The Board reviewed the Underground Communications Systems that are in use at the WIPP and were used during the U/G fire of February 5, 2014. The following is a description of the systems in use.
The Central Monitoring System (CMS) is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system consisting of a mix of functional units communicating on a redundant network
throughout the facility on the surface and in the underground. The network is made up of optical fiber and the associated fiber distribution units, switches, etc. The functional units are LPUs, operator, server PCs, printers and uninterruptible power supplies.
The CMS is used for real-time site data acquisition, display, storage, alarming and for the control of site components. The CMS monitors process, environmental, electrical, mechanical,
radiation, and fire protection systems and provides manual and automatic control of underground ventilation, backup power, underground evacuation alarm automatic shift to filtration, and electrical distribution.
The CMR, located on the second floor of the Support Building, is the central location for
monitoring site data and conditions. It is the location of the primary man-machine interface with the CMS, Remote Fire Alarm Reporting (RFAR) station, a satellite weather service and a
commercial television weather station. The operator is in voice contact with the on-site and off- site activities via the dial phones, mine pager phones, public address and intercom system and two-way radio. The master control console for public address and evacuation alarm control is located in the CMR. Space, phones, and furniture are provided in the CMR for the activities of the Operations Assistance Team during emergency conditions.
The Dial Phones system is a private automatic telephone exchange for on-site and off-site telephone communications. Dial phones and other terminal devices are located throughout the site. The telephone switchgear, backup batteries and battery charger are located in the telephone hut (Building 468) near the Support Building. Telephone communications are carried off of the site by cable and a microwave system that are owned and operated by the telephone company. Mine pager phones is a network of independent, interconnected, self-contained, battery-powered paging phones used for two-way emergency and routine communication between the
underground and the surface. The mine phones are interconnected on a two wire system. Each phone includes a speaker for paging and a handset for initiating pages and for normal phone communication between one or more other mine pager phones on the system. The speaker signal and the handset signal are electronically amplified at each phone.
Plant PA and Alarm Systems includes the site-wide public address installations and a separate and additional underground evacuation alarm system (strobe lights). The public address system master control console is located in the CMR. Submaster paging stations are located in the support building, Waste Handling Building, water pump house, guard and security building, salt handling hoist house and head frame, exhaust filter building, safety and emergency services facility, engineering building, training building, warehouse/shops building, and underground. The Hoist Radio system is comprised of a wireless, medium frequency FM radio system that provides two-way voice communication between the hoist control room and the shaft
conveyance (cage) in the waste-handling and salt-handling shafts. Programmable logic controller and radio modems provide for control of the movement of the waste-handling shaft hoist from the cage for special activities such as shaft inspection and maintenance. The voice radio system uses the hoist rope as a signal path (antenna), and the radio modems use antennae mounted on the cage and at the hoist tower on the surface.
The WIPPnet wide area network provides inter-connectivity between the WIPP, the underground facilities, and in-town buildings. Fiber-optic cable provides connectivity between buildings and the Underground areas at the WIPP site. Microwave and fiber links established through
contracts with the local telephone provider provide connectivity between the WIPP site and the in-town network elements.
The EOC is the designated, centralized location from which the site emergency response organization evaluates, coordinates and manages response activities and communicates with DOE and other federal, state, and local organizations. The EOC is located on the site in the safety and emergency services facility. It contains communication devices that are a part of the Dial Phones, Plant PA and Alarm Systems, Mine Pager Phones, and Radio and other systems. The Board has reviewed documents and statements from the workers that specifically stated that they could not hear the yelps or see the strobe lights, and the messages on the pagers were muffled and could not be understood.
Analysis
The procedure to begin evacuation of the underground requires the CMRO to turn on the strobe lights and activate the yelp alarm. The yelp alarm was only activated for about three seconds
instead of the procedurally required five seconds. Within a few minutes of the yelp alarm, the CMRO was notified by one of the workers that the strobe lights were not activated. The CMRO immediately activated the strobe lights. The strobe lights are a critical piece of the
communication system in alerting the workers underground of an evacuation. Due to the heavy equipment operations and other activities, the audible alarm could not be heard by everyone underground. Most workers rely on the strobe lights for notification.
The FSM and the CMRO did not fully follow the procedures for response to the fire in the underground. This can be attributed to the complexity of the alarm and communication system, lack of effective drills and training, and additional burdens placed on the FSM due to the lack of a structured Incident Command System. Unreasonable expectations are placed on the FSM and CMRO in an emergency situation. Critical elements of the system should be evaluated and automated.
CON 16: There are elements of the CONOPS program that demonstrate a lack of rigor and
discipline commensurate with operation of a Hazard Category 2 Facility.
JON 25: NWP and CBFO need to evaluate and correct weaknesses in the CONOPS program
and its implementation, particularly with regard to flow-down of requirements from upper-tier documents, procedure content and compliance, and expert-based decision making.
CON 2: NWP management allows expert-based, rather than a process/systems-based approach
to decision making, e.g., shift to filtration during a fire, sheltering decisions, etc.
JON 3: NWP needs to evaluate and apply a process/systems based approach for decision
making relative to credible emergencies in the U/G, including formalizing response actions, e.g., decision to change to filtration mode during an ongoing evacuation.
CON 1: The FSM and Central Monitoring Room Operator (CMRO) did not fully follow the
procedures for response to a fire in the U/G. This can be attributed to the complexity of the alarm and communication system, lack of effective drills and training, and additional burdens placed on the FSM due to the lack of a structured Incident Command System (ICS).
JON 1: NWP needs to evaluate and correct deficiencies regarding the controls for
communicating emergencies to the underground, including the configuration and adequacy of equipment (alarms, strobes, and public address).
JON 2: NWP needs to evaluate the procedures and capabilities of the FSM and CMRO in
managing a broad range of emergency response events through a comprehensive drill and requalification program.