5-45. Even in fluid situations, attacks are best organized and coordinated in assembly areas. If the commander decides t h a t rapid action is essential to re- tain a tactical advantage, he may opt not to use an assembly area. Detailed advance planning—combined with digital communications, SOP, and battle drills—may reduce negative impacts of such a decision.
5-46. Unless already in an assembly area, the attacking unit moves into one during the preparation phase. The unit moves with as much secrecy as pos- sible, normally at night and along routes t h a t prevent or degrade the enemy's capabilities to visually observe or otherwise detect the movement. It avoids congesting its assembly area and occupies it for the minimum possible time. While in the assembly area, each unit provides its own local ground security and air defense.
5-47. Units moving to assembly areas send out their quartering parties and link up with their guides at the designated locations. While subordinate units move to and occupy assembly areas, the commander completes the process of planning and coordinating the attack.
5-48. The attacking unit should continue its troop leading procedures and priorities of work to the extent the situation and mission allow prior to moving to attack positions. These preparations include b u t are not neces- sarily limited to—
• Protecting the force.
• Conducting task organization. • Performing reconnaissance. • Refining the plan.
• Briefing the troops.
• Moving logistics support forward.
• Promoting adequate rest for both leaders and soldiers. • Positioning the force for subsequent action.
As p a r t of troop leading procedures, leaders at all levels should conduct a per- sonal reconnaissance of the actual terrain. If a limited-visibility attack is planned, they should also reconnoiter the terrain at night.
5-49. A thorough reconnaissance of the objective, its foreground, and other enemy positions is a critical p a r t of attack preparations. The commander ex- ploits all available ISR assets to provide the necessary information. This in- cludes requesting JSTARS feeds of enemy movements from higher echelons or imagery of enemy obstacles. Reconnaissance forces infiltrate through the enemy security area to conduct an area reconnaissance. They can employ pre- cision munitions and conventional indirect fires to destroy detected enemy outposts while remaining undetected. They locate and attempt to infiltrate the enemy's main defensive positions to confirm his dispositions. When prop- erly task-organized, forces conducting reconnaissance may also be given a mission to conduct covert breaches in the enemy's obstacle complexes to facil- itate rapid movement of the decisive or shaping operation.
5-50. During this phase, the commander positions his artillery target-acquisi- tion r a d a r s to provide support throughout the AO. Divisions and corps estab- lish quick-fire channels between sensors, such as counterbattery r a d a r s and firing units, to rapidly silence enemy indirect fire systems. These channels do not change command relationships or priority of fires.
5-51. The commander exercises and refines his maneuver and fire plans during rehearsals which are an important p a r t of ensuring the plan's coordi- nation and synchronization. As part of the rehearsal process, the commander and his subordinates review the anticipated battle sequence to ensure all units u n d e r s t a n d the plan, the relationship between fire and movement, and the synchronization of critical events. These critical events include:
• Moving from the assembly area to the line of departure.
• Maneuvering from the line of departure to the probable line of deployment.
• Occupying support-by-fire positions. • Conducting the breach.
• Assaulting the objective. • Consolidating on the objective.
• Exploiting success or pursuing a withdrawing enemy. • Actions of echelon reserves.
The unit should conduct rehearsals under as many types of adverse conditions as possible with time and other restraints to identify and prepare the unit to cope with problems. At lower tactical echelons, the rehearsal includes battle drills, such as creating lanes through minefields.
5-52. From their assembly areas, attacking units move to their respective LDs. (See Figure 5-2.) Units move from assembly areas to the LD in the same way as for any other tactical movement. (Chapter 13 details troop move- ments.) The number of columns a unit employs in its movement depends on the availability of suitable routes and the friendly and enemy situation.
Primarily the tactical situation and the order in which the commander wants his sub- ordinate units to arrive at their attack positions govern the march formation. Using an LD facilitates the simul- taneous initiation of the attack at the prescribed time by all attacking units.
5-53. Light infantry units should move by tactical vehi- cles to the maximum extent possible to avoid prematurely exhausting their soldiers. How-
ever, light infantry forces should not travel too far forward in tactical vehicles. The enemy can detect the noise and other battlefield signatures associated with using tactical vehicles at a greater distance t h a n he can detect dismounted infantry soldiers, and will probably respond to the presence of tactical vehicles with direct- and indirect-fire systems. The commander must weigh the need for security against the time required to conduct a foot march and its resulting effects on soldiers.
5-54. Units move rapidly through their attack positions and across the LD, which should be controlled by friendly forces. A unit uses its designated at- tack position only by exception, such as when it must refuel prior to crossing the LD to ensure sufficient fuel to reach the objective or the conditions re- quired to ensure the success of the planned maneuver are not yet established. A unit does not occupy its attack positions for more t h a n 10 to 15 minutes without initiating actions to protect itself and increase its survivability, such as deploying local security and camouflage nets and starting the construction of fighting and survivability positions. If necessary, a unit can use guides to assist in occupying the attack position. These guides may come from organic resources or from another unit.
5-55. For units attacking on foot using infiltration and stealth, a commander may designate a point of departure for the attacking units instead of an LD. Armor and mechanized infantry units normally use gaps or lanes through the friendly positions to allow them to deploy into combat formations before they cross the LD.
5-56. Preliminary operations for an attack may include using preparatory fires and the relief of units in contact by executing a relief in place or a forward passage of lines. The relief of units may be desirable to continue t h e momentum of the attack with fresh troops, change the direction of the attack, exploit a weakness in the enemy position with reserve forces, or initiate an offensive on a stabilized front. (Chapter 14 details a relief in place. Chap- ter 15 details a forward passage of lines.)
5-57. The commander uses available artillery, mortar, CAS, and offensive in- formation operations to conduct preparatory fires. Preparatory fires are de- veloped from the top down, with bottom-up refinement. The subordinate
commander most affected by the effects of these preparatory fires must strongly emphasize the bottom-up refinement process. Preparatory fires can accomplish the following functions:
• Destroy the enemy.
• Suppress, neutralize, or disrupt high-value or high-priority targets. • Gain fire superiority.
• Suppress the enemy in his defensive positions. • Facilitate the attacking force's maneuver. • Deceive the enemy.
5-58. If the attacking forces are in contact with the enemy's security zone, preparatory fires may initially destroy or disrupt only the enemy's reconnais- sance and security forces and positions. In either case, counterfires and coun- terbattery fires conducted as p a r t of preparatory fires serve to degrade the enemy's fire-support systems and assist in achieving fire superiority.
5-59. The commander ensures t h a t his maneuver forces have the CS and CSS assets necessary to conduct the operation and continue the momentum of the attack as p a r t of the preparation process. That support effort must an- ticipate future maneuvers to ensure the uninterrupted sustainment of the maneuver force.