The Balkans are largely a ‘non-issue’ in France, with little strategic effort invested in pursuing a coherent policy towards the region. Media coverage is low and the French public can be called disinterested at best, if not openly hostile. The scarce attention France grants to the region is explained by the limited objective importance of the Balkans to France, be it in terms of economic relations or the possible migratory impact of accession. Stabilisation as one of the key justifications for the integration of the Balkans is largely viewed as a ‘mission accomplished’, leaving the Balkans very low on France’s priority list.
5.4.1 Balkans under the radar
External observers tend to agree that the Balkan region is not a strategic priority for France. Even inside the institutions, it is not unusual to hear that the region has “no strategic role” and is of “no vital interest” to France. The country has diplomatic representations in each of Balkan states; however, diplomatic postings to the region are not held in high regard. Moreover, France’s cultural presence is being reduced as its interest in the region dwindles. In 2013, the then French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in a letter to President François Hollande justified the decision to close the three French cultural centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the need to give up “diplomatic antennas in countries where our interests are non-existent”.101 One of the reasons for this absence of interest is the small size of the
Yugoslav diaspora in France. Estimated at a mere 250,000, with Serbs forming the largest group at 120,000102, these expatriates cannot build up the same political pressure as the larger communities in
other member states. Beyond public conferences held on the occasion of formal visits by Balkan policymakers, the level of attention given to the region is limited, be it in academic or policy circles. Balkan specialists in think tanks typically cover a broader region, such as Eastern Europe or the EU’s neighbourhood, or act as experts for other think tanks as well.
The lack of salience of the enlargement dossier is also reflected in the allocation of human resources. Following the economic crisis, several ministries cut down the number of contractual staff, leaving less people in charge of broader areas. The Balkans is one of the regions particularly affected by these measures, with the Ministry of Defence, for instance, going from three full-time analysts in charge of the Balkans a decade ago to only a single person on a part-time contract today. More anecdotally, as of September 2014, the latest update on the website of the French Permanent Representation
100 Assemblée Nationale, Secrétariat de la Commission des affaires européennes, Communication sur les Balkans et sur la
mission franco-allemande à Belgrade Mme la Présidente Danielle Auroi et de Mm. Christophe Caresche et Michel Herbillon, 5 June 2013, pp. 4-5.
101 “En Bosnie-Herzégovine, selon Fabius, les intérêts de la France sont inexistants”, Courrier des Balkans, 6 September 2013,
available at: http://balkans.courriers.info/article23144.html (last accessed on: 3 September 2014).
102 “Dijaspora može da promeni Srbiju”, Politika, 29 December 2013, available at: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Tema-
regarding the EU’s enlargement policy is dated 25 January 2013, with Croatia still presented as a member-to-be.103
5.4.2 Between indifference and opposition: media and public opinion
European issues feature regularly in the French media but are discussed mostly from a national perspective, focusing on the impact of European events or decisions on France. Coverage of the Balkan region is marginal at best, with the dominant topics being those of delinquency and immigration. Other triggers of media attention are official visits of French ministers to the region or of Balkan leaders to France, with the tone remaining factual and the treatment superficial. The entry of Croatia yielded a number of informative articles presenting the country to the French audience; however, attention quickly subsided. None of the French media have permanent correspondents in the Balkan region, and the only serious source of information for French-speaking readers is the Courrier des Balkans, a specialised online outlet that offers translations of articles from Balkan media alongside its own contributions, and regularly runs into funding difficulties.
The absence of public debate on the Balkans’ accession is lamented by some officials, while others fear a potential for polemic and therefore welcome the fact that ongoing membership negotiations with countries of the region pass under the radar of public attention. The most recent Eurobarometer survey shows a strong scepticism towards further EU enlargement in France: second only to Germany, a mere 23% of French respondents declare themselves in favour of the admission of new members, with 69% explicitly against.104 This is a marked decrease in comparison to the survey conducted just
after the entry of the ten new countries in May 2004, when already only a minority of 39% of French respondents supported further enlargement.105
5.4.3 Limited impact, limited interest
There is a general understanding in France that while no major negative effects can be expected from the Balkans’ EU membership, their accession would not bring many tangible benefits either. Where enlargement has triggered emotional reactions in the past, namely in terms of its economic impact, the accession of the Balkans would affect France only marginally. EU expansion to the east is in fact often equated with growing domestic unemployment and the delocalisation of French firms to more competitive regions. However, already in the case of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) enlargement, this widespread perception did not hold up in reality. A study conducted for the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) showed that only 4.2% of French firms moved abroad any kind of activity in the period of 2009 to 2011. Whereas the majority – 55% – of these delocalisations did concern a transfer within the European Union, only 22% of firms chose to relocate in one of the ten new member states, with 38% preferring a country belonging to the EU- 15.106 Given the small size of the Balkan economies, it can be assumed that the extent of delocalisations
following their EU accession would be very limited.
