The attacks of 11 September 2001 triggered changes in how the public, government officials, and political leaders in America think and talk about terrorism, discussed here as the social construction of terrorism.3 These changes include: the
framing of a war on terror as the most appropriate response; the focus on an amorphous and aggregated Islamic enemy; the presumption that this terrorist enemy primarily targets the United States, threatening especially devastating attacks; and, the intensity of related moral judgments. In turn this altered the frames of references, constraints on what was and was not appropriate to consider, and presumptions for decision-making.4 Much of this occurred without debate or conscious consideration through a complex dialectic process between political elites, more attentive members of the public, and the general public at large. At first the emotional response and unfolding drama of the attacks themselves and fears about what was coming next largely drove the evolution in thinking. Over time, the strategic narrative employed by political leaders and the
resulting policy choices – reacting to the same influences and constrained by the public
3 The classic works on social construction include: Berger and Luckmann, 1966, The
Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, First Anchor Books Edition, 1967 ed, New York, Anchor Books. Searle, 1995, The Construction of Social Reality, New York, The Free Press. Other works specifically focused on the social construction of terrorism: Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism. Tuman,
Communicating Terror. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism.
4 The perspective of my analysis builds on a constructivist approach as describe by
Wendt where, “the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by … shared ideas rather than given by nature” and “foreign policy behavior is often
determined primarily by domestic politics, the analogue to individual personality, rather than by the international system.” Wendt, 1999, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1-2.
mood – further shaped this transformation. Intermixed, the news and entertainment media reflected and reinforced as well as nudged and focused the new thinking.
Creating the Post 9/11 Construction and Strategic Narrative
How the public thinks and talks about terrorism plays a significant role in influencing and constraining the selection, formation, implementation, and analysis of national policy and strategy. As an interactively produced and complex construct, with emotional and rational dimensions, as well as a variety of positively and negatively associated concepts, how the public thinks about terrorism is not easily determined through opinion polls or surveys. Instead, following a methodology established by constructivist academic works, I argue the public’s understanding can be evaluated as it is reflected in the statements of political leaders, government officials, opinion makers, and other members of the public who are highly involved in or attentive to political and security issues as well as through the related content of news and entertainment media.5 At the same time all of these actors also play a significant interactive role in the creation and shaping of the larger public’s understanding, confounding the separation of
reflection from catalyst and instigator.6
The strategic narrative for the war on terrorism advanced by the Bush
administration after 9/11 not only guided decision making and policy implementation for the vast national security apparatus directly under the President’s command, but also
5 The assumption of my approach is that the success of each of these actors to a
significant degree is dependent upon their ability to align themselves with the general opinion and attitudes of the larger public or the respective sub-groups they represent. Using the same or similar approaches: Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 9-10. Sobel, 2001, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus, 12-4. Vlahos, 2006, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat," National Interest online (September 5), http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11982. Further, I principally focus on the public statements of senior political leaders arguing that these are more important for shaping U.S. strategic narrative for the war on terror than possible private beliefs or rarely read strategic documents that have been stripped of emotive language. As Marc Lynch argues, “The methodological argument encoded in this book is that what people say in public matters more for shaping political identities and strategies than their private beliefs or internal deliberations.” Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 27, 72.
6 Fortunately, the focus of this thesis is on examining the adverse effects of the
construction, rather than determining the degree to which each actor was separately responsible for which changes.
played a central role in shaping the public’s understanding of terrorism, the threat faced, and how best to respond. Freedman explains that strategic narratives in this context are “compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which
inferences can be drawn.” 7 He observes that these narratives are strategic in that “they do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current.”8 These narratives evolve from the rhetorical framing policy leaders use to describe a threat and justify a related cluster of responses as well as the significant actions they take which have their own performative aspects. Arquilla and Ronfeldt explain that “stories communicate a sense of cause, purpose, and mission” and “express aims and methods as well as cultural dispositions – what ‘we’ believe in, and what we mean to do, and how.”9 Social movement theory approaches narratives from the perspective of examining framing processes and the formation of shared meaning built on language and symbolism that resonates with particular
audiences to drive mobilization.10 In a similar manner Vlahos stresses the importance of strategic narratives in the context of national security for compelling subsequent action:
In war, narrative is much more than just a story. Narrative may sound like a fancy literary word, but it is actually the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else – policy, rhetoric, and action – is built. War narratives need to be
identified and critically examined on their own terms, for they can illuminate the inner nature of the war itself.11
7 Freedman, 2006, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, The International Institute
for Strategic Affairs, 22. Arquilla and Ronfeldt similarly write: “[S]tories communicate a sense of cause, purpose, and mission. They express aims and methods as well as cultural dispositions – what “we” believe in, and what we mean to do, and how.” Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND Corporation, 328.
