Dimensiones del control interno

With the emergence of a state-system in the Middle East, Saudi main concern was a Hashemite encirclement of the kingdom by Jordan and Iraq. This may be viewed as a continuation of the process of state formation when, after driving the Hashemite out of Hejaz and having monopolised power in the Saudi Arabia, the Sauds continued to fear a Hashemite incursion to topple the Saudi regime. An agreement was signed with Britain in 1927 (Treaty of Jeddah) to guarantee that both parties abstain from encroaching against each other (Safran 1991, 59).

The run up to WWII, the ensuing of the war and the decline in the number of pilgrims coming to Mecca made the Saudi regime financially weak and politically

vulnerable internally: “Ibn Saud’s financial anxieties and his basic security concern were one and the same thing” (Ibid., 60). Desperate for financial support, Ibn Saud granted Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) a concession to develop his kingdom’s oil resources, guaranteeing him an annual rent and a loan for the first two years. The outbreak of the war however nearly led to the financial collapse of the regime lead Britain and (under the influence of SOCAL) the US to come to the assistance of Ibn Saud. Diplomatic recognition between the Kingdom and the US took place six months after SOCAL secured a concession from the Saudis. In 1939, US representation extended to an ambassadorial level.

Similar to developments in WWI and the emergence of the third Saudi state, the US entry in WWII made Saudi Arabia important as a strategic partner for the latter “largely from a realisation of the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia’s oil now that the United States had joined the war against Germany, Japan and Italy” (Niblock 2006, 37). In 1943, President Roosevelt stated that ‘the defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the United States’. The US accordingly became a major supplier of aid to the Kingdom.

From this time on an interregnum begins in regional politics, which is theoretically telling in regards to Saudi behaviour. The US emerges as a major international player largely replacing Britain and bidding for influence in the Middle East, only to be augmented further with increased Soviet competition there. US replacement of the British in the region was gradual. During the interregnum Saudi Arabia sought US protection against the Hashemite alliance and also to balance British influence. In the post-war period, Britain’s influence in the Middle East decreased and, due to domestic opposition, it aimed to grant independence to Iraq and Jordan on one hand and to increase cooperation among Arab states.

In addition to British policy, Transjordan’s Abdullah aimed to integrate Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in his ‘Greater Syria’ scheme, while Faisal of Iraq wanted to establish the ‘Fertile Crescent’ including the above countries and Iraq. For Ibn Saud these schemes threatened his own polity and fear of British neutralisation saw him moving in two directions. He both sought a regional ally to balance the Hashemites and the US to balance Britain. In one way, what Ibn Saud was actively engaged in avoiding was the emergence of a regional hegemon that may end what has been described here as an ‘external neutralisation’ and hence threatening the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, a scenario similar to that of the collapse of the first Saudi state. As Safran

contends, “to protect himself against the dangers he perceived, he [Ibn Saud] strove to bring in the United States as acounterweight to Britain and as a substitute buttress for the Kingdom’s security” (1991, 63; emphasis added).

The strategy involve regularly calling the US to increase its assistance to the kingdom, arguing that Britain’s policy had “cooled down and its interest had deflected to Iraq and Transjordan” and that a Communist threat was emerging particularly in neighbouring countries. In inter-Arab politics, Saudi Arabia tried to strengthen its relations with King Faruk of Egypt, Syria’s President Shukri al-Kuwatly (overthrown in 1949), and other politicians in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon (Ibid., 67). All these attempts aimed at weakening Hashemite power.

American strategy to contain Soviet expansion culminated in the 1955 Baghdad Pact, which involved a defence alliance under US patronage including Iran, Pakistan, Britain, Turkey, and Iraq. Against such a backdrop, the Saudis, under King Saud, sought an alliance with Egypt, now ruled by the Arab revisionist regime of Nasser. Fearing that the military assistance to the Hashemites in Iraq would increase their threat to the kingdom, it sought to appeal to Arab masses in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria to woo them against joining the pact.

The Middle East cultural structure—specifically the Arab core—is composed of different cultural elements that may be activated and politicised such as Arab nationalism, Islamism, and national state identities. At this stage, given its political- strategic position, Saudi Arabia “did not hesitate to emulate the tactics used by revolutionary Egypt of appealing to the publics of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan over the heads of their governments and inciting them to disobedience” in addition to “the more congenial methods of discreetly trying to buy off politicians and supporting opposition groups in those countries” (Ibid., 68). Arab National identity was activated.

Saudi Arabia’s alliance with Nasser saw the Saudis support Egyptian-Soviet Arms treaty, reject American Point IV allotment in 1954 to and later ordering the aid mission to leave the country, and inviting an Egyptian military mission to train Saudi forces alongside the American mission. The nature of the two regimes varied however. While Nasser had a revisionist plan for the region including the weakening of British influence by extending his power through appealing to other Arab countries, the Saudis had a more limited and pragmatic aim: to contain Hashemite expansion.

The 1956 Suez crisis and Nasser’s appeal to Arab masses raised Saudi concerns. The blockage of the Suez Canal led to gross loss in revenue for the Sauds. In 1956,

thousands of demonstrators took to the streets when Ibn Saud visited Aramco facilities protesting against “imperialism”. Nasser’s visit in the same year however showed his influence in Saudi politics (Ibid., 67-81). Nasser’s anti-British policy in Yemen and Oman and increased Soviet-Egyptian cooperation further increased Saudi and US fears.