The same goes for the more immediate economic effect of the Balkans accession: the region’s role in the internal market is already extremely constrained; in addition, France’s bilateral economic relations with the Balkans are weak in comparison to the involvement of other EU member states. While Serbia
103 “L’élargissement de l’Union européenne”, Réprésentation permanente auprès de l’Union européenne, available at:
http://www.rpfrance.eu/L-elargissement-de-l-Union (last accessed on: 25 September 2014).
104 Standard Eurobarometer 81, Spring 2014, p. 66. 105 Standard Eurobarometer 62, December 2004, p. 153.
106 Fontagné, Lionel and D’Isanto, Aurélien (2013), “Chaînes d’activité mondiales: Des délocalisations d’abord vers l’Union
represents France’s main trade partner in the region, accounting for 47% of France’s exports to the Balkans and 43% of its imports from there, France only ranks as Serbia’s 10th biggest supplier with a
market share of 2%, and is only its 12th most important client.107
Fear of work migration, which was very acute in the case of the CEE accession, is not an issue in the discussions about the Balkans, be it within the institutions or in public perception. Trade unions and business associations are focused on Turkey when they worry about their competitiveness, while the Balkans are not considered a threat. Finally, whereas the immigration of Roma was discussed polemically, it is essentially linked to Bulgaria and Romania.
The aim of stabilising the previously war-torn region is only very marginally present in the French narrative on Balkans accession. While France remains involved in the various military and civilian missions throughout the region, with a leadership role in Kosovo, the country’s engagement is rapidly declining. France has terminated its involvement in KFOR (the Kosovo Force) in February 2014108, while
the country’s significant involvement via EUFOR (European Union Force) Althea missions to Bosnia has lessened considerably.
5.5 CONCLUSION
As one of the founding member states, France remains attached to the view of Europe as a community of values and a vehicle to strengthening France’s voice on the international scene. It is reluctant to accept its declining relative importance as the number of member states grows, and sees an emphasis on conditionality as a means to ensure coherence within the Union and to avoid ‘overstretching’. While the country’s stance on the accession of the Balkans is positive, its support is perfunctory and does not go significantly beyond the rhetorical level. The economic and immigration implications for France of an eventual Balkans accession are limited, explaining the reduced interest in the region.
When it comes to the nationalisation of enlargement policy, there is a feeling in France that the approval of new member states has always been a national competence, and that member states with their recent greater involvement in questions of accession are merely taking back prerogatives they have always had. Still, there is a recognition that the varying priorities of different member countries make the overall enlargement process less flexible, with member states now seeking to shape the content rather than just the outcome of accession negotiations. The new approach is seen as a sign of the return of enlargement under the member states’ control.
Overall, despite its clear stance on enlargement, France is no major player in the EU when it comes to defining the Union’s long-term approach towards the Balkans. Instead, the country tends to align itself with Germany’s positions on the dossier, stepping forward only in the case of divergences, such as the question of the opening of Serbian membership negotiations. Expertise and human resources dealing with the Balkans are limited both within and outside the French institutions, reflecting a lack of national strategic interest in the region. The awareness that no enlargement will take place in the
107 France Diplomatie (2014), “La France et la République de Serbie: Relations économiques”, available at:
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/serbie/la-france-et-la-republique-de-1127/ (last accessed on: 6 October 2014).
108 “Défense: la France retire ses troupes du Kosovo”, Le Parisien, 6 February 2014, available at:
http://www.leparisien.fr/international/defense-la-france-retire-ses-troupes-du-kosovo-06-02-2014-3566499.php (last accessed on: 8 October 2014).
coming years confirms France in its perception that there is no need for any particular investment in the Balkans. Over the next years, France is therefore likely to keep a low profile, neither supporting enlargement too vocally nor actively hindering an advancement towards the eventual membership of the Balkan countries.