DISCUSIÓN DE RESULTADOS

The political situation of organic farming in Europe varies at the macro level, and organic farming organizations face different challenges. The further development of organic farming policy is restricted in general by the limited interest of general farming policy actors and the lack of resources of organic farming organizations. However, our analysis showed that organic farming policy actors have differing potential to overcome this limitation.

Network analysis offers a structured approach for simultaneously analysing a variety of aspects which influence an actor’s options for engaging in a policy process. In particular, the network measures of size, density and betweenness centrality can support self-assessment and help an actor to gain a differentiated insight into the framework conditions for its political work. On this basis, a policy actor can draw up a strategy and seek suitable partners in a policy process. Three aspects are identified which are relevant in this context:

i) the centrality of the potential partner, i.e. its reputation and position in the network

ii) the potential partner’s interest in the policy issue under debate iii) the extent to which this actor has formulated a clear position

towards the issue

Firstly, an actor will be all the more interested in a potential coalition partner, the more powerful the partner is in the policy network in question. This power is determined, on the one hand, by its role as an information broker (betweenness centrality). If an actor lies in or close to the centre of a network, it can easily reach a high number of other actors. Thus, lobbying such a central actor has a widespread effect beyond the primary target. On the other side, the impact an actor has on a policy is also affected by its reputation. The more other actors believe that an actor is of particular importance in a policy field, the more this actor can make its point heard and thus has the power to influence the policy outcome. From this point of view, for a lobbying actor it is reasonable to seek to influence the most powerful actor(s) in a network in order to achieve the largest possible effect with limited resources.

Apart from the structure of relations between actors (i.e. the network), the quality of these interrelations is of particular interest. Michelsen et al. (2001) stipulated “creative conflict” as a necessary basis of

institutional interrelationships in order to further the development of organic farming. Such a creative conflict is defined as an

interrelationship between organic and general agriculture institutions built on mutual respect. Contact between them is continuous, with co- operation on some issues and competition on others. Both organic and general agriculture institutions have a joint perception of a number of common interests. This type of interrelationship between the two policy fields presupposes the existence of (a) distinct organic farming

organization(s). Only when these conditions are given, Michelsen et al. (2001) argue, can organic farming persist with the agenda of the societal domains of agriculture while the integrity of organic farming is

maintained. From this point of view, creative conflict with general farming institutions is a strategy that organic farming organizations should follow if they are interested in promoting organic farming. Finally, a fruitful debate is only possible if positions are clear. If they are not, a creative exchange of opinions will not be possible.

Transferred to our focus of analysis – the opportunities of organic farming organizations – this means that, at the EU level, it could be interesting for an organization such as IFOAM EU to get and stay in close contact with the interest group that is the most central policy actor in agricultural policy: COPA. By contrast, in a number of EU member states, state institutions play a central role and thus form an interesting lobbying target. Other network actors, e.g. environmental organizations, do not play a central role in the organic farming policy network, neither at the EU level nor at the national levels. Hence, from the point of view of political power, they are not first-choice coalition partners for an organic farming organization aiming at influencing organic farming policy. With regard to the call for a creative conflict, actors are needed who have an interest in the policy issue at stake. Referring to our EU level example, COPA is an interesting coalition partner from this perspective. Although this is not its main field of interest, COPA has a high level of knowledge on organic farming legislation and can be considered as interested in the topic, at least to some extent. The interest of state institutions and general farming organizations is relatively low in a number of new EU member states that were analysed, excluding CZ. Often, a national organic farming regulation has only been implemented in order to meet the requirements of EU accession. In consequence, state actors appear a difficult lobbying target in these countries. As regards environmental organizations, their interest in organic farming policy depends on the topicality of the issue. To them, it is a sub-issue of agriculture which itself is only one of many issues they are concerned with. Hence, continuous lobbying with these organizations will be difficult.

Lastly, we argued that a fruitful debate is only possible if positions are clear. In our example at the EU level, it is at this point that a challenge arises for the organic farming organization. COPA was unable to define a clear position towards organic farming and this makes it difficult to enter in a fruitful political discussion. A similar situation is reported for the new EU member state institutions where a lack of interest in organic farming is combined with unclear positions on this policy issue. Conversely, environmental organizations stated clear opinions on organic farming policy issues at both the EU and the national level. This

makes it possible for an organic farming organization to enter into a debate with them about the further development of organic farming. We can conclude that, although our analysis has a different focus, there are some parallels to the Michelsen et al. (2001) ‘path of successful organic farming growth’. Our perspective is the effect political structures have for the potential of actors to influence organic farming policy while Michelsen et al. (2001) focuses on the growth and dissemination of organic farming in Europe. However, from both viewpoints it is argued that it is necessary to formulate clear positions on the issue and seek political recognition of the organic sector. Only on this basis can a creative conflict between policy actors develop, which is necessary in order to build up effective networks and promote organic farming in the long run.