8 Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 22. 9 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 328.
10 Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization.".
Snow and Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.". Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation." McAdam et al, as quoted in Chapter Two, define framing processes as, “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, "Introduction," 5-6. Echoing social movement language, Freedman writes, “Narratives are about the ways that issues are framed and responses suggested.” Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 23.
11 Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and
He further explains that the strategic narrative becomes an “organizing framework for policy” which makes specific important assumptions “appear to be self-evident and undeniable,” in turn constraining the ability to criticize the resulting policy choices and serving as a guide for how “the war is to be argued and described.”12 As Freedman cautions, strategic narratives “are not necessarily analytical” and “may rely on appeals to emotion, or on suspect metaphors and dubious historical analogies.”13 Given its privileged position and powerful public advocates, when successful a strategic narrative exercises significant influence on the overall public construction of a threat. Because this narrative and the larger construction play a considerable role in public rhetoric as well as how strategies are pursued and individual actions carried out by actors at all levels of implementation they exercise significant influence on the pursuit of population-centric strategies. Freedman remarks that the importance of strategic narratives “is implied with every reference to a battle for ‘hearts and minds’,”14 recognizing that the overarching narrative establishes the framework for how a
government engages in the war of ideas and shapes the individual messages and actions involved in the framing competitions driving contested mobilization.15
Focusing on the Bush Administrationʼs Strategic Narrative for the War on Terror
In order to analyze how the American public came to understand the terrorist threat following 9/11 this chapter gives the most weight to exploring the strategic narrative employed by President Bush and leading members of his team responsible for
12 Ibid. See also: Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 328. Barry and Elmes,
1997, "Strategy Retold: Towards a Narrative View of Strategic Discourse," Academy of Management Review 22 (2). Casebeer and Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism.". Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 22-3.
13 Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 23. 14 Ibid., 24.
15 The new U.S. Guide to Counterinsurgency recognizes the importance of this: “The
influence strategy must cascade down from a set of strategic narratives from which all messages and actions should be derived. The narratives of the affected government and supporting nations will be different but complimentary. Messages and actions must address ideological, social, cultural, political, and religious motivations that influence or engender a sense of common interest and identity among the affected population and international stakeholders. They should also counter insurgents’ ideology in order to undermine their motivation and deny them popular support and sanctuary (both physical and virtual). In doing so, counterinsurgents should seek to expose the tensions in
motivation (between different ideologies or between ideology and self-interest) that exist across insurgent networks.” "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," 20.
policy related to terrorism and national security. As the elected executive, directly responsible for the national response, the Bush administration was central to shaping the evolving construction through official statements and actions. Given the realities of partisan politics and political benefits stemming from broader public approval, they were also very attentive to the national mood. The success of the administration in this regard is supported by consistently high approval ratings with respect to the handling of terrorism,16 victories in the 2002 and 2004 elections as well as on related legislative issues,17 and the observation that their principle partisan opponents largely echoed or
made similar statements when talking about terrorism.18 Focusing on the Bush
administration’s strategic narrative further enables this chapter to examine how the problems discussed directly undermined hearts and minds goals and the pursuit of a population-centric approach given that this narrative represents President Bush’s
16 I conducted a simple statistical analysis for this thesis finding that President Bush
consistently has been rated significantly higher for his handling of terrorism than his overall job approval rating. Details of this analysis are in the following paragraph and related footnotes.
17 Republican gains in the 2002 mid-term election ran against historical trends: “[T]he
President’s party had lost House seats in 32 of 33 midterms from 1866 to 1994.” Campbell, 2003, "The 2002 Midterm Election: A Typical or an Atypical Midterm?,"
PS: Political Science and Politics 36 (2), April.
18 For example, during the 2004 presidential campaign, a Washington Times article
described Democratic nominee John Kerry’s rhetoric related to the war on terror writing, “But in speeches so far, the Massachusetts Democrat sounds like President Bush when discussing his strategy for the war on terrorism and a military of the future. Mr. Kerry even attempts to sound tougher than the hawkish president.” "Clinton's Team Aids Kerry on Military," 2004, The Washington Times, June 3,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/jun/03/20040603-122407-4374r/. Jim Geraghty similarly reported, “But Kerry's policy addresses have generated zero buzz and garnered little beyond perfunctory news coverage, mostly because they're so vague as to be indistinguishable from Bush policies, or propose only minor changes from current actions… The end result is that Kerry has ended up selling himself as what John Hillen, director of the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, calls, ‘Bush Lite...a set of light, stylistic differences.’” Geraghty, 2004, "Me Too, Me Too!," National Review Online (June 3),
http://www.nationalreview.com/kerry/kerry200406030901.asp. See also: Navarrette, 2004, "Kerry's Dillemma: Criticizing a War He Helped Start," The Seattle Times, June 2,
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20040602&slug=navarrette 02. Sanger and Wilgoren, 2004, "Kerry Says War in Iraq has Allowed Bigger Threats to Grow," San Francisco Chronicle, May 30, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
priorities, policy choices, and public rhetoric while serving as guidance to key members of his national security team.
