The central issue which this thesis seeks to address is the question of how relations of power between students and the state and, more generally, between the state and wider
society under the New Order shaped the politics of identity of Indonesian university students. In order to answer this question, the following section examines existing scholarly writing on the relationship between state and society in New Order Indonesia. It then examines the nature of opposition under the New Order. The final section surveys the relevant literature on the politics of language practices and suggests that the present study can contribute to filling a significant gap in this literature.
Following Hewison, Rodan and Robison’s definition, the terms ‘state’ and ‘New Order’ are used in this thesis to refer to the particular ‘amalgam of social, political, ideological and economic elements’ which existed under the thirty-two year rule of Indonesia’s second president, Suharto (1966-1998). These authors suggest that ‘the state is not so much a set of functions or a group of actors as an expression of power’ (Hewison, Rodan and Robison 1993, 4). Yet while the state itself is a rather abstract construct, it has a concrete form in the state apparatus, defined as ‘the real, existing institutional forms of state power, namely the coercive, judicial and bureaucratic arms of the state’ (ibid., 5).26 Thus, as Crouch points out, ‘the ministers, senior bureaucrats and military and police officers must be regarded as the key leaders of the state’ (Crouch 1998, 110).27 Since there is such a close link between the state and its apparatus, this thesis does not draw a sharp distinction between the two, with the term ‘state’ being used to refer to both the abstract construct as well as its more concrete forms. Yet it is important to recognise that neither the state nor the state apparatus are unified entities. As Joel Migdal suggests, different elements within the state may ‘pull in different directions’ such that ‘we cannot simply assume that as a whole [the state] acts in a rational and coherent fashion, or strategically follows a defined set of interests’ (cited in Crouch 1998, 109).
The state and its apparatus can be broadly differentiated from ‘society’. A useful entry- point into understanding the relationship between the state and society is the concept of civil society. Although it has been given a wide variety of meanings over its long history, Rodan suggests that the concept is most usefully defined as an ‘inherently political’ sphere between the state and the individual. Civil society is political, he
26
Regime, in contrast, refers to ‘a particular type of organisation of the state apparatus’ including liberal democracy, dictatorship and totalitarianism while ‘government’ refers to ‘the legislative and executive branches of the state apparatus’ (Hewison, Rodan and Robison 1993, 5).
27
Crouch also argues for the inclusion of ‘key ‘private’ individuals, groups or organisations outside the formal–legal state’ (1998, 110).
argues, because it is concerned with ‘advanc[ing] the interests of members through overt political action’ (Rodan 1996, 20 and 28; see also Aspinall 2002, 12-13). The groups which constituted civil society in New Order Indonesia encompassed a broad range of social and economic forces. Up to the late 1980s, students and intellectuals were the most active civil society groups. However, from this time, a variety of other actors, including journalists, non-government organisations, organised labour, political Islam and the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), began to play a more active role (Aspinall 1996; James 1990, 18).
However, Rodan argues that a sharp distinction between civil society and the state tends to neglect the interrelationship between the state and society (Rodan 1996, 23). In particular, he suggests, it largely ignores ‘the way in which societal forces have been incorporated or coopted into some sort of relationship with state structures’ (Rodan 1996, 23 and 25). State corporatism, in which functional and interest groups are given representation in the state, is one of the ways in which this occurs (Rodan 1996, 24, see also below).
As a result of this recognition, a number of scholars have advocated a ‘third realm’ where state and society interact. Huang, for example, suggests that in post- revolutionary China this third realm, which included judicial institutions as well as farmers’ cooperatives, was used by the state as a means of penetrating civil society (Rodan 1996, 26-7). In the context of New Order Indonesia, the concept of a ‘third realm’ provides a useful means of understanding some of the complexities of the state- society relationship. However, the emphasis on state utilisation of the ‘third realm’ to further its interests perhaps overlooks some of the ways that civil society can use this sphere to its own benefit (see Aspinall 1996, 215; see also below).
Observers of New Order Indonesia during the late 1970s and 1980s tended to characterise politics in terms of the increasing dominance of the state over society (Aspinall 2000, 29). Anderson, for example, suggests that ‘the New Order is best understood as the resurrection of the state and its triumph vis a vis society and nation’ (Anderson 1990a, 109). He takes an historical approach, suggesting that the particular form of the colonial state, the weakness of the state during the parliamentary democracy and Guided Democracy periods, and the form which the transition to the New Order took, shaped the way the New Order state developed. Taking a more structural
approach, Mackie and MacIntyre argue that the growth of a strong state during the New Order was the result of a number of interrelated factors including the dominance of the military in politics (at least until the mid 1980s), the strengthening of the bureaucracy and the calculated weakening of the political parties. The opportunities for patronage provided by the economic growth of the 1970s, and the increasing influence of business and conglomerates as a result of the economic deregulation of the 1980s were also significant. At the same time, the increasing restrictions placed on political participation by wider society brought about important shifts in state-society relations. The result was an increasing concentration of power at the highest levels and, in particular, in the person of the president (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 7-9; see also Crouch 1998, 100-108).
