Discourse strategies in L1 vs EMI university lectures

The spaces around us everywhere, from the spaces in which we take shelter to those which we cut across and travel through, are part of our everyday social reality. Our spatial behaviour, which is defined by and defines the spaces around us, is an integral part of our social existence. As such, we understand space and spatial relations in the same way that we understand the other component parts of our social life. The facts about the world, John Searle (1995) argues, can be divided into two categories. The first category is what he calls ‘institutional facts’, facts that only exist by human agreement, because we believe them to exist. The second category is that of ‘brute facts’, those that exist independent of human institutions. Most elements of the social world belong to the first category, from money to marriage, property and government. The fact that a piece of paper has a value of, for example, five pounds is a social fact. Without our institutionalized agreement, it is no more than just a piece of paper. The brute fact about the space of our cities, therefore, is that it is a collection of objects and people on the surface of the earth. The social fact about the cities, however, is that these objects and their relationships have been created by human agreement and bear particular significance and meaning for people. The sheer physical presence of roads, schools, and houses does not render them meaningful. It is the collective intentionality, the capacity of humans to assign functions, to symbolize these objects beyond their basic presence that makes them part of the social reality.

The significance of symbolism in the construction of social reality, however, shows how there can be more than one interpretation for the social facts. As one of the most important dimensions of our social world, space finds different interpretations and meanings. As different groups give different meanings to space, it becomes a multi-layered place, reflecting the way places are socially constructed (Knox, 1995).

The various perspectives on space can be classified as those looking from inside, i.e.

the subjective views from the first person’s point of view, and those looking from outside, i.e. the third person’s external view. What is a home for one person, becomes a mere object for another. What is for one person a refreshing experience of feeling in touch with nature becomes for another party just a person walking past in the park. What is a rich web of emotions and attachments to places of a town for one person becomes a set of statistics on pedestrian behaviour for another. The diversity of views that can be found in the everyday experiences is also traceable in the academic studies of, and professional approaches to, space. The question always is how to approach this multiplicity. Is there a single correct interpretation of space and place? Or does this multiplicity of views mean that we should give in to a kind of relativism, where all interpretations are correct as they each represent a particular, equally valid perspective?

The perspective of phenomenology concentrates on the world as seen and narrated from the viewpoint of individuals. The problem it has to deal with is how human beings, who are therefore limited to their own experience of the world, can relate to each other.

Here the question of public sphere finds a central place, as it is where interpersonal relations are played out. How these individuals make sense of each other and how they can relate to one another is at the heart of social life. The meeting of different subjectivities results in a social world in which meaning is constructed through intersubjective relationships.

Public space allows us to experience other people’s presence and get to know their viewpoint, which is an essential ingredient of living in human societies. It is impossible for me to see the world entirely from the viewpoint of another person and I am not able to enter the private realm of strangers and experience life from their perspective. I can, however, albeit in a narrow sense, have the same perspective as they might have in public space. I can stand where they stood and experience common space from the same perspective, even though my experience may be completely different. I may not be allowed to look out to the city from inside the walls of a gated neighbourhood, from the exclusive balcony of a luxury private residence, from behind suburban net curtains, or from the broken glass of a run down apartment, as these are private spheres of strangers.

But if we are all present in the same space, I will be able to share the same street corner with the residents of these four private realms, looking at the city from the same angle.

The space we share, therefore, allows us to share an experience of the world around us (Figure 6.1). This is, however, temporary and limited. For a homeless person who lives in the public space, all experience is inevitably shared with others, as a private space does not exist.

This may appear to be a mere visual experience of looking onto the same physical reality from the same vantage point. It is, in fact, part of a multi-layered experience of the presence of others. According to Alfred Schutz, when we, for example, listen to someone

6.1 Looking onto the same physical reality and co-presence in public space allow us to share an experience of the world around us with each other and with previous generations (Stockholm, Sweden)

speaking, we catch the Other’s thought in its vivid presence. Schutz uses this notion to develop a general theory of alter ego, where he defines alter ego as ‘that subjective stream of consciousness whose activities I can seize in their present by my own simultaneous activities’ (Schutz, 1962:174). This means that I can understand how this stream of thought has the same fundamental structure as my own consciousness and how far the Other is like me. Sharing a present, which is common to both of us, can construct a ‘pure sphere of the “We”’ (Schutz, 1962:175).

Public space is not only a site for intersubjective presence, where space allows simultaneity. It is also a place where we can share experience with past generations, who could have stood on the same street corner and looked onto a physical reality that had some commonality with ours. The same may apply to future generations, who may have a similar experience mediated through spatial and institutional continuity. Presence in a common space, therefore, can cross time and relate to other generations before and after us. Spatial presence can be a clue to an understanding of temporal presence, albeit limited and thoroughly mediated.

This line of analysis clearly draws on Nietzsche’s perspectivism, on Husserl’s phenomenology, and on Heidegger’s analysis of Being. The question that needs

addressing is: how is it possible to go beyond the perspectives through which we observe and understand the world? Can presence in a common world be enough to bridge these subjectivities?