Dimensiones y Medida del Clima Organizacional.

We have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter the images in mirrors. The phenomenon as such is obviously independent from any context of sign use. So the question arises whether – or in what respect – we can classify mirror images as perceptoid signs. Or put inversely: is the definition of pictures as “perceptoid signs” too narrow to include mirror images – and hence probably too narrow in general? How do we have to interprete “natural signs”, as mirror images are sometimes called together with object shadows (cf. Fig. 17), the red spots of measles, and the foot prints on a sandy beach? In fact, in a society of blind nobody would have the idea of associating the discourse about, e.g., the surface of a quite lake with the discussion on perceptoid signs: considered as a mere object without anybody (even potentially) perceiving it in the right modality of sense (i.e., visually), there is no reason to link a mirror with pictures, at all.

C. S. PEIRCE has introduced the semiotic distinction between “index”, “icon”, and

“symbol” that comes in handy for this discussion [PEIRCE 1931ff, 2.274]. An index is an

entity that may be used as a sign for something – the referent – due to its direct physical relation to that referent.Thus, we may use smoke as an indexical sign for fire – we keep

Figure 17: A Shadow in Hiroshima — August 6, 1945, 8:15 a.m.

Burn pattern on the steps of the Sumitomo bank building – the only indication a human life has left in the moment the human race demonstrated its power of ultimate self destruction

our focus of attention on that (assumed) fire by means of “showing to ourselves” the smoke we perceive alone. Analogously, a photograph may be conceived of as an index. Due to the causal relations – mediated by the light energy and the chemical reactions of the photosensitive emulsion – between a spatial scene and a photo thereof, a person can use the photo in a sign act to move the attention of somebody else to that spatial scene (or rather his/her attitude toward that scene).

Indexical signs cannot be used to refer to fictitious scenes – taking something as an indexical sign implies the reality of the referent. Nevertheless it is possible to lie with a photo [HGBRD 2000]: if the sender is aware of the photo not to be an index (e.g., being a photomontage) but leaves the recipient in believing it to be used as an indexical sign this sign act fulfills all criteria of a lie. That a photo can be used as an indexical sign and as a non-indexical sign for referring to the very same scene leads us to PEIRCE’s second

class: icons are objects that may be used as a sign for something motivated by the fact that they bear resemblance with the intended referent. In the case of a photo, such a vis- ual resemblance is usually assumed even in the case of massive alterations of the origi- nal index: then, a fictitious scene is assumed to look like that, and the photo may be used in a sign act to denote that fictitious scene. Films with naturalistically rendered computer graphics that place believably behaving dinosaurs together with real actors in the background of an exotic forest, which may or may not be a real landscape, give a perfect example of such an iconic sign of a visual fiction.

PEIRCE’s third class, symbols, are characterized by no such immediate relation be-

tween sign vehicle and sign object or sign content: it is the semiotic activity of the sign users in general that is responsible for that connection. Hence, symbols are called arbitrary. For indexical signs and iconic signs it is possible to understand them without learning – by spontaneously activating knowledge about causal relations or resemblance within the contextual semiotic activity: “this guy tries to tell me something (anything!) with that thing, which looks similar to / is causally linked to …”. No such spontaneous semiosis may take place for symbols without a prior introduction. The meaning of words, “human life” for example, must be taught; the significance of a date, e.g., “Au- gust 6, 1945”, must be explicitly communicated (as part of an already established com- plex cultural frame) before they can be used as symbols.

In the light of these distinctions, we can interpret mirror images as icons and as iconic indexical signs: the situation for the interpretation as an icon is given when we get a fright because taking erroneously our own mirror image – in the periphery of our field of sight, or when it’s a bit dark – for another person appearing there unexpectedly (PEIRCE’s “genuine icon” [PEIRCE 1931ff, 3.362]). If we realize a moment later what has

happened, the mirror image changes its character immediately and becomes for us an iconic indexical sign: we focus our own attention to our own visual appearance by means of something looking similar and being causally linked directly to that appear- ance.

Quite obviously, iconic signs and perceptoid signs are closely related, to say the least. Note, however, that the explanations of “perceptoid” make an explicit reference to the psychological background of resemblance as something derived in perception according to the principles of object constitution. Speaking of icons does not necessary imply such a complication: if it is possible or favorable to define similarity between objects per se, iconic signs become possible that need not “feel” (“look” etc.) similar to the referent scene, as long as the perception-independent relation of similarity holds as well (and is used as a motivation for preferring that particular vehicle in that sign act). It is however

quite dubious that such a concept of resemblance apart from psychology should not be considered as merely derived and usable only within very limited conditions.

In any case, the use of iconic and indexical signs depends on the sign users’ aware- ness of similarity or causal relation, which can be stabilized inter-individually only by means of symbolic communication. Without anchoring the language-mediated context of Figure 17, its iconic use remains ambiguous (“Is this meant as a human form or not?”), its indexical reference unclear (“where is this?” “who/what made that shadow- like spot?”). In order to provide a better understanding of how iconic (and indexical) sign uses depend on symbolically mediated frames of interpretations, the next section gives a coarse sketch of the complex inner structures of resemblance relations.