Dimensiones de la Calidad de Vida Familiar

In the United States, the Customs and Border Protection component of the Department

of Homeland Security has the primary responsibility for inspecting outgoing cargo to

verify compliance with export licenses. Given the vast quantity of goods exported from

the United States annually, seizure of contraband nuclear commodities relies heavily on

guidance from the intelligence community and, to a lesser extent, law enforcement

agencies.

Customs and Border Protection now requires all shipping documents to be presented

electronically, greatly facilitating screening and the opportunity to detect anomalies that

can trigger further investigation, a measure promoted by the Kyoto Convention and the

WCO SAFE Framework. This electronic system is used by exporters to file online

export declarations, also helping the U.S. Census Bureau compile U.S. trade data. The

information is shared with the Bureau of Industry and Security at the Department of

Commerce, the Directorate for Defense Trade Controls at the Department of State, and

other federal agencies involved in monitoring and validating U.S. exports. Included in

the information provided is a description of the commodity to be shipped, its

harmonized tariff code, and whether the item is being shipped under a license. As

221

_{Ibid., p. 8.}

222

_{In a number of high-profile cases involving the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network, prosecutors in}

individual EU countries have encountered great difficulty in obtaining convictions because of challenges

in obtaining assistance from other EU members. See Sibylle Bauer, “WMD-Related Dual-Use Trade

Control Offences in The European Union: Penalties and Prosecutions,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium,

Non-Proliferation Papers No. 30, July 2013, http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-

consortium/publications/nonproliferation-paper-30 (spelling as in original); Anna Wetter, Enforcing

European Union Law on Exports of Dual-Use Goods, SIPRI Research Report No. 24 (Oxford and New York:

Oxford University Press, 2009).

223

_{Albright, Stricker, and Wood, “Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: Mitigating the Threat,” op. cit.,}

Chapter 3

mentioned above, through the C-TPAT program the United States also promotes the

implementation of rigorous internal compliance programs by offering freight carriers,

brokers, manufacturers, and traders whose programs are approved, expedited customs

treatment for importing goods into the United States.

224

_{The program currently has}

more than 10,000 participants. The United States has also signed Mutual Recognition

arrangements with several countries and the EU, which means that the AEO/C-PTAT

validation of a company in one country is recognized in the other.

225

Customs oriented investigations of export control violations are carried out by another

unit of the Department of Homeland Security, the Immigration and Customs

Enforcement agency’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) directorate, which, in

turn, has established an element dedicated to investigations of illegal exports of dual-

use equipment, technology, and materials potentially useful in the manufacture of

WMD, the Counter-Proliferation Investigations Unit.

226

_{As explained in testimony by}

John P. Woods Assistant, director of National Security Homeland Security

Investigations:

HSI’s export enforcement program uses a three pronged approach:

detecting illegal exports, investigating potential violations, and obtaining

international cooperation to investigate leads abroad. HSI relies on

specially trained U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers stationed at

ports of entry to inspect suspect export shipments. Following detection of

a violation, HSI special agents deployed throughout the country initiate

and pursue investigations to identify, arrest, and seek prosecution of

offenders…. The HSI Office of International Affairs has 71 offices around

the world that work to enlist the support of their host governments to

initiate new investigative leads and to develop information in support of

ongoing domestic investigations.

227

224

_{To clarify, the program focuses on preventing dangerous imports from entering the United States, as}

part of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.

225

_{As of June 2012, WCO reported that 19 AEO mutual recognition agreements had been concluded and}

that 11 such agreements were pending.

226

_{Statement of John P. Woods Assistant Director, National Security Homeland Security Investigations,}

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, Hearing on “Economic

Espionage: A Foreign Intelligence Threat to American Jobs and Homeland Security,” before the U.S.

House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and

Intelligence, June 28, 2012, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/120628woods.pdf. The

Counter-Proliferation Investigations Unit also investigates illicit exports of military equipment and

firearms.

In fiscal year 2011, HSI launched a total of 1,785 criminal investigations into possible

export violations, made over 530 arrests, and obtained 487 indictments and 304

convictions for export related criminal violations; the organization’s published statistics

do not indicate what proportion of this total were cases involving dual-use nuclear

technologies.

