Long before September 11, it was widely known that the aviation security at American airports was lax. In 1993, a journalist, Roger Simon, reported
the story of various incidents from 1979 to 1993, proving that weapons and bombs could be smuggled on board a commercial aircraft. The most notable example of this was the December 7, 1987, incident in which a fi red airline employee at Los Angeles International Airport smuggled a gun aboard a com- mercial aircraft. He fi red the gun several times, killing the pilots and causing the plane to crash. 2 This incident led the FAA to require all airline employees
to go through metal detectors. 3 Despite strong opposition from both airline
and airport organizations over the requirement and the $169 million price tag, this requirement was in place by the early 1990s. 4 In 1993, an FAA re-
port concluded that airport security in the United States remained “seriously fl awed” and “still not adequate.” 5 It had not improved since the summary of
aviation security weaknesses given in a 1989 report:
Interrogation of passengers boarding international lights is erratic. Hand searches of carry-on bags are often cursory. It is not uncommon for checked luggage to slip on board without being X-rayed. The X-rays cannot detect plastic explosives used in the modern bomb. 6
The problem was that the situation had not improved signifi cantly by September 11, 2001. Technology to ferret out bombs had been improved by 2001, but the equipment necessary to do so had not been made available at all major airports, let alone smaller, local airports.
A rigorous security system had been opposed for decades by the Ameri- can aviation industry. The industry wanted as few impediments as possible to the cheap and effi cient movement of passengers. More rigid security cost money. Allied to the aviation industry was its regulatory agency—the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Instead of regulating the aviation industry, the leaders of the FAA had developed a casual, cozy relationship catering to the airline companies’ desire for profi t over security. The FAA’s leaders had taken the promotion of the commercial airline industry as more important than providing for security. This overemphasis was never offi cial, but over the course of time it developed.
Further, the airline industry appeared interested only in short-term, in- expensive solutions. Often, these were paper solutions. This defi ciency was noted by Brian Sullivan, a retired FAA special agent, in an e-mail to Michael Canavan, associate administrator of civil aviation security to FAA federal se- curity managers, on August 16, 2001:
Your intent was to work with the regulated parties and develop action plans to per- manently correct problems. Here’s what’s really happening. A problem is identifi ed. Instead of opening a case, we work with industry to develop the required plan. The agents go out and fi nd that the problem persists, but fi eld management won’t allow them to open a case, incorrectly citing your May 30th memorandum as the basis for their decision. As a result we have a paper fi x. Nice looking plans, but no real fi x. The façade of security continues. Our line agents continue to experience the frustration of not being allowed to do their jobs. 7
How the Hijackers on September 11 Approached American Aviation Security 79 To counter demands for improved aviation security, the airline industry maintained that the aviation security system before September 11, 2001, was working. Spokespersons pointed out in early 2001 that there had been no hijackings or bombings of American airliners in more than a decade. In their opinion, the current security system was operating well enough to prevent such happenings. Most FAA attention was directed toward the threat of hi- jackings and bombings on the international fl ights of foreign carriers.
Attempts to improve security were sometimes blocked. Logan Interna- tional Airport in Boston had one of the poorest aviation security records of any major airport in the nation. 8 It was notorious for failing to detect illegal
weapons and for the ease of access to so-called secure areas. Joseph Lawless, public safety director at Massport (the Massachusetts Port Authority), noted that terrorists were operating in the Boston area and there was a need to improve security at Logan International Airport in a memo dated April 27, 2001. 9 Efforts by Lawless and State Police Major John Kelly to test aviation
security at Logan International Airport in the summer of 2001 were opposed by the airlines and the FAA. The FAA’s position was that Massport lacked the “legal authority to conduct these tests.” 10 The FAA had conducted some test-
ing at Logan International Airport, but the test results had been kept secret between the FAA and the Airlines. 11 This policy of keeping aviation security
information from airport authorities was evidently universal throughout the United States.
Another roadblock to improvements in aviation security came from Con- gress. Efforts to implement the recommendations of the commission headed by Vice President Al Gore after the incident involving TWA Flight 800 had been blocked, but lobbyists for the aviation industry were effective in persuad- ing congressmen and congresswomen to encourage government agencies to aid the aviation industry. Just weeks before September 11, the Transportation Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing to castigate Norman Mineta, the transportation secretary, about the lack of federal action on delays experienced by passengers at airports. 12