Analyses of New Order Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s drew attention to three main processes by which the state maintained its dominance over society. The first was the New Order’s vast network of patronage, which extended from the highest levels down to village elites. As James notes, those within this network were so well incorporated into it that they were often unable (or unwilling) to effectively challenge the state (James 1990, 18-19; see also Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 3 and 6-7; Crouch 1998, 101). A second process - repression - worked by silencing ‘those sections of society which [constituted] a potential or actual threat to the regime, but which [were unable to] be influenced by patronage’ (James 1990, 19; see also Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 1).28 The third process involved securing and maintaining both material and symbolic legitimation for the regime. The strong economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s meant that Indonesia’s middle class, often touted in the academic literature as the vanguard of reform, were prepared to tolerate the restriction of their civil liberties provided the New Order continued to deliver improvements to the material conditions of their lives (see Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 3). At the same time, the rigorous propaganda programs put in place during the late 1970s and 1980s, ensured that most Indonesians were well- versed in New Order ideology (see Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 25-7; Heryanto 1990a, 290-1; see also Bourchier 1996, chapter 8; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Mulder 2000).
28
For example, critical elements of the middle classes, including university students and religious leaders, were marginalised politically through, for example, the weakening of Muslim political organisations and the disbanding of student councils (James 1990, 19). Labels such as ekstrim kanan (extreme right) or
subversif (subversive) were also used to discredit these groups. Moreover, the vast internal security apparatus, which penetrated all regions and all levels of society, ensured an ever-present threat of violence, as did the not infrequent use of actual violence against dissenters.
Jackson’s and Robison’s analyses of the New Order provide two very different frameworks for understanding the dominance of state over society in the late 1970s. Using Riggs’ (1966) classic study of Thailand, Jackson (1978) characterises the New Order as a ‘bureaucratic polity’, which he defines as ‘a political system in which power and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of the state, particularly the officer corps and the highest levels of the bureaucracy’ (Jackson 1978, 3). However, as Mackie and MacIntyre note, the application of this label to New Order Indonesia tended to overstate the extent to which those outside the bureaucracy were excluded: at times, they argue, ‘elements outside the state structure have … been able to play roles of some importance in the political system’ (Mackie and MacIntyre 1993, 6).
A second framework was Richard Robison’s class analysis of the ‘military-bureaucratic state’ (Robison 1978, 1986). Robison suggests that it was the growth of capitalism in Indonesia from the late 1960s onwards, rather than any other factors, that led to the particular form of the New Order state (1978, 17). He argues that power relations in the New Order state were centred on the competition between the Muslim merchant class, foreign and Chinese business interests, military bureaucrats and a coalition of state bureaucrats, intellectuals and students (Robison 1978, 17-18). He suggests that the opportunities for patronage provided by the development of bureaucratic capitalism during the 1970s enabled the military bureaucrats to triumph although not without some conflict (Robison 1978, 37). Opposition to the regime during this period largely emanated from the Muslim merchant class who were disadvantaged by the emergence of bureaucratic capitalism, or from students and intellectuals, who objected to the large- scale foreign investment and corruption not only on moral grounds but also because the system offered them few meaningful roles (Robison 1978, 37-9).
Students and intellectuals had been key elements of the broad coalition which supported the New Order in its early years. However, from the early 1970s, this coalition began to break down and the New Order began to take an increasingly intolerant attitude to criticism (Aspinall 1996, 216-7). From this time, the state also began to put in place a corporatist strategy of political representation, ‘simplifying’ the political parties, creating a party of functional groups (Golongan Karya, Golkar) and functional representative bodies for youth, farmers, fishers and workers. It also began to promote more vigorously the ideology of the ‘organic state’.
The idea of the ‘organic state’ has a long history in Indonesia and its application by the New Order was by no means new: during the early Guided Democracy period, for example, Sukarno had advocated a corporatist model for state-society relations (see Bourchier 1996, 11; Reeve 1985). However, it was the New Order state, under the guidance of its chief ideologue Ali Moertopo, which institutionalised the organic state concept.
Indonesian ideologues claimed that the organicist model was an authentically ‘Indonesian’ framework for state-society relations. They rejected individualistic, Western models such as parliamentary democracy which, it was stressed, were incompatible with Indonesian political culture. The model of the organic state they offered emphasised harmony and consensus in decision-making. The state was represented as a family, headed by a paternal figure (Bourchier 1996, 2). Since society was an integrated or ‘organic’ whole in which each group had a specific role to play, social and political organisation was to be based on functional groups rather than competing interests (ibid., 2 and 6; Robison 1993, 45). The role of the state in this model was to articulate and embody the common interests of society and there was to be no distinction (at least in theory) between the state and society (Bourchier 1996, 2 and 7; Robison 1993, 43). Opposition to the state was thus both contrary to the common interest and ‘un-Indonesian’ (Bourchier 1996, 2).
Yet as Bourchier points out, the organic state was an ideal, rather than a political reality (ibid, 10). Moreover, the New Order’s organicist ideology did not develop in a systematic or consistent way but rather as a response to the periodic challenges that the state faced from various social forces (ibid, 12). He suggests that:
The intense and continuing efforts on the part of the government to stress the harmonious nature of Indonesian society and of state-society relations stem[med] from a deep fear of explosive communal conflict and social upheaval, much of it a result of its own political and economic policies (ibid, 10).
The student demonstrations of the 1970s were, as Bourchier points out, one of several factors which led to the introduction in 1978 of a wide ranging program of ideological indoctrination based on organicist principles (ibid, 301).
In the late 1980s, and coinciding with the period of ‘openness’ (keterbukaan), more serious challenges to the organicist model emerged. These challenges were the result of structural changes in Indonesian society brought about by the sustained economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s and the changing nature of Indonesian capitalism (ibid, 303; Aspinall 1996, 215). Bourchier suggests that the growth of a new, more politically aware middle class and the emergence of organised labour led to increased pressure for more meaningful political participation (ibid., 12-13 and 302-3). At the same time, the deregulation of the economy and the increasingly global nature of business led to demands for more transparency and legal certainty.