228

_{Prior years’ statistics are also impressive. The numbers have trended}

upward over time, likely reflecting increased effort on the part of ICE, but also

suggesting that law enforcement efforts, while disrupting individual transactions and

actors, have not had a deterrent effect on other malefactors.

229

_{Enforcement activities to}

combat nuclear commodity smuggling are further discussed in System 6: Enforcement

Measures.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

At the international level, the WCO is expected to announce in early 2014 further

components of its on-going Strategic Trade Enforcement Initiative, which builds on the

SAFE Framework of Standards. In particular, the WCO Enforcement Committee is

developing a set of recommended best practices for customs administrations regarding

the detection, inspection, and investigation of the illicit transfer of strategic goods.

These would eventually be endorsed by the WCO Policy Committee and then be

published. The Enforcement Committee will also continue a series of regional outreach

meetings to present the best practices and is expected to launch a campaign targeting

strategic commodities, with the goal of interdicting illicit transfers.

In the United States, during the second and third quarters of 2013, customs authorities

launched a number of new enforcement actions, which are discussed in System 6:

Enforcement.

228

_Ibid.

229

_{For statistics for Fiscal Year 2006 through 2010, see Export Controls: Proposed Reforms Create}

Opportunities to Address Enforcement Challenges, Government Accountability Office Report 12-246, March

2012, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589640.pdf. In recent years U.S. customs agencies have launched

a number of major initiatives to protect against the introduction of WMD into the United States, including

the Container Security Initiative to inspect and seal containers coming to the United States in the ports of

departure and the National Targeting Center, which screens and targets for anti-terrorism inspection all

passengers and cargo before their arrival in the United States. These important efforts are not directly

relevant to the problem of illicit exports of nuclear commodities, however, and are not further examined

in this study. However, CSI staff provide important insights into the functionality of U.S. and partner

country targeting and inspections capabilities, thus indirectly enhancing efforts to detect illicit transfers.

See Customs and Border Security website, “CSI: Container Security Initiative,”

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/; and written testimony of U.S. Customs and

Border Protection Office of Field Operations Assistant Commission Kevin McAleenan before the House

Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Hearing, “Eleven

Years Later: Preventing Terrorists from Coming to America,” September 11, 2012,

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/09/11/written-testimony-us-customs-and-border-protection-house-

homeland-security.

Chapter 3

At the national level China appears to have significantly tightened customs activities

along its border with North Korea, which external observers have long considered to be

one of the main access points for illicit trafficking (not limited to nuclear commodities)

to and from North Korea. The action came in the wake of Pyongyang’s third nuclear

test on February 12, 2013.

230

_{(China also supported tightened Security Council}

sanctions against North Korea under UNSCR 2094 (2013)). It is not clear how far-

reaching these changes will be, however.

GAPS AND CHALLENGES

As indicated earlier the customs authorities worldwide face great difficulties in

combatting illicit nuclear commodity activities. The scale of international commerce,

the opacity and pervasiveness of containerized cargo, the desire to create expedited

customs clearance processes to speed the flow of goods, and the great breadth of

responsibilities falling to customs authorities, all coupled with inevitable limitations on

resources create enormous obstacles to successful interdictions and enforcement

activities. The use of electronic shipping documents allows for the automated scanning

of these records, but even this advance continues to fall prey to the falsification of end-

use and end-user entries and to the failure of private industry to comply with

regulations requiring correct completion of basic data elements in their shipper export

declarations.

With limited available resources, countries seeking to bolster their nonproliferation

bona fides will sometimes also tend to focus on one initiative rather than seeing

multiple approaches as essential to the goal of detecting illicit commodity transfers. For

example, some large developing countries have strong Authorized Economic Operator

arrangements in place, which can help reduce the number of shipments and companies

warranting further scrutiny. But then, these same countries do not take steps to target

dual-use goods or to train frontline inspectors to recognize the tell-tale signs of illicit

movement of dual-use goods. Still other advanced countries have superior licensing

systems but no systems in place to detect outbound shipments for which licenses have

not been sought.

230

_{Charles Hutzler, “China Punishing North Korea for Missile Tests with Economic Pressure,” Huffington}

Post, March 23, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/23/china-punishing-north-korea-

missile-tests_n_2939512.html; Ben Blanchard, “China Steps Up Customs Checks, But North Korea Trade

Robust,” Reuters, April 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/us-korea-north-sanctions-

china-idUSBRE93T15E20130430; Associated Press, “China Ups Pressure on North Korea by Detailing List

of Weapons-Related Items It Won't Sell to Ally,” CBS News, September 24, 2013,

This latter concern demonstrates why reform of EU customs and licensing activities to

create a more robust and consistent system throughout the EU zone remains on the

agenda. Few of the recommendations in the EU Council’s 2011 Green Paper

highlighting weaknesses in the EU system appear to have been implemented as of late

2013.

231

_{A report by the European Commission to the European Parliament on}

Regulation 428/2009 underscored the continuing challenges in controlling transfers of

dual-use goods. Some stakeholders commenting on the current status of controls, the

report notes, consider that EU export controls do not sufficiently address differentiated

levels of risk, while enforcement remains sometimes fragmented for lack of systemic

cooperation between relevant national authorities. From a security perspective, some

stakeholders take the view that varying levels of control increase the risk of exposing

“weak links” in the export control chain and might compromise the overall

effectiveness of EU export controls.

Customs activities at transshipment hubs, such as Dubai, Hong Kong, and Singapore,

remain problematic, but it appears that important progress has been made in these

settings.

232

_{Elsewhere, as noted at the outset of this section, the failure of many states to}

implement basic laws controlling exports of nuclear and other WMD commodities

limits the ability of their customs authorities to interrupt such illicit activities in this

sphere.

231

_{See note 219.}

232

_{Comments made by a number of participants at Wilton Park Conference 1261, Meeting the Challenge}

of Emerging Nuclear Commodity Smuggling, September 2013.

System 4: Supplier-State Private Sector Internal Compliance Programs

BASIC FRAMEWORK

At some point in their activities, illicit nuclear procurers must interact with the

legitimate private sector entities. At such intersections, alert private sector firms

committed to curbing nuclear commodity smuggling can serve as a crucial first line of

defense in preventing a successful procurement. The essential tool is an internal

corporate program dedicated to complying with relevant nonproliferation controls,

referred to generally as “internal compliance programs.”

At present at least four major economic sectors must comply with a range of

nonproliferation rules, triggering the need for internal compliance programs:

manufacturing, finance, insurance, and transportation (including freight-forwarders

and courier services).

233

_{Such requirements are established under domestic laws, which}

themselves are mandated by a number of international instruments and undertakings,

including UN Security Council Resolutions, although, in the United States and many

Western countries, these domestic laws often pre-date the related international

requirements and were adopted independently, as a matter of national policy.

234

Current best practice standards for effective internal compliance programs for

manufacturers of dual-use commodities attempt to address all major elements of the

233

_{Academia is also subject to export restrictions, namely those governing the export to persons abroad of}

relevant intangible technology and the provision of such technology through training or other means to

foreign persons in the United States, including foreign students and trainees (“deemed exports”). At the

moment, illicit nuclear commodity procurement efforts to support emergent nuclear weapon programs,

as described above and highlighted in Security Council sanctions committee reports, are largely focused

on the acquisition of tangible goods. However, an increasingly worrisome longer-term trend is aggressive

efforts by states of proliferation concern to acquire intangible technology, for instance, by sending

engineers or scholars to study programs or seminars abroad, and/or by the hacking foreign networks to

gain access to military technology. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

“Higher Education and National Security: The Targeting of Sensitive, Proprietary, and Classified

Information on Campuses of Higher Education,” White Paper, April 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/about-

us/investigate/counterintelligence/higher-education-and-national-security; and Richard Perez-Pena,

“Universities Face a Rising Barrage of Cyberattacks,” July 16, 2013, New York Times,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/education/barrage-of-cyberattacks-challenges-campus-

culture.html?_r=0. Regarding such intangible technology procurement efforts, China and Iran are the

states of greatest concern.

