears that Angelie was offered for adoption to petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes (sister of Gina Carreon) and Nelson Cervantes. Petitioners took custody of the child when the latter was two weeks old. Gina Carreon executed an affidavit of consent to the said adoption and the court later approved the petition for adoption.
Years later, the biological parents of Angelie demanded from the adoptive parents the payment of P 150,000 otherwise they would get back their child. Petitioners refused and as a result, Gina took the child from the petitioner’s residence and would only return the child upon the payment of the said amount.
According to Gina, the consent of adoption was not fully explained to her. However, this is in contrast with her utterances during the interview with the social worker who conducted the case study of the said adotion.
II
SSUESSUE::
Considering the circumstances surrounding the life of the natural parents as compared to that of the adoptive parents, the latter being in a better position, are the adoptive parents entitled to the custody of the child?
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Ruling:
Ruling:
YES.
YES. II
n all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon previously gave birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. On the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and the consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and to exercise parental authority and responsibility over her.
ESPIRITU v. COURT OF APPEALS
ESPIRITU v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115640, 15 March 1995
G.R. No. 115640, 15 March 1995
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ACTSACTS::
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. They both went abroad to work and there maintained a common law relationship. They finally got married while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines. They had two (2) children, Rosalind and Reginald.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co- petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of
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being arrested. Meanwhile, she decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children.
II
SSUESSUE::
Should the custody of the children be given to Teresita?
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ULINGULING::
NO.
NO.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.Both Rosalind and Reginald are over 7 years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend.
Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother.