Debate also occurred on what shape the executive structure of the agency should take, for this had serious implications for ministry influence regarding its daily administration. At first a chairman- directors (kaicho-riji) format, similar to many existing statutory corporations, was considered, but it made a balance of representation difficult to achieve. The chairman would represent the controlling
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ministry (the MFA), while MITI and MAF interests would be given only directorships. To place both on an equal and elevated footing, the alternative of having a president and two vice-presidents emerged as the most appropriate and was incorporated in Article 8 of the bill. Settling on the number of directors, however, proved a more complicated problem. The large number of ministries and agencies which demanded a place meant that, instead of the usual three or four directorships for a statutory body, twelve were assigned to JICA.
Once these issues had been resolved within the Committee, the LDP's PARC Deliberation Commission considered the bill for approval
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before it went to Cabinet. At this opportunity, however, other ministries and their supporters in the Party forced changes in the
financing functions of the agency. There seems to have been a delay of a week over the timetable envisaged for the bill in late January. Nev/spapers on 27 January reported that the bill was drafted and would be approved by Cabinet on 8 February. While there was no mention of
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the "social development" aspects of JICA's work at this stage, however, 73
by 7 February they had been included.
Ministries with minor economic cooperation programs, excluded from the Hirai Committee - Construction, Transport, Posts and
Telegraphs, Welfare Ministries and the Science and Technology Agency - wanted to participate in the work of the agency but had to wait until this late period in drafting to put their view. Their arguments were about the sectors which the agency could finance, and about the meaning of "infrastructure" financing and the relation between it and lending to actual industries or projects. The LDP Deliberation Commission advanced the case, on behalf of the ministries, that "international cooperation" meant much more than assistance to infrastructure projects in agriculture, mining and industry. Consequently, the concept of
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"social development" was introduced in the body of the draft. There was insufficient time to resolve doubts about precise interpretation of
the concept, or to make substantial changes to the wording of the bill (such as in articles referring to jurisdictions), so JICA's confused functions stemmed partly from this late interference in decision-making already hurried and tense.
The relationship between agency financing and investment by private enterprise was also raised. The Hirai Committee had determined that, in principle, the agency would not finance projects where private firms were in a position to make a profit, and that projects undertaken on a largely private basis should be financed by other institutions, such as the Eximbank. JICA was to support projects, or areas of projects, with an extensive public or "social capital" content. This was neither entirely what the MAF had wished for, nor what Tanaka had envisaged.
In respect of private firms, however, the Law remained equivocal. The OECF and the EPA argued vigorously to ensure that JICA was prevented from financing foreign governments directly, so
that the OECF was not cut out of implementing future government loans, but no clause was placed in the bill to define who should receive agency funds. It was left to inter-ministry memoranda to stipulate
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that only Japanese companies could receive JICA loans, and therefore, while the aim of the original drafting committee was to avoid links between JICA and private enterprise, the agency was restricted to offering finance to Japanese companies or to persons engaged in
development projects overseas. Furthermore, no criteria were established to measure the public benefit of such projects. JICA operations were thus severely curtailed, in two ways. It could finance only "related facilities" or "experimental projects" (and needed associated OECF or Eximbank funding in the former) and had to depend on private enterprise
7 6 investment decisions before it could become involved in either.
In all, MAF, MITI and MFA conceptions of economic cooperation were not reconciled in JICA, and the effectiveness of JICA as a
financing agency rested primarily on the initiative of private businesses The scope of JICA operations was still unclear in 1976 and arguments between ministries over jurisdictions prevented the smooth implementation of agency programs, as we shall point out in detail in Chapter 5.
While, initially, political pressures forced a compromise in the budget context, further political interference in finalising the new agency's structure and responsibilities only complicated the agency's tasks.
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The Diet Debates
After five weeks of Committee bargaining, Cabinet ratified the JICA bill on 15 February 1974. It was presented to the Diet on 18 February, passed by the House of Representatives on 14 May after deliberations in the Foreign Affairs Committee, and by the House of Councillors on 27 May. It was promulgated as Law No. 62 of 31 May 1974.
By the time the bill reached the Diet, basic organisational 77
questions had been settled. The capital of the agency was set by Article 4 at ¥4 billion and, with the funds of those agencies taken over (the OTCA, the JEMIS and part of the JODC) added, initial capital totalled ¥22.4 billion. The budget for 1974, consisting of operational expenses and capital transferred from the 1974 budgets of the absorbed agencies plus a new budget for the agency, amounted to ¥27.37 billion. Staff were to number 900-1000, including 500 from the OTCA, 420 from the JEMIS and about 100 to be recruited from ministries to work in the new financing and survey departments.
The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Japan Communist Party (JCP) and Komeito all opposed the JICA bill, although their opposition never endangered its passage through the Diet. The objections were predictable: criticism of the overseas expansion of Japanese capital as represented by JICA and the neocolonialist nature of resources development projects. The Komeito differed slightly with its emphasis on human rights, which, it claimed, Japan's economic cooperation failed to protect. The
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) supported the bill.
While the debate on the bill was one of the most comprehensive on foreign aid held by the Japanese Diet, it excited no passions.
Nevertheless, some issues were discussed at length: the relationship between the new agency and the bill for an economic cooperation
minister; the control of the agency; resources development and development import; JICA and private firms; and the administration of Japanese aid as a whole. Much of the criticism of the agency and of
the proposed minister was levelled at the increased powers which could pass to the Prime Minister and arose from doubts about his personal
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motives. An LDP member, Ishii Hajime, alleged that agency supervision was too involved and that the new organisation would quickly lose its
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administrative efficiency. He considered that there were too many areas of joint control, too many directors and too many officials transferred from the ministries. One Komeito member, Watanabe Ichiro,
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even called JICA a "freak". Charges that employment conditions varied between sections of the staff were pertinent, for there had not been time for the drafting committee to sort out the details of combined ministerial control of the agency, let alone inconsistent staff
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