234

_{Export licensing requirements in the United States for nuclear-specific goods date back to the Atomic}

Energy Act of 1954. The current requirements for arms exports were established in the Arms Export

Control Act of 1968, and for strategic dual-use goods (a category including nuclear dual-use goods) in the

Export Administration Act of 1979. As noted above, the relevant UN Security Council resolution

requiring states to adopt export controls was adopted in 2004, and to embargo nuclear-relevant goods to

Iran and North Korea, during and after 2006.

illicit procurement – sometimes termed “cradle to grave security”

235

_{– and call for such}

programs to include, with certain variations:

•

Commitment to this mission by high-level management, ideally including a

firm’s board of directors, and the appointment of a chief export compliance

officer;

•

Tailored screening, or “risk management,” procedures to determine whether the

proposed transaction is consistent with current export and sanctions regulations,

including

o

Application of commodity control lists;

o

Customer, end-user screening, and (where applicable) freight-forwarder,

intermediate destination, and shipper screening;

o

Shipping controls to confirm goods shipped are as intended and properly

characterized in shipping documents;

•

Monitoring of post-shipment activities including license condition compliance,

re-exports and transfers, and servicing and returns;

•

Written procedures applicable across an enterprise;

•

An active training program to support the screening effort;

•

An internal program for monitoring and auditing the effectiveness of the internal

compliance program;

•

Procedures for handling and reporting export compliance problems and

violations, both internally and to appropriate authorities;

•

Procedures for implementing corrective actions.

236

Arrangements for information sharing with national governments in countries where

the firm does business can contribute crucially to effectiveness of such programs, on the

one hand providing mechanisms for firms to receive background information on

nuclear procurement patterns and alerts regarding specific suspect procurement

235

_{“Elements of an Effective Export Compliance Program,” Tom Andrukonis, Director Export}

Management & Compliance Division Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S.

Department of Commerce, undated PowerPoint presentation,

http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_download/244-compliance-pdf.

236

_{Ibid. See also, “Core Elements of an Effective Export Management and Compliance Program,” Bureau}

of Industry and Security, U.S. Commerce Department website,

http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/compliance-a-training/export-management-a-

compliance/elements-of-an-effective-emcp; “Best Practice Guidelines on Internal Compliance

Programmes for Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,” Wassenaar Arrangement, adopted at 2011 Plenary,

http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/2%20-%20Internal%20Compliance%20Programmes.pdf,

and “Good Practices for Corporate Standards to Support the Efforts of the International Community in

the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” recently published on the NSG website,

http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/A_test/01-

Chapter 3

operations, and, on the other, offering firms a means for advising governments of

unusual procurement approaches of which the company becomes aware.

237

Cradle-to-grave, or supply chain, security encourages firms to focus not only on their

own compliance, but on that of other entities with whom they do business, including

suppliers and downstream partners, as well as subsidiaries and affiliated and

unaffiliated distributors. One corporation, MKS Instruments, whose pressure

transducers are used to monitor the uranium enrichment process, learned of an alleged

diversion of these items to Iran, potentially involving an employee in a Chinese

subsidiary.

238

_{To avoid such challenges in the future, the company decided to tighten}

its supply chain and sell selected products directly to end-users and only to those that it

had certified through due diligence procedures as legitimate.

239

Although the above best practices are designed with the manufacturing sector in mind,

the banking community has formulated parallel guidelines, focused on complying with

a wide range of national and international sanctions regimes.

240

_{Indeed, in advanced}

industrial states, most firms are subject to a wide range of regulatory requirements, and

compliance with nonproliferation controls is a component of a broader compliance

effort. In some cases requirements for screening for proliferation relevant transactions

can be incorporated into preexisting screening efforts. In manufacturing, for example,

where the licensing to a variety of destinations of a range of commodities – including

nuclear-specific and dual-use commodities – has been required for many decades,

refinements in export control lists and additions to lists of banned end-users can be

easily incorporated into existing practices. Similarly, in the banking sector, the

screening of transactions for money laundering and terrorism financing has been

expanded to include screening for proliferation financing.

241

237

_{Germany and the United Kingdom are considered to have particularly effective information sharing}

arrangements. U.S. efforts may lag somewhat behind these because of corporate concerns that self-

reporting of possible violations will trigger penalties, despite cooperation with the government.

238

_{See “Pressure Transducers with Nuclear Applications to China and Elsewhere,” Justice Department}

In document Calidad de vida familiar en pacientes con discapacidad que acuden al servicio de trabajo social del Hospital de Rehabilitación del Callao, periodo 2018 (página 35-40)