The methodological approach of this chapter for studying the public’s social construction of terrorism posits that the complex nature of this construct can be understood to a significant degree by examining it through the reflection found in the public statements of opinion leaders. In order to empirically test confidence in the assessment that the Bush administration’s rhetorical framing of terrorism after 9/11 accurately represented how the larger public came to think about terrorism during this time I conducted a simple statistical analysis comparing President Bush’s overall job approval rating to public approval for his handling of terrorism. I examined six years of data from two different national polling firms using 111 surveys where both questions were asked in the same survey and with the questions remaining consistent over the full time period for longitudinal comparisons.19 Suggesting that the public particularly identified with his approach to terrorism, as opposed to simply having a favourable or unfavourable opinion of his performance in general, approval for President Bush’s handling of terrorism was usually significantly higher – and never lower – than his overall job approval.20 Further, comparing fluctuations between the two questions demonstrates that increases in the relatively higher approval for his handling of terrorism came at times corresponding to periods where he focused on terrorism in repeated public statements.21
19 This analysis was based on six years of CBS News/New York Times data (77 polls
from November 2001 to October 2007, 26 of which included their specific terrorism question) and three and a half years of USA Today/Gallup Poll data (38 polls from January 2003 to May 2007 all of which included both their general and terrorism approval questions). Archival polling data available on the PollingReport.com website.
20 Approval of President Bush’s handling of terrorism was never lower in either poll
than his overall approval rating, in the CBS/NYT Poll approval of his handling of terrorism averaged 15.8 percentage points higher than his overall favourability rating and in the USA/Gallup Poll the net difference averaged 9.0 points. In both polls
President Bush had a generally net positive post-9/11 overall approval rating into 2005, with some exceptions during the 2004 Presidential election in the CBS/NYT poll. Both polls also only begin to show regular net negative ratings of his handling of terrorism from mid-2006 on, and then by only an average of 2 points over the last year of available USA/Gallup data (through 6 May 2007) and an average of 9 points over the last year of available CBS/NYT data (through 16 October 2007).
21 For example, and of significant note to the analysis of speeches later in this chapter,
In order to examine the Bush administration’s strategic narrative I focus in this chapter on the public statements made by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice.22 This chapter includes specific reference to 63 different speeches given over seven years after reviewing the complete set of official transcripts for those officials published during the Bush administration by the White House, Department of Defense, and Department of State for references to or discussions of the war on terror. My analysis of those statements in conjunction with other texts representing or giving insight into the larger public construction looked for recurring themes, how arguments developed over time, indications of how the resulting narrative was enforced and employed, and how the core elements of the administration’s strategic narrative were represented in the public discourse of other opinion leaders, experts, and the news and entertainment media.
net positive ratings for President Bush’s handling of terrorism (an average of +6.6 in the CBS/NYT polls, and +4.5 in the USA/Gallup polls). This is important as it was during this time that President Bush made several public speeches specifically focused on the war on terror and threat of terrorism that are included in the analysis of this thesis. It is likely that to some degree the positive reaction shown in these polls is indicative that these speeches (and related messaging efforts) were consistent with and positively received by the general public. During the same period of time his overall favourability or approval ratings in these polls changed much less. Further, while earlier increases in his approval ratings correlated with general success by the Republican Party, in the fall of 2006 while approval of President Bush’s handling of terrorism went up at a time when he gave several highly publicized speeches on the topic, the Democratic Party achieved significant mit-term election victories capturing control of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.
22 Vlahos’s analysis of strategic narratives in the post-9/11 war on terror similarly
focuses on the public statements of political leaders. Vlahos, "The Long War: A Self- Fulfilling prophecy of Protracted Conflict – and Defeat." The principle public national security documents were also part of this analysis, and are not inconsistent with the discussion in this chapter, but their influence on the public construction is insignificant given how infrequently they are referenced. "National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism.". "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.". "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," 2002, Washington, DC: The White House, September, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." As Marc Lynch argues, “The methodological argument encoded in this book is that what people say in public matters more for shaping political identities and strategies than their private beliefs or internal deliberations.” Lynch,
Voices of the New Arab Public, 27, 72. Arquilla and Ronfeldt similarly distinguish