For tour years from 1553 to 1556, northern Chekiang suffered repeatedly from pirate Invasions. Confined in the first year to sea borne raids on coastal settlements, by early 1554 the pirates had set up semi-permanent camps on the east coast of Sung-chiang and Chia-hsing prefectures from which they made raids on inland cities and towns. Until 1555 military resistance was ineffective, and the pirates continued to penetrate deeper and to grow in numbers. In that year pirate gangs were active in the vicinity of the great cities of Hangchow, Soochow and Nanking, and their raids on the north bank of the Yangtze forced the temporary discontinuation of grain transport along the Grand Canal. The pirate attacks reached a climax in 1556 when forces many
thousands strong made a co-ordinated invasion of the region between the Yangtze River and Hangchow Bay.
The response to the pirate invasions from all levels of government, including local administration, is reflected in the gazetteers of the period. After 1553 they show an interest in military affairs which had been almost entirely absent in the first half of the century. The Chia- hsing prefectural gazetteer of 1549 contains only the most casual and passing references to military affairs; not one chapter, nor section within a chapter, is specially devoted to military administration. The major interest of its compilers was the land equalization tax reform, with which the head compiler, the prefect Chao Ying, was closely connected.1 Yet six years later, the honorary editor-in-chief of the
1 Chia-hsing fu t*u chi 1549. Prefaces by Chao Ying and Chao Wen-hua. The two men were doctoral graduates of the same year. On Chao Ying's connection with taxation reform in Chia-hsing prefecture, see Mori Masao, "Juroku seiki Taiko shuhen chitai ni okeru kanden seido no
gazetteer, Chao Wen-hua, was touring the prefecture as Inspector of Armies in the south-east, discussing with provincial and local officials the deployment of troops and the building of fortifications. The
impact of the 1550s was reflected in the provincial gazetteer published in 1561 by the inclusion of four chapters on military administration and an emphasis on defence in other sections of the work.3
The escalation of piracy in the lower Yangtze region cast doubt on the ability of the Ming government to continue effective control of the region. The pirate invasions were like a sharp spear driven into the fat belly of the empire, making a deep and painful wound, with much blood. The invasions showed the central government that it was
seriously lacking in military strength in the south-east, and that in response the civil bureaucracy could be slow and ineffectual. But the wound was not fatal: the pirates were driven from the mainland of the delta in 1556 and from the surrounding seas in the following years. In the long-run the invasions demonstrated that within the mesh of social and governmental institutions that made up the Ming system of government was a degree of strength and flexibility capable of compensating for its weaknesses.
The Rise of Piracy
The pirate invasions of northern Chekiang were part of a wider unrest which had broken out along the south-eastern sea-board. The troubles in the south-east coincided with severe instability on the northern borders which in 1550 had brought the army of Altan Khan within bowshot of Peking. The northern borders claimed the court's attention before pirate raids reached crisis level in the south-east and continued
to hold higher priority because of their proximity to the capital and because the hard lessons of centuries had taught that the greatest danger to a Chinese dynasty lay on its inner Asian frontiers.
kaikaku" (Changes in the domain lands system in the Lake T ’ai area in the sixteenth century), Töyöshi kenkyit 21:445-7 (1963).
2 DMB:132-6, biography of Chao Wen-hua.
Che-ohiang V ung-ohih 1561. 3
These emergencies on China’s northern and south-eastern peripheries had evolved in intimate relationship with the policies and practices of the Ming government. In the south-east, weaknesses in the institutions and policies by which the central government sought to administer the advanced sectors of that region were essential elements in the emergence of the pirate phenomenon.
Piracy was endemic along the coast of China, fluctuating in range and intensity depending on the capability of the central government to police the coastline but never entirely eradicated. Piracy was a
corollary of a sea-connected economy and of officially regulated trade, and the pirate Invasions of the 1550s were linked with the development of a large-scale, illegal overseas trade.
From the first reign of the dynasty, trade with foreign merchants was restricted by law to official trade conducted through designated
ports in conjunction with the tribute system of government-to-government relations.'' At the same time private sea-going travel and trade were banned under provisions of the military law of the Ming code. The maritime inderdict (hai-chin) as these bans were collectively called remained law throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.5
Introduced for reasons of foreign policy and military security, rather than of economic regulation,6 the system of official trade did not satisfy the demands of foreign merchants for Chinese goods nor of Chinese who wished to trade with them. Moreover from the time of the removal of the capital to the north, the central government lost much of its interest in relations with its overseas neighbours and therefore in the operation of the trade. From the mid-fifteenth century onward, the opportunities offered by the official system for trade with Japan, for
y instance, were progressively narrowed.
4 For a history of the port offices (shih-po-ssu), see Wada Sei, Minshi
shokkashi yakuohit (Annotated Translation of the Treatise on Economic
Matters of the Ming History), Tokyo 1957, pp.890-908.
5 For a history of the overseas trade and the maritime interdict in Ming, see Bodo Wiethoff, Die Chinesische Seeverbotspolitik und der
private Überseehandel von 1368 bis 1567 (The Chinese maritime
interdict policy and private overseas trade 1368-1567), Hamburg 1963. 6 Wiethoff, Seeverbotspolitik, pp.46,50.
During the last half of the fifteenth century the maritime
interdict was gradually allowed to lapse and by about 1500 was virtually a dead letter.8 This and other manifestations of the court's declining interest in coastal affairs led to a corresponding loosening of control over the south-eastern provinces. Certain regional interests began to emerge and dominate long-term development on the coast. In this way the intentions of the central government's maritime interdict gradually gave way to regionally-based private trade.9
At all times throughout the dynasty large numbers of people on the south-eastern sea-board were looking for increased opportunities to trade. The people of the coastal prefectures of Fukien were heavily dependent on coastal trade for staple foods and for selling their market-oriented agricultural produce. The neighbouring provinces of Chekiang and Kwangtung were their major trading destinations. Large numbers of Fukien people traditionally had looked to "fields in the sea" for their livelihood, and as they prospered, so their numbers continued to grow. With no official system to accommodate the trade, and with geographical conditions favouring sea transport (as much as twenty times cheaper than overland transport), coastal trade flourished and within it, the Fukien people were the most active.10
The overseas trade was inextricably linked with the coastal trade. The demand for Chinese goods among foreign merchants steadily increased, and with it the profits which Chinese merchants could make. Foreign traders from Japan, South East Asia and later Portugal were prepared to